

JPRS-UPA-90-050
27 AUGUST 1990



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JPRS Report

Political Affairs

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-050

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27 August 1990

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OGONEK Interviews Leningrad's Sobchak

90UN2538A Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 28, Jul 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, Leningrad University professor, USSR people's deputy, and chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, by Dmitriy Gubin, OGONEK correspondent: "Without a Dictatorship"]

[Text] When the chairman's seat in the Leningrad Soviet was still vacant, LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA asked readers to name possible candidates. Out of 40 people who called in over the course of 1 hour, 22 said: "Sobchak." OGONEK's own correspondent, Dmitriy Gubin, met with Anatoliy Sobchak, Leningrad University professor, USSR people's deputy, and chairman of the Leningrad Soviet.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, you have headed a city soviet in which the majority of the seats belong to supporters of radical economic and political reforms. The situation is the same in Moscow and Sverdlovsk, but, in general, there are fewer seats. Aren't you worried that the attempt, ascribed to you by some critics, to build capitalism in "some individual" cities will end in failure?

[Sobchak] No, I'm not worried, because we do not plan to build capitalism. Rather we are planning to reorganize management of the city based on common sense. I know how dangerous it is to talk about concrete deeds, but I nevertheless will cite several examples.

Now, in order to change housing or get in line for an apartment, every citizen gathers endless applications, descriptions of the living space, information about the size of his family, and takes his request to an official, say, to the rayon soviet ispolkom. The official confiscates these documents and files them in order to give a report: the person came, but was rejected. But the requester, naturally, is not satisfied; he goes farther, to the city soviet ispolkom, and he has to assemble this stack of papers all over again. Why does all of this happen? Who needs it? You see, the paper work can be simplified! Another example. In the Leningrad Soviet, we recently began examining the decisions made by our ispolkom since January of this year, and we clutched at our heads. With the terrible housing situation we have in the city, tens of thousands of square meters of floor space were converted to non-housing needs just in the first months of this year: to organizations, joint ventures, offices, and so forth. They were given away with astonishing ease, although the law prohibits this! A third example. How many apartments in the housing fund are occupied by all sorts of housing-management committees, bases for maintenance of public order, party bureaus, and so forth? We would free up hundreds and maybe thousands of apartments if we were to evict all these organizations into the non-housing fund.

[Correspondent] Are you confident that you can change something by "instituting order"—if only in the housing problem?

[Sobchak] No, I simply cited measures that do not require either capital investments or additional manpower. Of course, I understand that this is just crumbs for a city of 5 million. We cannot get out of the crisis with our "individual efforts," even if we take advantage of recently passed laws on local economy and local self-management and on taxation of the population, according to which we will have more rights and more money. Leningrad is becoming dilapidated before our eyes, and I am astonished by the statements of our former leadership who say that the city is giving up "completely." The ecological catastrophe in Leningrad is not an exaggeration. The conclusion of the recent commission of the Committee on Ecology of the USSR Supreme Soviet is clear: the construction of a levee is both ecologically and economically unsound. Incidentally, hydrologists warned about this long ago, and I remember articles which stated that the projected cost of 2 billion rubles for the levee would turn into 10 billion needed to return the situation to its previous condition. What about the condition of the houses, streets, and our monuments of architecture? Entire apartment buildings require repair, and repairs are not even being made to those buildings from which residents were moved decades ago... Even if the Supreme Soviet were to pass a law on taxation of enterprises and the Leningrad Soviet were left with a sizable portion of their profits, this situation would not change. We need more revolutionary measures. Above all, Leningrad must be given the status of a free economic zone so enterprises can quit being subordinate to the ministries and departments, operate as independent, economically and legally independent producers, cooperate and create joint ventures, so that favorable conditions can be created in our country for investment of foreign capital... We must do two tasks as quickly as possible: first of all, we must turn Leningrad from a center of the military-industrial complex, which it is today, into a center of culture, science, and production of consumer goods. To do this, we will have to decide the fate of unfinished projects: sell them to those who will offer the city the most favorable terms. We must decide the fate of those enterprises that are economically unprofitable and that pose an ecological threat. We should not permit such things as a nuclear reactor being installed on a nuclear icebreaker in the center of the city, on Vasilyevskiy Island, about which the newspapers are still writing with pride! What if there is an accident? We cannot keep the life of the city in constant tension...

[Correspondent] You also mentioned a second task.

[Sobchak] Yes, we need to learn to earn money ourselves through tourism. Given the incredible attractiveness of Leningrad for international tourism, we do not have sufficient hotels or a tourist service infrastructure in general. And Inturist, this monopolist-octopus, sucks out practically all the currency earned on the city, leaving us nothing but problems such as prostitution and crime. Therefore, we need to create our own structures of international tourism and with the aid of foreign capital build new hotels and re-equip old buildings as hotels.

The experience of other countries shows that the city economy can get rich and recover in only a few years namely through tourism. I visited the capitals of several countries with parliamentary delegations and saw how these problems are being resolved. For example, the souvenir business. At the Metropolitan Museum, after visiting the excellent display, you can buy a reproduction of any picture, a copy of any statue or dish—a copy of absolutely everything that is in the museum! All this is sold at very high prices because it has the museum's imprint, but I believe that this is the correct arrangement. And our Hermitage and Russian Museum could produce an enormous profit if things were organized sensibly.

[Correspondent] In talking about the problems facing the city, you did not mention the political problem: power is divided in Leningrad—a clearly abnormal situation. You are a member of the Communist Party, so it is appropriate to ask: How, in your opinion, should the CPSU Obkom conduct itself with respect to the new Leningrad Soviet?

[Sobchak] I cannot decide that for the obkom, but I think that the most reasonable way is to cooperate with the Soviet power and voluntarily eliminate the consequences of the party monopoly in the city. If the party bodies want to preserve their influence in deciding city issues, they should provide maximum assistance to the city authorities. If they take the path of opposition or sabotage, we then will be forced within the framework of the law to take all measures specified by the law.

[Correspondent] What do you mean by consequences of the monopoly of one party?

[Sobchak] Until recently, the oblast committee gave direct instruction on what to do and how to do it to the officials of state organizations and how to conduct economic activities, that is, they continued to decide issues which they always decided, but which by law were never under the jurisdiction of the party bodies. There will be no more of this. And I think that in the activities of the new Leningrad Soviet and its ispolkom we should advance the idea that any official who dares to carry out a direct instruction of a party body of any party will be relieved of his duties. If the party committee believes, say, that housing should be allocated to some party member, it can apply to the Leningrad Ispolkom like a normal political organization: taking into account this and that and on the basis of such and such law, we request that housing conditions be improved for the party member... And the state bodies and the city authorities will decide whether or not to satisfy this request and whether or not it conforms to the law. I understand how purely psychologically difficult it will be to make this process take place because just yesterday the plant department of the obkom, say, believed that it had the final say in deciding who would be the plant director, and today it can resolve only intraparty problems.

[Correspondent] How does the Leningrad Soviet react to the sympathetic warning by Boris Gidaspov that the new Russian Communist Party may be a more serious enemy than the OFT [United Workers Front] for the Leningrad Soviet?

[Sobchak] I already said once that if this party's platform contains a thesis on the dictatorship of the proletariat, I personally will recommend to the Leningrad Soviet to prohibit the activities of this Communist Party on the territory of Leningrad, since the demand for a dictatorship is a demand for the violent overthrow of the existing system, no matter what name this dictatorship uses to cover up its actions. And I think that Boris Veniaminovich's [Gidaspov] warning should be directed to the oblast party organization, which is helping to consolidate all the reactionary, conservative forces of the CPSU. After all, it is no secret that the initiators of creating the Russian Communist Party were the party committee secretaries of the largest enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Incidentally, Comrade Gidaspov himself is also an offspring of this complex...

[Correspondent] Don't you think that in today's tense situation the ispolkom will side not with the Leningrad Soviet but will resort to the Omsk variant, that is, to sabotage by means of total resignation?

[Sobchak] As far as the present ispolkom is concerned, it already is practically inoperative, as the curtain is falling trying hastily to transfer state buildings to party, Komsomol, and other organizations. We have already adopted a decision to halt this practice and will look into the legality of decisions of this sort. Regarding the Omsk variant... I do not think we will have that here, because deputies will rise up to form the ispolkom, and I hope that the democratic composition of the ispolkom will be ensured. But I want to make special emphasis here that in forming the personnel composition of all bodies of city administration, we should base this on combining the experience of the old workers with the initiative, decisiveness, and honesty of democrats (I will call them this) coming in to manage city affairs. This combination, in my view, will help to smooth over the conservatism of the former and the lack of experience of the latter. With their initiative and adherence to principle, the democrats can be of great benefit in areas oriented directly at people: in trade, everyday services, health, culture, housing... And the ability, experience, and knowledge of managers come to the fore in management of industry, transportation, and construction...

[Correspondent] One can hope that the economic reforms will soon be transformed from slogans of the opposition into decisions of the city authorities. But the strictness of the Russian decisions, as we know, are more than compensated for by the non-obligatory nature of their execution, coming, so to speak, "from the bottom." Will the residents of Leningrad support your plans for creating a free economic zone? Won't they boycott, using banning the "sale of national riches" as a cover?

[Sobchak] During the election campaign, both our nationalist organizations and the conservative forces in the CPSU aggressively exploited this thesis—here you are selling Russia, and so forth... But I believe in the people's common sense and believe they will understand: we do not plan to sell anything; on the contrary, we plan to use foreign capital here, in our country, to develop and build that which will bring us tremendous assistance—those same firms and enterprises for producing construction materials, due to the lack of which it is impossible to build one's house, even if you have a head, hands, and money... Of course, if we only build currency restaurants and bars, this will cause our citizens heartburn. But I think that in developing a tourist infrastructure we should bear in mind that there will be a circulation of both currency and rubles. In addition, the status of a free economic zone will enable every person to make transactions with currency and receive wages in currency. For the time being, as far as I know, this is a criminally punishable act.

[Correspondent] Will you appeal to the citizens with the traditional appeal for a free economy: "Get rich!"?

[Sobchak] I can firmly promise that I will do all I can to encourage the creation of private, cooperative, joint, and mixed enterprises, but do so taking into account the interests of the city. I will give you an example. Today, when a facility is leased to some enterprise or cooperative, it is not at all taken into account whether this enterprise will be profitable or not or whether the city needs it or not. The lease rates are all the same, and when several people come and ask for the facilities, I will say frankly, they begin making room for machinations and bribery. I think we should lease facilities on a competitive basis and depending on what kind of services or what kind of product this enterprise will produce and at what prices it plans to sell them, and then establish the lease payment. I think that in those cases when an enterprise will produce goods which the city extremely needs and if it pledges to sell them at prices no higher than state prices, we can exempt it from lease payment altogether. All this is within our power. And if someone gets rich by making the city rich in doing so—we can only welcome this.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, as a lawyer, you are an expert in the field of housing law...

[Sobchak] I even gave a course on housing law at the university...

[Correspondent] That is why I would like to hear more details from you on the planned housing policy. This is a painful question both for Leningrad and for the entire country.

[Sobchak] Now the thought that apartments can and must be bought and sold is being perceived fairly calmly, but I remember back in 1964 when they first passed the decree on broad cooperative construction, you won't believe it, there was a period in Leningrad when already built cooperative buildings were left unoccupied. How

can this be, pay for housing? No one was paying, and suddenly you have to lay out 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 rubles? They were not used to this... I have long professed the idea that a person should own his own housing. First of all, this conforms to the principle of social justice. After all, now such an injustice exists as a distinction between the city and rural areas, in which more than 80 percent of the population live in their own homes built at their own expense, unlike the free housing of city dwellers... Incidentally, this was not the last reason for the flight of rural residents to the city. Another side of the issue is urban state and urban cooperative housing. Why does one person have to buy his apartment, and another person does not? But there is still another aspect, which is the most important: one person's respect for another begins with respect for his property. It is not for nothing that the Bible says "thou shall not steal"—it is one of the principles of moral order of society. We lost this, and the most terrible change, from a lawyer's point of view, took place in the consciousness of the masses from daily contact with state, anonymous, no man's property: stealing ceased being morally condemned. And the people's consciousness made note of this in the language, calling thieves "pilferers."

[Correspondent] The right of ownership is tied to the possibility of disposing of it: you also cannot steal it...

[Sobchak] Recently I was with a parliamentary delegation in Finland, and I spoke with a professor at the University of Turku. He said that he was planning to move and had changed jobs to the University of Helsinki. I said: "How are you resolving the housing problem? Our first problem is that we cannot invite talented, well-known scholars to work at our university namely because they have no residence permit or housing." He said: "Well, that is very simple. I sold my apartment in Turku and also arranged to buy an apartment in Helsinki. True, I will have to pay more for it, considering that this is the capital." That is how they solve the problem throughout the world: depending on how well-to-do a person is and how much money he has at that moment, he either buys or rents an apartment. Instead of this, we have a residence permit, which we use to try to restrain migration processes. And, naturally, we have a housing crisis.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, if I am not mistaken, you once were affected by the problem of a residence permit.

[Sobchak] I always took pleasure in my studies and during the entire time of instruction at Leningrad University did not have a single grade of "four." But despite my red diploma, I could not remain as a post-graduate student because I did not have a Leningrad residence permit. I left for Stavropolskiy Kray, which I do not regret in the least—this was a good school of living—and only later moved to Leningrad, exchanging my two-room apartment in Stavropol for a room in a communal apartment... There are other ways of solving housing

problems, simply morally unacceptable. Several years ago on our faculty, for example, they expelled a person from the party who got married and divorced five times to improve his housing conditions. He was expelled for moral degeneration. But I am afraid that this was exactly a person of rare moral fortitude, because he divorced and married his own wife all five times! This was a trick, but there should be a normal, economic solution to the situation.

[Correspondent] I can imagine how, say, the members of the OBT react to this idea: "Aha, tomorrow all these cooperators and all these underground millionaires will crawl out from the cracks and have luxurious apartments, and we will have nothing!"

[Sobchak] First of all, those who in fact have millions got their housing long ago without any special difficulty. We only make it appear that we do not have buying and selling, but go to the exchange market and any stockbroker will quote you the exact price of 1 square meter of floor space. The most usual trade in housing takes place under the guise of exchange; true, it is very difficult to prove in court. Secondly, initially it is proposed to sell apartments to those who occupy them and also to those on the waiting list. And the assessment will be made according to the residual inventory value, with mandatory consideration given to the area and type of house—this will turn out not to be very expensive. And only when both those on the waiting list and the apartment tenants are satisfied will vacant apartments appear in the city and can the question of their free sale to anyone who wishes be resolved. Then the following principle will clearly be in effect: if you want better housing, then work better and earn more.

[Correspondent] But you see, today many state workers hardly have enough for food and clothing. That means that they will only be able to lease apartments. And if apartment rent increases, this will hit their pocketbook much harder. And what about the handicapped, pensioners, and large families?

[Sobchak] The point of the planned reforms is not to increase housing rent, but to make it differentiated. You see, today if one person lives in a three-room apartment, he does not notice this very much; the amount of the rent is purely relative. I am not talking about the fact that millions of people in the country have been paying nothing at all for their apartment for years—no problem, they got away with this. So, rent should be levied taking into account, first of all, the size of the apartment; secondly, the location; and thirdly, the type of house: block or brick. Is it on Nevskiy or Shuvalovo lakes? Does it have a 6-meter kitchen or 12? As far as low-income people are concerned, there is no problem here. Low-cost, municipal housing exists in all countries of the world. And those who lived through the blockade, war veterans, and the elderly can be granted municipal housing either free of charge or on favorable terms.

[Correspondent] Who will determine the rent or the cost of housing?

[Sobchak] The owner: the person from whom you rent the housing. According to the law now, all available housing is the property of the local soviets.

[Correspondent] One last question for you as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. Do you think that very soon, having left the solution of Leningrad's problems, you will have to deal with the problems of St. Petersburg?

[Sobchak] I know that today there are many who support renaming the city. But I do not like hasty decisions. The city lived through the most difficult period, the blockade, with the present name, and this name has become close to the residents regardless of any politics. I think there are other ways we can restore the famous name of Peter, the founder of the city. The Leningrad University, say, today is not named after anyone... The only renaming that I will insist upon and that I will propose to the Leningrad Soviet is the renaming of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Square in front of Smolnyy to the Academician Sakharov Square. That is because for me this renaming is linked to a certain demonstration of what we plan to do in the city. We plan to implement the ideas of our great fellow countryman and humanist, those ideas of a multiparty system, class cooperation, priority of values common to all mankind, which assumes the rejection of any dictatorships, no matter what they are called.

[Correspondent] OGONEK wishes you success.

P.S. So far, the proposal to rename the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Square has not gathered the necessary number of votes in the Leningrad Soviet...

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Baltic Pro-Moscow CP's Hold Conference

90UN2370A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Report by press center of Latvian CP Central Committee on regional applied-science conference in Riga on 14 June on "Relevant Aspects of Party Renewal and Democratization" and text of Appeal to Communists and All Workers in the Soviet Baltic Republics]

[Text] This was the topic of a regional applied-science conference in Riga on 14 June in the Latvian CP Central Committee.

It was attended by delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the communist parties of Latvia, Lithuania (CPSU), and Estonia and from the Belorussian SSR and Kaliningrad Oblast, social scientists, secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms, and party activists from these regions—over 300 people in all.

When First Secretary A.P. Rubiks of the Latvian CP Central Committee called the conference to order, he

said: "I feel that the purpose of our applied-science conference is, first of all, to prepare for the 28th CPSU Congress, which I am certain will occupy a special place in our party's history, by summarizing some of the results of the work we have been doing in preparation for this important event. Second, we must draw some conclusions on the theoretical and practical levels on the major issues of party construction and CPSU history that have become the subject of heated arguments and debates. Third, I personally feel that today's applied-science conference should be an occasion for the exchange of experience in party work, including work in the Soviet Baltic republics, where the communist parties are waging a relentless political struggle in defense of Marxism-Leninism in a unique and distinctive atmosphere and are striving to reinforce their ranks on the basis of the Leninist ideological-organizational principles of the Communist Party. In view of the fact that delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress are attending this conference, we should discuss their position at the forum of the country's Communists and their role in this crucial time for the party and country. Lastly, I believe that our conference will be of partywide significance, and I would even dare to say international significance, as another indication of our firm defense of Communist Party positions."

Speeches were presented at the conference by First Secretary A.P. Rubiks of the Latvian CP Central Committee, Secretary V.A. Lazutka of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee (CPSU), Secretary A.A. Gusev of the Estonian CP Central Committee, instructor in the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor Yu.K. Krasnov, and Docent in the Department of Party Construction of the Leningrad Higher Party School I.I. Petrovskiy. The discussion of these speeches included an enthusiastic conversation about current issues in the development of the Communist Party in line with the policy documents which will be submitted for consideration at the 28th CPSU Congress.

Conference participants passed a resolution approving the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress and stressing the need to include several statements from the "Democratic" and "Marxist" platforms in this draft.

A Statement on the Danger of Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Baltic Republics was approved.

Participants also approved an Appeal to the Communists and All Workers in the Soviet Baltic Republics.

Appeal to the Communists and All Workers in the Soviet Baltic Republics

Dear Comrades!

At this difficult and crucial time for the people of the Soviet Baltic zone, when the very existence of the Soviet socialist order in our region is at stake, we participants in the regional applied-science conference on "Relevant

Aspects of Party Renewal and Democratization" are addressing an appeal to the Communists and all workers of our republics to be fully aware of all the complexity of the current situation and to work together in the defense and protection of socialist gains.

Separatist and nationalist forces have been taking advantage of the slogans of autonomy, independence, and sovereignty that became popular during the period of the perestroika, launched by the CPSU, to win part of the native population over to their side. This was made easier for them by the wide-ranging economic and political experiments that were conducted in the Soviet Baltic republics with the support of union organs and, in some cases, at their suggestion. Opposition leaders have been giving the purpose and final goals of perestroika their own interpretation in line with their own political plans and personal ambitions. After assuming the exclusive right to express the wishes of the people of these republics, they are openly promoting the restoration of bourgeois practices. This was reflected, in particular, in the acts passed by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on 11 March, Estonian Supreme Soviet on 30 March, and Latvian Supreme Soviet on 4 May 1990, which we regard as illegal and contrary to the constitutions of the USSR and the Soviet Baltic republics.

The conciliatory attitude and inaction of former leaders of republic party organizations and their betrayal of party interests played a pernicious role in this atmosphere. The result was the disintegration of the unity of party ranks in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. We are declaring that the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), Estonian Communist Party (CPSU), and Latvian Communist Party are strong enough to wage a resolute struggle for socialism in the Soviet Baltic republics. Now that our communist parties have announced the policy line of democratization and renewal, they are striving to consolidate their ranks and stabilize the sociopolitical situation.

After discussing relevant aspects of party renewal and democratization, conference participants called upon the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress to set guidelines for the reinforcement of party ranks and plan a program of action by Communists to renew the party on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism and Leninist organizational principles. We feel that the consolidation of party forces in the Baltic zone should be based on the following tenets at this time:

The commitment to the socialist choice assumed by the laboring public of the country under the leadership of the Communist Party in October 1917;

The legality of the reinstatement of the Soviet regime in the Baltic republics in 1940 and the inclusion of our republics in the USSR as a result of the voluntary expression of the will of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian people;

The need to preserve and reinforce the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in line with the principles of a new union agreement;

The acknowledgement that major socioeconomic and political changes serving the interests of the laboring masses took place in the Soviet Baltic republics during the years of Soviet rule.

We are certain that the communist parties of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, as part of the renewed CPSU and with wide-ranging autonomy in the management of all organizational, personnel, financial, and other affairs, are the only political force capable of protecting and defending the interests of the laboring public.

The main function of the communist parties is the protection of the political, economic, and social interests of the laboring public through the resolute defense of workers in all government agencies and in line with an organic combination of national and international principles.

The communist parties of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are willing to cooperate with all organizations and movements with socialist aims and will wage a relentless political struggle against those acting against the socialist order and the interests of the laboring public.

The communist parties renounce the monopoly on power but nevertheless will strive to become the ruling parties by employing democratic methods, including parliamentary ones, to win elections to soviets on all levels.

The communist parties of the Soviet Baltic republics will act in the interests of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia and will strengthen ties with communist youth organizations.

The conference resolutely condemns the anti-army actions of extremist elements of certain social organizations and movements. The communist parties will maintain and strengthen their traditional businesslike contacts with Communists and the personnel of the Baltic Military District, the Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Border District, and the troops of the internal forces of the USSR.

The active defense of the abovementioned fundamental tenets should be the objective of all party organs and primary party organizations and of each Communist.

Comrade Communists! We will reinforce our ranks for the protection and defense of socialist gains in the republics of the Soviet Baltic zone!

Ruutel Describes Baltic Talks with Moscow

90UN2344C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 15 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Nelli Kuznetsova: "It Will Take Political Will"]

[Text] Our parliamentary correspondent Nelli Kuznetsova reports from Toompea Palace:

It has already become trite to say that time is passing by more quickly than ever before. It might be in parliament, however, that you sometimes get a strong physical sense

of how quickly time is passing and events are changing, merging, and then being displaced by other events. Sometimes an event speeds by so quickly it makes your head spin. Furthermore, it does not seem likely that political events will slow down in the near future. I thought about this when I listened to Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Ruutel's speech in parliament on the last day of the 10th session, which turned into the main event of the session, eclipsing all of the other events of these 3 days.

He informed the deputies of the meeting of the Baltic Council last week and stressed that the broader contacts between the three Baltic republics had already been quite productive. According to A. Ruutel, these contacts should be continued on an even broader scale in politics and economics. The prime ministers of the three republics also met for a conference last week and concluded an agreement on more intense cooperation. The Baltic Council, according to A. Ruutel, will coordinate all of these inter-republic relations.

Readers already know from reports in the press that the leaders of the three Baltic republics had a meeting with the president of the USSR. First the members of the Baltic Council sent M. Gorbachev a telegram suggesting the start of negotiations or at least a meeting. The telegram, which was worded in the proper diplomatic style, as A. Ruutel said, produced results. The Presidential Council phoned to say that M. Gorbachev had agreed to a meeting. The leaders of the three Baltic republics were invited to attend a meeting of the Federation Council, where the sole and principal topic was the renewal of the Soviet Federation. A. Ruutel said that there has never been such a free and open conversation and such a frank exchange of opinions at an official conference, especially on the summit level.

As A. Ruutel said, the ideas M. Gorbachev expressed during the conversation can be summarized as the following: We are already somewhat late in solving problems in the renewal of the federation, and events are now taking their own course, in a spontaneous process. To make up for lost time, we must find the best solutions quickly, not in the next few months, but literally in the next few weeks or even days. The federation should develop along the lines of a union of sovereign states. Incidentally, when these matters were being discussed later, the representative from the Ukraine said that his republic was also ready to adopt a declaration of sovereignty. Something similar is also being drafted in Belorussia.

Member of the Presidential Council A.N. Yakovlev stressed that the economic reforms in the USSR and the transition to a market economy will help to eliminate

departmental tyranny and the earlier procedure of issuing orders from the center. A common market or collective market will be the basis of mutual republic interests. According to R. Kishanov, who also took part in the discussion, all of the republics should conclude agreements with each other, and the combination of all these agreements will be the union pact.

A. Ruutel made special mention of how impressed he was by the entire conversation and by its tone and implications. This union, in his opinion, is already a **reality**. Its establishment will require great effort, however, because we are still following many of our old patterns of behavior, although there have been colossal positive changes, A. Ruutel stressed, in the country's top level of leadership. These changes, the new understanding, and the new attitude toward these problems will create opportunities for the constructive resolution of issues which were even difficult to discuss just a relatively short time ago.

A. Ruutel informed the deputies that he had demanded the national leadership's recognition of the transition period announced in Estonia. M. Gorbachev, in his words, responded to this in the affirmative. He also issued a second demand: If a consensus should be reached at some stage of the negotiations, the agreement will be implemented without delay. Only this, in A. Ruutel's opinion, can strengthen the trust in cooperation.

Now, A. Ruutel said, the Supreme Soviet must think the situation over carefully, review some of its earlier decisions, and suspend some for the sake of successful diplomatic relations. The Supreme Soviet chairman suggested the following method of work to the deputies: The Supreme Soviet Presidium will draw up alternative decisions which will then be discussed by the different political factions. A. Ruutel underscored the highly crucial nature of this work and advised the deputies to be political realists and to make a sound assessment of the situation. We must be careful not to injure the country's prestige or the president's dignity, A. Ruutel said. We will take a step forward, he will take reciprocal steps, and the development of interrelations can grow into a constructive process.

It must be said that the Supreme Soviet chairman's speech, which was extremely impartial, serious, and thorough, apparently motivated many deputies to also take a serious approach to the upcoming preparations for the talks. Judging by some questions, however, some insisted on first finding out exactly **what**, exactly **which** factors, had brought about these changes in the upper echelon's attitude toward the Baltic republics and encouraged M. Gorbachev to agree to the talks. One deputy frankly said that the "length of our compromise steps" will depend on this. Of course, this was a dubious approach: Is it right to begin bargaining in this way from the very start?

It is true that this is a crucial time. After all, politics, as one observer said, has its own **theory**—or, more precisely, **practice**—of relativity. Sometimes speed is necessary, and at other times it is better to stop, look around, and make an effort to think things over....

We can only hope that the parliament will do its thinking **well**—that it will approach the matter impartially and make a sound assessment of political and economic realities. It is important to all of us voters just **how** the parliament thinks....

What other events were noteworthy at the 10th session? Probably some aspects of the second reading of the bill on the rules of procedure in the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet.

It might seem that this would be of little interest to voters: After all, this is a matter of internal procedures in the Supreme Soviet, and what is important to the voters is the result. In this case, however, this is something that influences the result, the decisions that are made. It is no wonder that Deputy A. Payu, who is inclined to think in metaphorical terms in general, compared the bill to a multilayered torte or an iceberg whose underwater dimensions would be difficult to even estimate.

As a matter of interest, what might be the result if, for instance, a change in the rules would require only a simple majority of the vote or even one vote over 50 percent of the total, instead of a qualified majority as before, for the approval of important decisions? Deputy P. Yermoshkin illustrated this with a situation which might seem absurd but clearly indicates the possible result. Let us assume, he said, that 100 deputies abstain from the vote on a bill (we will assume that they did not understand some of the provisions), 3 people vote for it, and 2 vote against it. The bill would be passed, but would this kind of law be valid? Something else is even more important, however: This approach would give the minority no chance at all to influence the final decision. It would not even be able to defer the discussion of a bill which it finds objectionable and which its constituents are protesting. Is this democratic?

It is no wonder that G. Israelyan said that this would turn the Supreme Soviet into a mere voting machine, a decision-making conveyor belt. Here is another important point. One of the articles stipulates that the floor will not be turned over to any one deputy more than twice during the discussion of any matter, even if he simply wants to ask a question. This means that if a deputy does not understand something and he asks the speaker two questions, he will not have the right to express his opinion of the topic of discussion later. Is this kind of "discipline by the rod" necessary? Will it promote the careful and thorough discussion of bills?

There are many of these dubious, to put it frankly, provisions in the bill. It is not surprising that one of the deputies made a direct reference to "elements of dictatorship" in his description of the bill. Besides this, there are also proposals such as P. Kask's idea about granting

the administration chairman the right to announce new elections to the Supreme Soviet. But are the administration and its chairman not accountable to the Supreme Soviet? And what about the rights of the voters who voted for this Supreme Soviet? Would this be in full accordance with democracy and with the principles of the construction of a legal and democratic state? How could anyone resist reminding these people again that if one form of totalitarianism is replaced by another and one form of intolerance succeeds another, a rule-of-law state would be out of the question? And how could this not bring back our childhood memories of the famous fictional hero who cried out mournfully: "Who will stand up for the poor peasant!"

Deputy Ya. Yeryuyut said that this draft does not represent the product of the collective efforts of the working group. It submitted a completely different draft. He asked who was behind the changes. It would probably be difficult to answer the question in specific terms, but it is probable that there is a political struggle behind them. This is normal. There should always be political struggle in parliament—in parliament rather than in the street.... But must it lead to the loss of democracy and the impossibility of reasonable compromise?

Our political system is now in the process of development, and this means that the Supreme Soviet's role in the state and the nature of its work will have to be clarified, but it is important, vitally important, to all of us that the journey not begin with a detour....

The bill on rules has been set aside for the time being.

Baltic Ministers on Independence Talks

90UN2321A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 30 Jun 90 p 3

[Statement on Talks Between USSR and Baltic States by Lennart Meri, minister of foreign affairs of the Estonian Republic, Janis Jurkans, minister of foreign affairs of the Latvian Republic, and Algirdas Saudargas, minister of foreign affairs of the Lithuanian Republic, on 27 June 1990]

[Text] The discussion of problems connected with the restoration of the governmental autonomy of the Estonian Republic, the Latvian Republic, and the Lithuanian Republic presupposes one-on-three talks by the four states—i.e., talks between the president, Supreme Soviet, and government of the USSR on one side and the heads of state, supreme soviets, and governments of the above-mentioned states on the other.

In connection with this, the foreign ministers of the Baltic states wish to announce the need for a written record, in the form of a protocol before the talks by the four states begin, of the group of issues requiring discussion in connection with the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states and the scheduled deadlines, which will be obligatory for all sides in the talks. Furthermore, the topics and dates must be recorded before

any decisions are made with a possible direct or indirect impact on the talks by the four states, including possible decisions on the suspension of legal statutes previously passed by the parliaments of the Baltic states.

Estonian Congress Declaration of Mandate, Legitimacy

90UN2426A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
13 Mar 90 p 3

[Estonian Committee release: "Declaration Regarding the Mandate and Legitimacy of the Estonian Congress"]

[Text] 1. The Estonian Congress declares that it is the first assembly of citizens to convene after the occupation and annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1940.

2. According to Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the highest state power is held by the people, i.e. by the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia.

Under the present circumstances, the highest power of the state cannot be fully exercised in the Republic of Estonia. Until constitutional state power is restored, only the Estonian Congress has the mandate to represent the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia and to express its will.

3. The continuing refusal to recognize the annexation of the Republic of Estonia, and the continuing recognition given to the Estonian delegations abroad by most of the democratic nations of the world, also signifies continued recognition of the sovereignty of the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia as the holder of the highest state power.

Based on that, the Estonian Congress, and the individuals mandated by it, are lawfully empowered to represent the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia, and that also in the area of international relations.

4. The Estonian Congress, as the representative body of citizens of the Republic of Estonia, is mandated and lawfully empowered to take steps toward restoring the lawful state power of the Republic of Estonia within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, according to the Peace Treaty of Tartu dated 2 February 1920, and the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.

5. The Estonian Congress performs the functions of a mandated representation of citizens of the Republic of Estonia and seeks recognition of this mandate by other states, including the state authorities of the Soviet Union.

Tallinn, March 11, 1990

**Estonian Congress Appeal to Congress of
Deputies**

90UN2426B Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
13 Mar 90 p 3

[“Appeal of Estonian Congress to the USSR Congress of
Deputies”]

[Text] The Estonian Congress, representing the citizenry
of the republic of Estonia, occupied by, and annexed to
the Soviet Union through aggression beginning in 1940
and lasting to this day, relying on the legal continuity of
the Republic of Estonia, and on the Peace Treaty of
Tartu concluded on February 2, 1920, has on March 11,
1990 adopted a declaration regarding legal restoration of
state power.

The Estonian Congress calls on the USSR Congress of
Deputies to complete the restoration of historical truth
and justice in their relations with the Republic of Estonia
in accordance with the resolution of the USSR Congress
of Deputies, passed on December 24, 1989, regarding
“the political and legal evaluation of the Soviet-German
non-aggression pact of 1939” and recognize the illegality
of the annexation of the Republic of Estonia.

While performing the functions of a fully mandated
representative body of the people of the Republic of
Estonia until the constitutional organs of state power can
be restored, the Estonian Congress demands that the
USSR Congress of Deputies terminate the annexation
and remove the USSR occupational forces from the
territory of the Republic of Estonia.

In making this request, the Estonian Congress relies on
world public opinion, and on the position of govern-
ments of most of the countries in the world, who have
not recognized the 1940 Soviet annexation of the inde-
pendent Republic of Estonia belonging to the League of
Nations. The restoration of independence to the
Republic of Estonia that was occupied and annexed
during the course of World War II is an international
matter linked to the liquidation of various sources of
tension in Europe.

Backing the legal continuity of the Estonian republic,
and the restoration of independence to the Republic of
Estonia, based on that continuity, will endanger neither
the legal rights of any other state, nor the civil rights of
citizens of any other state living within the territory of
the Republic of Estonia.

The Estonian Congress proposes to the USSR Congress
of Deputies that negotiations with representatives man-
dated by the Estonian Congress be started without delay
in the matter of terminating the annexation and
restoring the Republic of Estonia. In this connection, the
Estonian Congress deems it advisable to institute a
transition period in the presence of international armed
forces.

Tallinn, March 11, 1990

**Estonian Congress Memo to CSCE, USSR
Government**

90UN2426C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
13 Mar 90 p 3

[“Memorandum from the Estonian Congress—to the
Governments of States Participating in the European
Security and Collaboration Council—to the Govern-
ment of Soviet Socialist Republics”]

[Text] Estonians have occupied their present territory
for millenia. Although there have been several foreign
powers that have ruled the country, Estonians have
managed to preserve their ethnicity and their culture,
and to build up an independent economy. Relying on
their long-standing tradition of self-government, the
Estonians were able, upon collapse of the czarist Russia
in 1917, to rapidly create the necessary institutions to
realize their self-determination. On February 24, 1918,
an independent, democratic Republic of Estonia was
declared. In the War of Freedom that followed, the
young republic defended its independence against all
attackers.

On February 2, 1920, a peace treaty was concluded in
Tartu between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet
Russia, according to Article 2 of which “Russia uncon-
ditionally recognizes the independence of the Republic
of Estonia, relinquishing voluntarily, and for all time, all
sovereign rights that Russia has held in relation to the
lands and people of Estonia, based on state order and
international agreements, both of which will, in effect,
no longer be valid for the time to come.”

The Peace Treaty of Tartu has not been cancelled by
either of the states, and thus determines relations
between the Republic of Estonia and the USSR to this
day. In 1921, Estonia became a member of the League of
Nations. Vigorous economic and cultural buildup,
taking place over the next few decades, changed Est-
onia's appearance beyond recognition. Relations with
minority groups living in Estonia were regulated by one
of the most progressive laws of cultural autonomy. In
1932, the Republic of Estonia entered an agreement of
non-aggression with the Soviet Union, where both sides
reaffirmed their respect for each other's sovereignty.

In violation of the system of agreements and obligations
thus evolved, the Soviet Union entered, on August 23,
1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany, the
secret protocol of which provided for dividing up the
spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. On December
24, 1989, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies
declared the secret protocol void from the moment of its
inception.

In the autumn of 1939, relying on the aforementioned
secret protocol, the Soviet Union pushed the Republic of
Estonia, under threat of force, into entering the so-called
agreement for bases, according to which the Soviet
Union obtained the right to build its military bases on

Estonia's territory. Article 5 of that agreement emphasized that "implementation of this pact should in no way impair the sovereignty rights of the parties to this agreement, particularly their economic system and state order."

On June 16, 1940, in violation of this provision of the agreement, and also of repeated promises made to preserve Estonia's statehood, Soviet Union presented an ultimatum to the Republic of Estonia, occupied the territory of the entire state, and, on August 6, 1940, annexed it by force and added it to the Union under the name of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. The democratic states of the West have not recognized the legality of the annexation of Estonia and the other Baltic states. In the United States of America, the consular legation of the Republic of Estonia is still operational. In its resolution dated November 12, 1989, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet has also judged the events of 1940 as aggression against the Republic of Estonia.

Despite the complexity of the situation, Estonians continued their attempts at restoring statehood, even under the German occupation that began in 1941. In September of 1944, a government lead by Jüri Uluots, the lawful prime minister of the Republic of Estonia, took office in Tallinn, but soon the Soviet army occupied the entire country again. An armed resistance movement lasted into the early 1950's. Resistance of the spirit has endured, undiminished, to this day.

The Soviet power effected a brutal regime of terror. Tens of thousands of people were arrested and deported. By the 1950's, Estonia had lost more than a quarter of its pre-war population. In their place, hundreds of thousands of USSR citizens were colonized into Estonia, causing the population ratio of Estonians to drop from 94 percent to 61 percent over the decades of Soviet power. Ethnic culture and religious life were suppressed, the previous economic culture liquidated. During the 1970's the russification policy was strengthened again. Industrial colonization practices have caused the country to be faced with ecological disaster.

Violating the supplement of The Hague (fourth) convention of 1907, and the Geneva convention of 1949, regarding protection of civilian citizens, the Soviet Union has been carrying out mandatory recruitment of Estonian citizens into its armed forces.

However, resistance to the foreign power never stopped. In fact, it grew, during the second half of 1980's, into a powerful popular movement. A clear desire to restore independent statehood has been expressed at numerous demonstrations and public events. The Baltic chain organized on August 23, 1989 demonstrated the Baltic people's quest for freedom to the whole world.

Estonia's struggle for freedom has been conducted by peaceful means, exclusively, and with deference to the interests of other ethnic groups living in Estonia.

On February 24, 1989, three organizations dedicated to the restoration of the Republic of Estonia called for the formation of citizens' committees of the Republic of Estonia, for the registration of citizens of the Republic of Estonia, and for the formation of their representative body—the Estonian Congress. During the past year, an overwhelming majority of the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia has been registered, thus expressing their desire to restore independence in Estonia. Participating in the elections of the Estonian Congress, as the representative body of citizens of the Republic of Estonia, were more than 550,000 citizens of the Republic of Estonia or close to 80 percent of all citizens eligible to vote.

Relying on the foregoing, the Estonian Congress, representing the citizenry of the occupied Republic of Estonia, voices its protest against the continuing Soviet occupation and annexation, and demands that the Soviet occupation forces be removed from the territory of the Republic of Estonia, that the mandatory recruiting of Estonian residents into the Soviet armed forces be stopped, that the restoration of a lawful government be made possible, and that restitution be made for damages caused by the occupation.

We turn to the governments of all states participating in the European security and collaboration council to include the issue of restoring the independence of the Baltic states in the agenda of the conference. We also request participation privileges at the said conference for representatives of the Estonian Congress.

After World War II, on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, independence was restored to all states occupied during the course of the war—with the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. We would like to hope that the European security and collaboration conference will take the historic step of putting an end to this international crime that has gone unresolved for half a century now.

Tallinn, March 11, 1990

Estonian Congress Declaration on State Boundaries

90UN2426D Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
13 Mar 90 p 3

["Declaration Regarding the State Boundaries of Estonia"]

[Text] As it approaches the task of restoring the Republic of Estonia annexed by the Soviet Union, the Estonian Congress wishes to express its readiness to discuss and resolve all boundary issues relating to the restoration of the Republic of Estonia, including those coming up within the framework of the European security and collaboration conference, given the international character of these problems, and their connectedness to the goal of preserving lasting peace and security in Europe.

Being fully aware of the complexity of these problems, and of its own responsibility, the Estonian Congress declares:

The land boundaries of the Republic of Estonia are determined by the following bilateral agreements:

1. State boundary between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union—by the peace treaty concluded on February 2, 1920 in Tartu (Article 3 of the agreement).
2. State boundary between the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia—by a joint declaration of the governments of both states regarding boundaries between Estonia and Latvia, dated March 31, 1927.

The sea boundaries of the Republic of Estonia are derived from the Waterways Law of the Republic of Estonia (1938 State Bulletin, 12, 96) and from the principles and agreements prevailing in international law.

The air space of the Estonian Republic consists of the airspace over all of the territory defined by the land and sea boundaries of the Republic of Estonia.

Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia stipulates: "The territory of the state of Estonia is an indivisible unit."

Based on the foregoing, the Estonian Congress will consider it unlawful to separate any part of Estonia from the territory of the Republic of Estonia, or to join such territory to any other state. The Estonian Congress expressly condemns all actions directed against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Estonia.

The Estonian Congress is ready to enter negotiations with the government of the Soviet Union to find a peaceful resolution to problems emerging in the course of restoring the boundaries defined by the Peace Treaty of Tartu.

Tallinn, March 12, 1990

Estonian Deputies Discuss Immigration Law

90UN2344A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 13 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Nelli Kuznetsova: "The View from the Balcony"]

[Text] Our parliamentary correspondent Nelli Kuznetsova reports from Toompea Palace.

During the first day of the 10th Session of the Supreme Soviet, which was full of plenary meetings, Speaker U Nugis remarked with pleasure several times that the deputies were working quite productively this time. It is true that the earlier tension, which had been smoldering just below the surface of externally reserved statements, with the subsequent obligatory thanks to the listeners, seems to have abated, disappeared, or dissolved. This can only be applauded, unless, of course, it has given way

to fatigue and a certain degree of indifference.... There are signs of fatigue, of course, and this is not surprising after months of sessions, heated arguments, and conflicts. It is no wonder that the majority voted for a month-long recess starting on 1 July, although some deputies felt that the work should be continued until it reached "a triumphant conclusion," saying that there were still so many laws to pass.

It is true that they still have to consider a whole mountain of serious bills regulating the Estonian economy and all life in the republic. The consideration of all these bills by parliament, in view of our history, all of the baggage of the past the society has to carry, and the severity of ethnic and social problems, will be a complex and time-consuming process. Furthermore, it will be a political process, and here it will certainly be necessary to quell emotions, avoid hasty moves and, what is most important, surmount the incompetence that has sunk so deep into the sphere of economic and political administration. The methods of accomplishing this also present a difficult problem. In fact, the art of politics consists in solving problems of this kind, and here I would like to mention the **traditions of social responsibility** again. We are not schooled in them, and the lack of these traditions is the reason for many of our present difficulties. I think the establishment of these traditions should be one of parliament's primary objectives. Is it not parliament's main function to evaluate bills from the standpoint of their subsequent impact on people's lives and futures?

In this context, I would like to discuss the bill on immigration. The bill was given its first reading at this session. It is a pity that the deputies received the text only 15 or 20 minutes before the start of the discussion. This might be the reason for the chill of indifference (or did it just seem to be this?) which accompanied the whole discussion. It appears that some deputies knew exactly what the bill said, even between the lines. Others, however, could not grasp much of the meaning and had many questions about the bill. Some deputies asked questions. M. Titma, for example, asked whether the bill specified the difference between citizenship and resident status. There is no law on citizenship yet. Who will be granted citizenship?

Deputy V. Lebedev wondered who would decide whether or not a woman was a prostitute, since the bill says that prostitutes, along with alcoholics, drug addicts, and inveterate offenders, will not be issued a permit to reside in Estonia. Forget about the prostitutes, because they will find some way out of the situation, especially, as A. Kollist correctly pointed out, society has to protect itself from undesirable elements. But how will the person whose 3-year residence permit has expired, for example, prove that Estonia needs him? And who will decide how much he is needed? The bill seems to imply that his residence permit will not be renewed otherwise.

It also implies something else: A person with limited resident status (a permit for a specific period of time, even several years) will not be able to own, for instance,

a garage, a dacha, or a flower bed or vegetable garden. Many questions will also arise in connection with the status of servicemen and their families.

Finally, there is the issue of migration quotas. In the earlier draft Law on Migration, the quota applied to all of those who wished to enter Estonia without exception. The present draft exempts those whose status in Estonia falls into the most-favored category (citizens of the Estonian Republic who were unjustifiably repressed and deported, their descendants, and other people of Estonian origin).

Of course, the problem of migration must be regulated. No one is questioning this. By the same token, there must be an organ to regulate migration. These organs exist in each state. But in an atmosphere as charged with tension as ours, are we not likely to overdo it? Some deputies were discussing this in the hallway. They also wondered about the correspondence of the bill to the Declaration of Human Rights. There is no mention of the declaration in the bill. Is this a coincidence? The first reading transpired without incident. What will happen in the later discussions?

I would also like to discuss something else. We know that the bill on immigration was the topic of nationwide discussions after it was published in the Estonian press. It was also published in the Russian-language press, but somehow I do not remember any constructive—I repeat, constructive—discussion of the bill in the Russian-speaking community. Is this another indication of the now familiar approach? People refuse, for example, to vote in the local soviet and then they get angry about its decisions.... They refuse to take part in discussions, and then protest what others did.... It would not be a bad thing for all of us to learn our laws, make use of them, and fight for them.... When I say "fight," I am not referring, of course, to any kind of "combat operations," public marches, or the occupation of buildings.... After all, there are normal democratic procedures and democratic social behavior.... This applies to both sides.

The Law on Property also had its third reading. It has not been passed yet either. Deputies had many questions and objections. The main stumbling-block is probably the problem of returning property to its previous owners. It is still difficult to predict what this will mean, especially in view of the absence of the proper return mechanism.... Later, in the crowded lobby where the deputies usually gather to smoke, Deputy V. Melnikov told me that the bill is fine in general, but it is unlikely to work. Other laws will be required before it can work. A law on privatization, for example.... I. Raig stressed again, however, that the law should apply to the future. He was supported by M. Lauristin, who said that the proposed bill is a "framework" law, a basic law, the first in a package of economic laws.

The deputies are still deliberating.... There are discussions in the commissions. The earlier haste seems to have disappeared, and this is good.

Nevertheless.... From time to time there is something in the air.... Is it fatigue? Alienation? Some form of deafness? It is as if some feel that they are obligated to speak, and others feel obligated to listen. And not to do anything else.... This was the case, for instance, when A. Zybin read the appeal to the Supreme Soviet from the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] conference on the upcoming gathering of veterans of the 20th SS division, the "Omakaytse" battalions, and other such military units. The appeal seemed to fall on deaf ears. Just one person muttered that now that the activities of the OSTK have been stopped, there is essentially nothing to talk about.

In this case, however, the fact that the OSTK does or does not exist is not that important. The fact of the upcoming rally is important. Should the Supreme Soviet express its opinion of this fact? After all, this is not a gathering of outstanding workers.... What is more, this is a particularly impressive fact in light of another event—the projected demolition of the "Tank" monument and its pedestal in Valgaskiy Rayon. Deputy P. Yermoshkin issued an appeal to the Supreme Soviet in connection with this on behalf of the "For Equal Rights" and "Virumaa" groups of deputies and the Communist faction. "In the name of the radiant memory of the 8,000 Soviet soldiers who died in the battles to liberate the city and district of Valga, in the name of the 30,000 people who were tormented in the torture chambers of the Valga Concentration Camp, we must not allow the monument in Valga to be demolished," the appeal says. Deputy May Kolosova, former first secretary of the Valgaskiy party raykom, could only say that Valga was not liberated from the Fascists by a single tank regiment. She was immediately corrected, however, by N. Aksinin. I recalled some of the passionate statements some of our deputies used to make when they addressed the Communist rank and file at party central committee plenums and realized that freedom from convictions does give people a tremendous advantage: They can easily subscribe to the point of view guaranteeing success and then just as easily renounce it when the weather changes....

In general, it is probable that acceptable answers to these questions can also be found, if this is what everyone wants....

Estonian Deputies Pass Ownership Law

90UN2344B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 14 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[ETA report on meeting of Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet on 13 June]

[Text] The meeting was called to order at 10:00 in the morning on 13 June, with 85 deputies present and 20 absent.

The third reading of the draft Law of the Estonian Republic on Property was resumed. After A. Zybin, P.

Varul, and T. Made spoke, Deputy Chairman I. Raig of the Economic Commission presented the concluding speech.

There was a discussion of the voting procedure. A roll-call vote was chosen (83 for, 2 against, 1 abstention). The proposal to pass only certain sections of the Law on Property was rejected (18 for, 63 against, 4 abstentions).

The speaker of the Supreme Soviet put the Law on Property to a vote, and it did pass (72 for, 15 against, 4 abstentions).

Now property relations will be governed by the Law of the Estonian Republic on Property until the Civil Code of the Estonian Republic has been adopted. The statutes of this law will serve as the basis during the drafting of a new civil code and other laws on property relations in the Estonian Republic. The Law of the Estonian Republic on Property will serve as the legal basis for the development of commercial enterprise, the privatization of property, and the return of illegally appropriated property or the payment of compensation for it to the former owners or their legal heirs during the transition period. In addition, the privatization and de-nationalization of property, as well as the return of property or the payment of compensation for it to the former owners will be governed by separate statutes drafted in accordance with the Law of the Estonian Republic on Property.

A Supreme Soviet resolution on the enactment of the Law of the Estonian Republic on Property was passed, stipulating that the law will go into force on 1 July 1990 (72 for, 1 against, 14 abstentions). In connection with this law, a law was also passed "On Changes in the 'Civil Code of the Estonian SSR'" (71 for, 4 against, 12 abstentions).

The meeting continued after a brief recess.

On behalf of the group of deputies "For Equal Rights," N. Aksinin informed the Supreme Soviet that the monument to Soviet Army soldiers in Tapa was desecrated on 11 June. He also reported that local authorities paid no attention to this whatsoever.

The news sparked a lively debate, during which A. Gusev suggested the formation of a commission to investigate the circumstances. A decision was made to return to this matter following the discussion of the main items on the agenda.

The deputies began discussing the sixth item on the agenda—the second reading of the bill on rules of procedure in the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet.

P. Kask, the head of the working group drafting the bill, presented a speech and answered deputies' questions. A supporting speech was presented by V. Jurjo, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and a second supporting speech was presented by Chairman T. Anton of the Legal Commission. Another supporting speech was presented by Chairman Kh. Eller of the conference commission working on the bill on rules of procedure.

The speakers in the debates were Ya. Allik, S. Petinov, G. Israelyan, A. Melder, T. Made, A. Payu, Ya. Yyeryuyut, S. Sovetnikov, A. Tarand, T. Kyabin, R. Yarlik, and A. Maarend.

The Supreme Soviet decided to interrupt the second reading of the bill on rules and continue it at the next session (85 for, 1 against, 1 abstention).

The speaker of the Supreme Soviet then turned the floor over to Chairman A. Ruutel of the Supreme Soviet, who informed the deputies of recent political events and answered their questions.

The Supreme Soviet will meet for its next session on 18 June.

Estonian CP Secretary on Coalition Party

90UN2346B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Sergeyevich Malkovskiy, secretary of Estonian CP Central Committee and republic Supreme Soviet deputy, by Lyubov Torshina: "A Bad Truce Is Better Than a Good Fight"]

[Text] [Torshina] It has been more than 2 months since the 20th Estonian CP Congress, but Communists still feel ambivalent about it. How do you feel about the present situation in the republic Communist Party?

[Malkovskiy] At the congress I saw the delegates' agonizing search for the proper wording to resolve the contradictions in the instructions they were given at party conferences on the local level. The Communists of Narva, for example, simultaneously insisted on three conditions: Estonia would be part of the new federation (on the basis of a union pact), the Estonian Communist Party would maintain its ideological and organizational ties with the CPSU, and the third instruction was that there would be no split in the party. The program of most of the congress delegates, however, already rejected the first two principles. On the other hand, questions connected with the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress had obviously been given thorough consideration, and this created the impression that all was not lost. Some delegates voted for the Estonian CP program and others voted against it, and this alone guaranteed a split or at least a serious crack in the republic party organization. As the congress went on, the delegates who did not agree with the policy documents proposed a compromise—a coalition Central Committee. Its formation would have represented at least a fine thread connecting all of the currents in the party.

[Torshina] What exactly were you planning to connect?

[Malkovskiy] Whether our opponents wanted to admit it or not, a coalition Central Committee would allow us to conduct a dialogue and give us a chance to communicate with the Communists of different party organizations. We know that their attitudes differ and that they change

in response to new developments in the country and the republic and in inter-ethnic relations. We want to do everything within our power to preserve at least a small opening in the wall dividing people on fundamental grounds. We want Communists of any nationality to be able to consider their options and make a choice. It is our job to create a calm atmosphere for unbiased choices. Everyone knows that slamming the door shut is the easiest thing to do.

We have a serious problem with the Communists of many rural party organizations, most of which are curtailing or stopping their activity. There are people who want to stay in the CPSU, but they are in the minority. We must give them our support. The coalition Central Committee will also allow us to address these party organizations and speak to people on both sides. There is a possibility that we can help them with organizational matters. In this short time I have already been to Prichudye, Tartu, Valga, Vyr, Pyarnu, and Yyg, va...not to mention Narva, Kokhtlya-Yarve, and Sillamyae. There is the hope that our republic party organization will not be mono-ethnic.

[Torshina] Are you certain?

[Malkovskiy] I am. Otherwise, I would have nothing to do here. Keeping track of how many people have signed up for membership in the Estonian Communist Party and how many have remained in the CPSU does not take much effort. It is much more difficult, in my opinion, to solve specific problems in the activities of party organizations connected with property and finances, and to solve them without hurting anyone's interests. All of those who do not agree with the coalition Central Committee should remember that we did not enter it for the purpose of being diluted in it or adapting to it, which is something we are constantly being accused of today, but for the purpose of pursuing our own policy line while retaining our commitment to unity with the CPSU. I repeat, we engage in dialogue every day. We go to Moscow frequently, where we get first-hand information, learn how people feel about us, and put an end to false rumors. You know from your own experience that information is a very important tool.

[Torshina] I think I am beginning to understand: Your efforts are not intended to produce an immediate return—it is as if you are fighting for "souls." But why not tell people this? Why not explain? After all, you are being accused of so many different things: Have you heard what Malkovskiy is doing in the coalition Central Committee?

[Malkovskiy] First of all, it will be a fairly long time, as you correctly pointed out, before we see any immediate return. On the other hand, and you know this as well as I do, there are difficulties with various publications. The state of affairs in the press, radio, and television suggests that the journalists who support the present republic leadership have suddenly lost their typically discerning approach. This might have been caused by fear or it

might be a sign of the times. It is already clear from the tone of some publications that it would be better not to expect anything from them. Readers are aware of this and are suggesting the issuance of genuine party publications in the Russian and Estonian languages. On the pretext of the democratization of the news media, the Estonian CP Central Committee made a grave error when it gave up certain newspapers. Other movements and parties in Estonia are creating their own monopolies, and without a trace of embarrassment.

[Torshina] Let us return to the main topic I wanted to discuss with you, please—the compromise Central Committee. Have you run into any surprises?

[Malkovskiy] Yes, unfortunately. There are times when the work is stressful and when mistrust and suspicions arise.

[Torshina] Can you give me any examples?

[Malkovskiy] Don't force me to insult people. Maybe, as children say, they did not mean it. Say we agree to finance party organizations restructuring their staff, and then we learn that the money was used less for restructuring than for the payment of wages in the rayon party organizations where membership dues will not cover these expenses. This takes funds away from party organizations supporting the other platform. Various expenditure items are changed. Sometimes there is a tendency to lean toward "sympathetic" party organizations which cannot support themselves during the transition to self-funding. I think we are now putting all of these affairs in order. I want to believe in human decency, however difficult it might be at times.

I can sense that some documents bypass me completely. Of course, we do not suffer in silence. We make our own decisions. We are preparing a decision on the role of Communists in law enforcement agencies, for example, in connection with the act of 30 March on the independence of Estonia. There are other difficulties, but I am certain that we must preserve the coalition Central Committee until the 21st Estonian CP Congress, which will be held after the 28th CPSU Congress and will probably unite all Communists accepting its decisions in a single organizational structure.

[Torshina] I realize that the present situation is unpredictable, but I do want to know what you think will happen to the Estonian Communist Party.

[Malkovskiy] I am very happy that many Communists of the Estonian nationality are in no hurry to leave the party and are waiting for the 28th CPSU Congress. This gives me the hope that if both of our central committees are tactful and considerate, the resolutions of the 28th congress will help us preserve a multinational Estonian Communist Party.

[Torshina] In the purely formal sense, what distinguishes these "waiters"?

[Malkovskiy] They pay their dues, but they have not signed up for membership in the autonomous Estonian Communist Party. The number of registered members is now 3,700 (the membership of the Communist Party of Estonia on 1 January this year was 102,000). When I see the old friends I used to work with, many of them say they are waiting until the 28th congress. People are now afflicted by mass neurosis, and many are being extremely cautious and are afraid to show any preference for the CPSU.

[Torshina] I will tell you what absolutely kills me. In my 30 years of newspaper work I have never seen the kind of behavior I am seeing now, when the Estonian Communists who speak at plenums ask me not to use their names....

[Malkovskiy] The tendency to persecute Communists in the republic is not that new. I know of cases in which Communists who openly took a party stance were treated quite brutally. I know of cases in which deputies who defended their political views at sessions of our Supreme Soviet of the previous convocation were immediately asked to report to the voters and would give up their deputy mandates when they returned a few days later. There is a great deal of pressure. When the events of 1940 were being assessed at a session, one deputy from Tartu told me: "I agree with you, Vladimir Sergeyevich, but if I tell other people what I am telling you, it will complicate my life."

Political rivals are not physically annihilated, but they are destroyed in an underhanded way by distorting facts and creating the kind of atmosphere few can survive. Things are a little easier for me: The support of the Communists of Narva, Kokhtlya-Yarve, and Sillamäe gives me confidence and security. But what about those whose views do not coincide with public opinion in their communities? Nevertheless, I am certain that people will eventually learn.

[Torshina] Comments on the CPSU Central Committee Politburo decision on Estonia have been published. What do you think of them?

[Malkovskiy] Do you know what amazes me? These are the same comments, in form and content. Now some people are even asking whether or not there really was a Politburo meeting. But when I asked people here in the bureau and at the secretaries' conference exactly what they did not like about the decision, no one had any objections to most of the points.

[Torshina] In your opinion, what is the most important thing about the document?

[Malkovskiy] The resolution refers to the administration of economic activity, which should secure the normal functioning of party organizations. As for publishing houses, if these are our property, then we should take charge of them. As I already said, something unimaginable is happening with newspapers. It has reached the point at which we have to guess whether Sillari's report

at a plenum will be printed or not. Are they doing their job? Now, finally, the Estonian Communist Party will have a weekly Estonian-language newspaper and a daily edition which will reprint articles from a northeastern publication.

[Torshina] I think that if the news media had offered their pages and screen and air time to both sides, the reorientation of publications would not be such an urgent matter. Now, however, people are even talking about...the nationalization of publishing houses....

[Malkovskiy] Judging by the official information about income and expenditure items in the party budget of the Estonian republic party organization, scrupulous records were kept of the maintenance costs of party organs and party establishments, including the management of their affairs. These figures are available if necessary. Most of the party facilities in Estonia were built with the funds of the CPSU Central Committee. Membership dues would not have allowed us to build gorkoms and raykoms in rural locations. Incidentally, these buildings are now being turned over to cooperatives. At the very least, we should talk about this honestly.

[Torshina] Vladimir Sergeyevich, those who do not agree with your position frequently come out with this kind of comment: It is easy for Malkovskiy; he is backed up by Narva, which is almost like Russia, and the inhabitants of Narva only observe republic laws when it is convenient....

[Malkovskiy] There is a definite difference. The level of politicization in Tallinn is higher than the average. People here sometimes do not even notice the spontaneous arousal on both sides. I do not want to insult anyone, but some deputies get so inflamed that it reaches the critical point. If we want to lower the level of politicization, we must get down to real action as quickly as possible.

[Torshina] And what do you think will calm all of us down?

[Malkovskiy] The most logical thing would be to start right away. After the first echoes of M. Gorbachev's meeting with G. Bush had died down, the international public was more inclined to view Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as republic-members of the USSR. I do not think any republic will ask for more than a union agreement with a broad range of freedoms. If one does withdraw from the union, it will only do it on legal grounds. I think the euphoria is already subsiding. Even the reliance on Yeltsin did not produce anything. He is a powerful man, but if Russia begins to charge world prices or even contract prices for raw materials, we might discover that we are wearing the emperor's new clothes. It would be better for us to seek direct ties, instead of indirect ones through Boris Nikolayevich.

[Torshina] Tell me, are you not bothered by the thinking of your colleagues in the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee? Think of the souvenir they gave Yeltsin!

[Malkovskiy] Have you never noticed that the Estonian leaders have always had a weakness for war souvenirs? They gave Landsbergis a sword and Yeltsin a mace. The mutual penetration of thoughts, of course, is important. This provides an understanding of motives. Without this, it does not take long to reach a deadlock. It is banal but true that we must try to put ourselves in the other person's place to learn his motives.

[Torshina] But this is the hardest thing of all. What gives you your endurance, besides the support of the "Narva party organization"?

[Malkovskiy] Don't waste your sarcasm on me. No one would ever get anywhere without support. In the human sense, the desire to live as friends, the way we lived for decades side by side, keeps me going. My earlier athletic training also helps. I frequently saw an opponent's self-assurance end in defeat. A knowledge of one's own strength and the ability to keep oneself under control lead to victory.

[Torshina] P.S. ...Vladimir Sergeyevich, after I had edited the interview for publication, RAKHVA KHYAEL and SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA suddenly printed an article by one of your comrades in the coalition Central Committee, Harri Roots, "The Article Is Dead, But the Principle Lives On." I have read other articles by this author, but this one is completely different: It is an unqualified denunciation. He is staking his all. He mentions you. Please tell me what you think.

[Malkovskiy] In an attempt to discuss the article as fairly as possible, I simply want to repeat that even if our Central Committee is called a coalition committee, a tolerance committee, a compromise committee, a parity committee, and so forth, this does not presuppose unanimity. The members have different opinions and different points of view. Because of this, the decisions they make are also different. The Secretariat makes some decisions, for example, and the bureau of the Estonian CP Central Committee cancels them and makes others. In particular, this is what happened in the matter of party organizations in law enforcement agencies after my meeting with you. It is extremely important, after all, that members of the present Central Committee include people who support the Estonian CP Program and people who cannot accept it at all. Time will tell who was right.

[Torshina] Especially since we do not have that long to wait anymore.

[Malkovskiy] No, not long. Ever since the recent conference in the CPSU Central Committee, I have been more inclined to believe that we were right to a certain extent.

[Torshina] What were the topics of discussion at the conference?

[Malkovskiy] We were taking the best proposals from all 19 platforms to work out the position of delegates to the

28th CPSU Congress. Today I am firmly convinced that the congress will favor a single CPSU.

[Torshina] Not a union of communist parties?

[Malkovskiy] I think not. It will be a single CPSU with broad autonomy for union as well as city, rayon, and primary party organizations, including the status of a legal person. Today it is already clear that the Communists of the Baltic zone, Moscow, and the trans-Ural zone cannot be combined as a single entity, but under no circumstances should the basic principles of the communist outlook be allowed to disintegrate.

[Torshina] Thanks again for the interview.

Further on Estonian Party Congress

90UN2353A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 22 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by T. Opekina: "Abundance of Questions—Shortage of Answers"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] By a decision of the Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum advocating ideological and organizational unity with the CPSU, the 20th congress of Communists continued its work on 20 June to complete the preparations for the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress. There were six items on the agenda. Delegates heard and discussed a report by Estonian CP Central Committee Secretary A. Gusev on the first three—the state of affairs in the Estonian Communist Party, the program of action for Communists, and the amendments and additions to the draft CPSU Charter. This was followed by a summarization of the results of the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress in party districts and the adoption of a resolution on the next, 21st Congress of the Estonian Communist Party and a declaration "On the 50th Anniversary of the Restoration of Soviet Rule in Estonia."

To put it briefly and concisely, the discussion of these topics took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and in the absence of the serious disagreements which had dominated the 3-day forum in March and had split the party. But if we depart from the telegram style of writing...

The March debates certainly were an exercise in confusing and florid rhetoric. Three months have passed, and now, in June, many Communists are still shrugging their shoulders and wondering why the union of people with the same point of view turned out to be so fragile. Why have we not learned—now that fate has put us on different sides—to be tactful opponents, having the right to our own view of events but striving nonetheless to find areas of agreement?

After all, it only seems to each side that it sees everything clearly. In reality, everyone now has more questions than answers. These questions were asked in abundance from the rostrum in the auditorium of the Officers Club where

the delegates were working. Each time the floor was turned over to a new speaker, he asked new questions....

"Many of our Communists feel completely lost today," V. Mikhaylov from the Dvigatel Plant said. "It is no secret that the workers do not have enough knowledge of theory to understand all of the different opinions and judgments with regard to the present state of society and the reasons for the crisis. It is clear that earlier ideological cliches are obsolete, but who will help the person with no knowledge of theory understand why we were cursing the market and its accompanying poverty and unemployment yesterday and are relying on it to provide us with solutions today? What is socialist ownership, and is it preferable in any way to other forms of ownership? No one can even define the present position of the CPSU in the structure of our society in simple terms...."

Tallinn railway worker A. Maslov expressed his doubts even more clearly. Most people—party members and non-members—judge the results of perestroika not only by whether the stores are empty, but also by whether they can breathe easier. As it turns out, they cannot breathe easier. Furthermore, it is clear that ideological pluralism, which is oxygen to some, suffocates others, who think of it as ideological anarchy.

Many of these questions arose not only because of the unfamiliarity of the wide range of opinions to the Soviet individual, but also because of the instability of the political situation in the country and in the republic and the general sense of insecurity.

Communists are worried about the snowballing exodus from the CPSU and the curtailment of the activities of many primary party organizations. In connection with this, the Estonian CP Central Committee, supported by congress delegates, defined the main objectives in its efforts to keep the CPSU organizations in the republic and consolidate the efforts of Communists and the portion of the laboring public supporting the sovereign autonomy of a socialist-oriented Estonia, connected to other members of the federation by a union pact.

The Communists advocating ideological and organizational unity with the CPSU are sending 11 delegates to the 28th congress: A. Gusev, V. Yermolayev, P. Panfilov, L. Annus, I. Borodin, V. Kovtun, I. Shepelevich, V. Malkovskiy, Yu. Tolmachev, N. Zakharov, and T. Pupkevich. In addition, they decided to ask that invitations to the 28th congress also be extended to party members—workers V. Vashurin and M. Chekotovskiy.

The 20th Estonian CP Congress has completed its work. I repeat, it raised many questions which Communists themselves cannot answer yet. We must hurry, however, because every person today is seeking a spokesman or defender of his interests—in parliament, in the government, in the press, and in public opinion. People are reading the party platforms and listening to the speeches at rallies. How do Communists evaluate their past performance? What solutions to the crisis do they suggest? Unfortunately, the report by A. Gusev and the speeches

by congress delegates did not analyze our contradictory reality in sufficient depth or address the possibility of a major advance in the future under the specific conditions of our republic.

Estonian Deputies Assess Parliament Work

90UN2321C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 30 Jun 90 p 3

[Interviews with Supreme Soviet deputies Yu. Uluots, M. Titma, and S. Petinov by parliamentary correspondent Nelli Kuznetsova: "Parliament Is Going On Vacation..."]

[Text] The last session has come to an end. Three months of work, three months of plenary meetings and discussions in deputy commissions, working groups, and deputy factions, are over. In essence, it took 3 months to form a new regime.... Does parliament have an identity of its own? Has it taken shape as the supreme body of the republic legislative branch? How do the members of the Supreme Soviet, who are essentially first-generation parliamentarians, feel about their status? In short, what were the results of the session? What has parliament accomplished before going on vacation?

Our parliamentary correspondent Nelli Kuznetsova asked some deputies these questions. Today we are printing these brief interviews, which took place on the last day parliament was in session.

[Uluots] What do I want to mention first? In these 100 days, a little over a hundred completely different individuals, most of whom did not know each other and had come from different cities and rayons in the republic—I could even call them just a certain number of people gathered together in a single auditorium—became a parliament to some extent. Only to some extent and only just recently, but they did become a parliament.... You know, there is an unwritten or unspoken law that you can only address parliament when you want to convince others of something and when you have the necessary arguments. If you are able, for instance, to win me over to your side with these arguments, I will vote however you want me to. At least 70 percent of our speeches are attempts to express our own point of view, but I, for example, am not always interested in what a particular deputy thinks about something. I am interested in the result, in the approval of a particular decision. There is not always enough competence—this is our problem. Although as far as competence is concerned, I have to say that we have a surplus in some areas and an acute shortage in others. Unfortunately, the "others" include the economy.

When we formed our economic commission, we could not find five people who were genuinely competent in economic affairs. We have many experts, however, on general political affairs.

You know, when a certain sense of euphoria was apparent during the first meetings, I said: Just wait, soon

we will have to deal with economic laws. Now the room is half empty when serious topics are being discussed, economic problems requiring a knowledge and understanding of the present situation and the ability to judge consequences. But after all, the economy is the foundation of policy.

What is most striking? Many of the deputies do little work at home and are poorly prepared for the meetings. They begin gathering information at the plenary meetings, but the information must be gathered at home, or in the commissions, in a group..., in any convenient place, but people must come to the meetings prepared, with firm opinions of their own. This is something we still have to learn to do.

So, what did we accomplish in the last 3 months? First we adopted an entire series of political declarations, which made virtually no changes in our life.... In this way, however, we put ourselves on the same level with the other Baltic republics in the political sense. This made the creation of the Baltic Council possible, and this is important.

In the sphere of economics it was important that we managed to pass a law on property. The main thing now is to make it work. We have already passed many laws which did not work later. Maybe this is how we arrived at the present situation. This law should free people, untie their hands and give them every chance to display initiative.

We often hear people say that there are not enough managers. Good managers.... But when we had separate farmsteads, each owner was a manager. He managed his own farm. The owner of a store was also a manager.... Do you realize that until recently, and even today, a hundred or just over a hundred people did the thinking for all of Estonia, and everyone else was simply supposed to act on their decisions. Now we have to strive for a situation in which each person will do his own thinking, manage his own affairs, and take the responsibility for this.... We need to increase commodity output and create wealth.... This is the main thing for us. The law on property should help.

[Titma] I would say that parliament has been growing, but it has not undergone any great qualitative change yet. Parliament still has not become a genuine organ for the development of political compromises prior to the discussion and adoption of decisions. These compromises arise—if they do arise at all, of course—as a result of open struggle at plenary meetings. In a normal parliament, however, a great deal of work requiring political consultations and the review of decisions goes on behind the scenes, so to speak, and it is this work that leads to consensus. We might be able to do this in the fall.

The second topic I wish to address is the problem of the effectiveness of parliamentary work. Too much effort is going into the horn and the whistle, as the punch line of some current jokes say. This is regrettable, because it is

clear in many cases that intelligent preparations could have reduced the amount of time we lost.

The third thing is that we already know that declarations do not produce any tangible results. We have begun drafting laws. This is good. These legal decisions, however, still have little to do with real life. Take the law on property as an example. At some point people were already willing to include the statement that the property relations of 1939 were being restored in the preamble on the third reading of the bill. But after all, we have to think about what this means. It means that half of Estonia would be suing the other half. Imagine that someone once built a home for himself on someone else's land. The previous owner would ask that the land be returned to him. Where would the new occupant go? I say "new" even though he might have been living on this land for around 40 or even 50 years. All suits of this kind usually end up with the state having to pay the costs. But where would the state get the gold or the funds to pay for all of this property? And what if foreign capital submits claims also? And it will if we give it a chance to do this on legal grounds....

Parliamentarians must foresee what changes a law will make in the real lives of their constituents. This kind of foresight will be developed, but it will take time. Communication with the voters will also help to develop the new image of the parliamentarian and the realization that he must protect the interests of voters, and not some kind of **abstract beliefs**.

What was the result of the 3 months? We did finally realize that the development of processes in the union will be one of the main conditions for Estonia's achievement of autonomy, and that our eastern policy must focus on contacts with Russia. We realized all of this, and this is encouraging, because it is the truth: Most of the decisions we make will pertain to this area. Decisions pertaining to the west will be few in number. The kind of business contacts that are being established with Leningrad at this time should also be established with Moscow, with other regions, and with Russia as a whole. It is through these contacts that we will become independent.

[Petinov] What does this 3-month leg of our journey mean to us deputies? We learned good lessons in parliamentary work on the whole. To tell the truth, however, we are just beginning to master the tactics of political struggle. The polarity of opinions is still quite pronounced. After lengthy political battles, we finally began drafting economic laws. In other words, work of genuine practical significance, and with a real impact on our daily life, has begun.

I think we did not have time in the last 3 months to do the main thing: to surmount ideological differences within the parliament. This will continue to influence our legislative activity.

I think that many deputies have not been able to overcome some stereotypes yet. Which ones? It still seems to

some of them that the Russian-speaking population or at least part of this population—the Russian-speaking deputies in parliament, for example—cannot understand the Estonian people's desire for independence. But this is not the issue at all.

We want to understand the main thing: Where are we going? What kind of governmental structure are we establishing?

It seems to me that things are reversed in our legislative activity: The parliament is not moving from the general to the particular, but in the opposite direction. Instead of, for instance, defining the constitutional laws, we are working on separate legislative acts. I think it will be difficult to coordinate all of these separate laws later.

We cannot overcome our tendency to rush the legislative process. The laws we pass are still not coordinated adequately with their possible consequences. In other words, we do not always think about the role a certain law will play in real life, in the lives of hundreds and thousands of people. The overall development of the political situation in the republic and beyond its borders is not always taken into account either. This could eventually deceive people, as in the case of, for example, IME [Self-Managing Estonia]. Besides this, we often forget that any kind of unilateral action evokes a negative reaction.

We must admit that our Russian-speaking group still feels uncomfortable in parliament. There was good reason for the heated arguments over the rules of procedure. They all boiled down to the issue of forcible pressure, the pressure of the majority. I see this as the intention of certain political forces in parliament to shut us up.

Now it is vacation time, but for us it will be a time for work. We must familiarize ourselves with all of the details of the statutes which will be passed and draw up our own alternative drafts, if necessary, which will take the interests of the Russian-speaking population into fuller consideration. After all, it is completely understandable that the laws which will be passed without our participation probably will not be enforced in our electoral districts.

The deputies' strength is being tested. This is a serious test. Will the new authorities, essentially already representing a multi-party system, be able to prove that they can cope better with the administration of the republic? If so, then many of the people's doubts will be dispelled.

So, vacation time is here.... The Supreme Soviet will reconvene in the fall....

Tartu Party Chief on Future of CPSU, USSR

90UN2353B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 1 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Juhan Tamme, first secretary of the Tartu gorkom of the Estonian Communist Party: "It Is Time To Declare Our Position"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] **First Secretary Juhan Tamme of the Tartu gorkom of the Estonian Communist Party answered SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA's questions.**

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] Everyone is talking about the birth of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. How do you feel about this event?

[Tamme] My feelings are positive, as positive as my feelings about the birth of the Russian Communist Party, but I cannot understand why essentially nothing has been settled there. A conservative tone prevailed in the report of M.S. Gorbachev, and especially in the statements by other speakers. This was quite noticeable in the statements of conference-congress delegates about the organizational structure of the CPSU. The only possible conclusion is that the party is still unitarian. The republic Communist Party seems to have become an autonomous entity, but it has neither a program nor a charter. Furthermore, the pyramid still exists. This means, regrettably, that the earlier machinery of party policymaking is still in place. This is what we can expect at the 28th congress. This is why I do not have any special hope for the party forum. It is no longer any secret to anyone that many party members, including some of the leaders, are openly waging a struggle against perestroika and trying to stop the democratic processes in the society. Their attempts, however, have been futile. It is a pity that if this goes any further, the CPSU will be expressing the views of anti-perestroika forces more and more clearly.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] Which platform will you be taking to Moscow?

[Tamme] In Tartu we drafted our own platform, our own view of the problems which must be discussed at the congress, but we do not plan to submit it as a separate platform. The Communists of Tartu took part in drafting the republic platform of the Estonian Communist Party, and it is this platform we will be supporting at the congress. I must say that we, the Communists of our district and city, are not 100-percent satisfied with the results of the last Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum. We sensed some attempts to weaken the resolutions of the 20th Estonian CP Congress in the interest of coalition. We still have not seen the final draft of the Estonian CP Platform.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] Exactly what do you dislike about the platform?

[Tamme] There was the hope that the plenum would make the draft platform more radical, but what happened was the opposite. This is why a joint meeting of the Tartu city and district committee bureaus of the Estonian Communist Party was held on Thursday to express our opinion of the draft platform. The Communists of Tartu are certain that the renewal of the Soviet Federation is already impossible. The CPSU cannot be turned into a democratic political organization. For this reason, the attempts to reform the USSR and the CPSU are futile and a waste of time. We should concentrate on their peaceful dismantling in line with the objective development of processes in our society. I think the USSR has no future as a union of sovereign states either, and the CPSU is already inconceivable as a union of republic communist parties.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] And what, pray tell, do you suggest instead?

[Tamme] No one doubts that the integration process will continue, but it must lead to the governmental independence of the different parts of the USSR. We should be striving for cooperation by genuinely free and equal states in the future.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] Would this be a confederation?

[Tamme] The confederation train has already left the station. The train waiting at the platform now is a free community of states: Russia, Finland, Sweden, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Estonia, and so on and so forth. It can be defined in three words as the common European home.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] In your opinion, what are the party's prospects?

[Tamme] I think the CPSU will be dissolved and will turn into organizationally autonomous communist parties, including the Estonian Communist Party. This will be accompanied by the establishment of new leftist parties. These parties will form a voluntary association similar to, for instance, the Socialist International. The autonomous Estonian Communist Party (which will probably have a new name in the future), a member of this association, will be completely autonomous in the choice of allies and in the choice of areas of cooperation. These were the two main topics—the future of the USSR and the future of the CPSU—at our joint bureau meeting. The Communists of Tartu are asking the Estonian CP delegates in Moscow to convey our ideas in the most specific terms to congress delegates. It is time to declare our position. We plan to cooperate with all democratic forces in the party at the 28th congress.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] Do you think you will win any support at the congress?

[Tamme] In terms of fundamental content, the program of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" is very close to ours. Therefore, there will be some people who share our point of view.

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA] Well, good luck at the congress.

[Tamme] Thank you.

Estonian Deputies on Occupation, SS Rally

90UN2346A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by Nelli Kuznetsova: "Do We Need Rallies in the Supreme Soviet?"]

[Text] Our parliamentary correspondent Nelli Kuznetsova reports from Toompea Palace.

The atmosphere in the Supreme Soviet yesterday was surprisingly similar to that of the first days in parliament, which seemed to have disappeared and become obsolete—the atmosphere of intense stress, political confrontations, and controversy. Once again, the session agenda was discussed almost until lunchtime.... Once again, alternative political resolutions were read; first some people left the room, then others.... Parliament passed resolutions and immediately cancelled them. Everything seemed to be "in line with the best traditions" of the rally days....

I must say that the session agenda proposed by the presidium was so full that it should have completely excluded the possibility of wasting any time at all. It included the first reading of the Law of the Estonian Republic on Leases, a report on the draft laws on taxation and the bill on the Estonian Republic state budget for 1990, the first and second readings of the draft law on the excise tax, a report and supporting report on the main points of the republic government's discussion of the political and politico-economic aspects of land reform, the second reading of the bill on immigration and the bill on rules of procedure in the Supreme Soviet, a report on environmental protection measures in northeastern Estonia—the mere list of all the items on the agenda for this week proves how busy this session will be. This is understandable. There is not much time left before the summer recess. In essence, this is the next-to-last session, but many bills still need to be discussed. In addition, there is also work in the commissions.... It is no wonder that Deputy Speaker M. Lauristin, who presided over the session, made several suggestions regarding the extension of the session, the start of work earlier in the morning, and so forth. Consciously or unconsciously, however, she was the one who set the tone of the proceedings even before the discussion of the agenda yesterday by unexpectedly yielding the floor to R. Veidermann, who read a statement by the Supreme Soviet with regard to the 50th anniversary of the occupation of the Estonian Republic by the USSR.

The statement says that 17 June 1940 was the date of a fateful turning point in modern Estonian history. On that day the troops of the USSR occupied the independent Estonian Republic. The statement stresses that all of the subsequent decisions determining the fate of Estonia were not an expression of the will of the Estonian people. The Supreme Soviet, the document says, views the acknowledgement of the occupation and annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 by the USSR as an important prerequisite for the restoration of historical justice and the establishment of a free and secure future for Estonia.

The deputy who read this text told all the rest that they were obligated to vote for it, because the failure to do so would be viewed as "a crime against the Estonian people." In spite of the importance of this issue, I must say that he was wrong to tell them how they were obligated to vote...especially in view of the fact that the statement specifically underscores the Supreme Soviet's commitment to democratic principles.

There is no question that our democracy sometimes takes a strange turn. It seems that it should lead to greater tolerance, to reasonable compromises, and to the thorough consideration of all opinions and interests—in short, as one political correspondent said, to "civilized forms of political competition"—but this is not what happens.... Or it does happen, but far from always.... All the rest of this long and difficult, stressful day offered conclusive proof of this.

Deputy N. Zakharov read the text of a statement which was the direct opposite of the first. This made joint work on the document impossible. V. Koys' idea that the wording of the first statement should be changed to make it acceptable to both sides was ignored. It was simply not noticed, although it probably did contain some grain of reason. After all, the period of occupation is a complex and controversial issue. Many people have already suggested the need for an impartial governmental and legal assessment of Estonia's past and of its present status. Furthermore, the document N. Zakharov read seemed to oversimplify the issue because it did not take many of the complex and contradictory events of that time into account. It is possible that collective efforts could produce a common point of view, but.... Incidentally, the solution proposed by the "For Equal Rights" group—to ask a commission of international experts to come to Estonia for an impartial and complete assessment of these complex periods in its history—was also rejected by parliament, and especially by the Supreme Soviet Presidium....

All of the rest of the day's discussions also seemed to be traveling down parallel roads. Deputy A. Gusev suggested that the agenda include a discussion of the plans for the reunion of veterans of the SS division and the "Omakaytse" units near Pyarnu in the beginning of July. He believes that the Supreme Soviet should express its opinion of this unprecedented event. N. Aksinin agreed, saying that, otherwise, the square in front of Toompea Palace might be full of people again—this time people on

crutches and in wheelchairs. The veterans who fought against Fascism and were wounded in these battles are angry.... The Supreme Soviet, however, did not support the proposal. M. Lauristin said that it would be wrong to overdramatize the event, although the possibility of political repercussions is indisputable. According to M. Lauristin, this could complicate Estonia's relations with the West by casting a "negative shadow" on them. For this reason, M. Lauristin suggested, the Foreign Affairs Commission should study this matter. No, Tiit Made objected, the Supreme Soviet should have all of the necessary information about the projected event because, as he said, it could cause a major political scandal.

Yes, there probably will be a scandal, and this is also understandable. After all, a unrestricted gathering of former SS-men is difficult for hundreds and thousands of people to imagine.... It seems inconceivable in our day...following the famous Nuremberg Trials, following the condemnation of Fascism by the entire civilized world....

The Supreme Soviet also rejected J. Liim's proposal regarding financial benefits and awards for the veterans of the liberation war (1918-1920) and the declaration of 23 June an Estonian state holiday (to commemorate the Estonian victory in the battle of Tsesis on 23 June 1919), although M. Lauristin said that the presidium would be willing to return to this matter and hear J. Liim's proposal again....

It must be said that M. Lauristin presided over the meeting with an "iron hand." T. Made even felt the need to tell her there was no need to put so much pressure on the deputies. It is bad when the officer presiding over a session does not act like a speaker, but like a representative of, for instance, the People's Front at the presidium table.... This is the reason for the pressure.... This is the reason for the irritation.... And for the interruptions, which were also many in number. Can any of this promote flexibility, or the desire and ability to combine something that might be extremely difficult to combine—the diversity of opinions and consolidation...?

Finally, there was another important detail. There were too many empty seats in the room. It turned out that around 30 deputies were absent, and so was almost half of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Where were they? Just as in the famous children's song, "they went sailing in a little boat." Of course, the "little boat" in this case was the luxury liner "Nord Estonia," which arrived from Stockholm on Sunday and sailed back to the capital of Sweden that evening. Of course, participation in the inauguration of a new shipping line is necessary, flattering and, what is most important, prestigious, but is it so necessary that this many deputies, especially the chairmen of deputy commissions and members of the presidium, had to go on the maiden voyage? And did they have to do this when they have such a difficult and full schedule, when so little time and so much work remain before parliament recesses?... It is no wonder that Yu. Telgmaa asked out loud several times what kind of

important government affairs had summoned the deputies to Sweden. He never did get an answer.

I want to love the democrats for their democratism, one correspondent said. I also want to love the democrats for their democratism, but, regrettably, yesterday my love was ill-fated....

Estonian Presidium Statement on Fascism

90UN2321B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 30 Jun 90 p 3

[Statement by Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Estonian Republic]

[Text] The local association of the Society for the Preservation of Estonian Monuments plans to hold ceremonies on 7 and 8 July and declare them Estonian Soldiers' Days in commemoration of all those who fell in battle.

Regrettably, a tendentious news item on this event launched a campaign in the union press which created misconceptions about the undertaking itself and about Estonia's wish for independence. The event has been described as a gathering of former SS officers.

This kind of misinformation is also being disseminated deliberately in the international press, with a view to the international democratic public's completely understandable negative attitude toward Fascism.

The Estonian people's feelings about Fascism coincide with the condemnation of Fascism by all mankind. The restoration of Estonia's independence is the opposite of Fascism as well as Stalinism.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium knows its people and unequivocally states that there was not and is not any social or political support for Fascism in Estonia.

For this reason, we regard the recently disseminated reports of signs of fascism in Estonia as a provocation directed against the process of democratization in Estonia.

Contrary to the wishes of the organizers, the event is being exaggerated in order to incite the forces opposing Estonia's independence and planning to use force to prevent the gathering from taking place.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Estonian Republic, acting on the orders of the Supreme Soviet and on its responsibility for the peaceful acquisition of independence by Estonia and for the safety of its people, advises the participants in this undertaking to maintain a strong sense of responsibility and avoid all possible provocations and international complications.

Goals, Structure of Latvia's USSR Constitution Defense Committees

90UN2268B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
23 May 90 p 2

["Speech by chairman of the OSTK, P. Nefedov, at the founding fathers of the Committee for the Defense of the Constitution and the Rights of USSR Citizens in the Latvian SSR"]

[Text] Democratization and glasnost have revealed the deep processes of both the shortcomings and various points of view of the building of a democratic humane society in a genuinely rule-of-law state.

The political situation in our republic is not becoming simpler. Supporting in words the ideas of restructuring, the Duma of the People's Front of Latvia and some organizations are persistently carrying out work in regard to the restoration of capitalist relations. In so doing, until recently, they did not receive an appropriate rebuff and resistance from the so-called party-economic aktiv, which was not mobilized, but was localized by the very party from this vitally necessary work.

The situation was extremely complicated by the fact that, because of the lack of a strong political will and unscrupulousness in the realization of the program documents, the former buro and Central Committee turned over the mass media into the hands of those who were far from genuine restructuring.

By the vote of 138 deputies, representing about 40 percent of the inhabitants of the republic, the Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic," having restored the validity of this republic's Constitution of 1922 and having proclaimed the de facto withdrawal from membership in the Soviet Union.

The USSR Law "On the Procedure for Solving Questions Connected with the Withdrawal of a Union Republic from the USSR," the relevant articles of the Constitution of the USSR and the Latvian SSR require for the most important questions of state life, including questions of the status of the republic and its withdrawal from the USSR, must without fail be solved through the method of nationwide discussion and be submitted to a referendum. However, the Declaration of 4 May 1990 was adopted without a referendum.

At the same time, in the document adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet on May 4, 1990, the claim is made that in 1940 the question of the state system of Latvia should have been decided only by the people in a referendum, and not by the Seym. Hence the Declaration of the Latvian Seym of 21 June 1940 "On the Entry of Latvia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" is declared as not having legal force from the moment of its adoption, and Latvia's membership in the USSR as being unlawful. But you cannot erase from history the fact that the act adopted by the Seym on the

entry of Latvia into the Soviet Union was repeatedly reaffirmed through the participation of its population in the elections of the highest organs of state power of the USSR, including the elections of 1989, the participation of its representatives in the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR, and the half-century long participation of the republic in the life of the USSR.

The text and contents of the Declaration call forth serious objections from the juridical and legal point of view.

The present state-territorial status of the USSR, which includes Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as sovereign Soviet republics, is confirmed by the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

The Declaration, which calls on the people of Latvia to withdraw from the USSR, and consequently for the breaking up of the state borders that took shape in Europe during the postwar period, contradicts the concluding document of the Vienna Meeting of 1989.

Further, the assertions concerning the preservation to the present time of the legal force of the Constitution of the Latvian Republic of 1922 contained in the Declaration are illegal. The adoption of every one of the Constitutions of the Latvian SSR after 1940 signified the de facto repeal of the preceding one.

The proclamation of the restoration of the validity (although at once suspended) of the Constitution of the Latvian Republic of 1922 represents an exceptionally non-democratic act, since few people among those living in Latvia now have seen the text of this Constitution and know its content. It remained known only to a narrow circle of people who prepared the Declaration. The Constitution of 1978, which established the present-day constitutional foundations of the Latvian SSR, went through the stage of extensive nationwide discussion. The Constitution of 1922 did not pass through such a stage in modern conditions.

Point 5 of the Declaration contradicts the provisions of the USSR Law "On the Procedure for the Solution of Questions Connected with the Withdrawal of a Union Republic from the USSR." In the decree on bringing the indicated law into effect, the USSR Supreme Soviet established that any actions connected with the formulation of the question of the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR and contradicting this law, taken both before and after its coming into effect, does not give rise to any legal consequences both for the USSR and for the union republics. And this circumstance lies at the basis of the Ukase of the President of the USSR of 14 May 1990, which recognizes the Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic" as having no legal force from the moment of its adoption.

Since in the Declaration of 4 May 1990 there is talk about the restoration of the structures of state authority and the government of the Latvian Republic, there are no grounds to think that these structures will be the Soviets of People's Deputies. Consequently, the Declaration speaks of the replacement of the state system in the republic being realized, as this has already been said, without a nationwide vote, which contradicts both the Constitution of the Latvian SSR and the Constitution of the Latvian Republic.

In the course of 2 years, pursuing a one-sided treatment through the mass media, the "new" politicians came to believe that they could paralyze the will of the entire people of Latvia. Ignoring the repeated demands of the workers for the adoption of considered and well-thought through decisions, the deputies of the fraction of the People's Front of Latvia believed that they could do everything. Especially characteristically this manifested itself on 15 May.

The majority of the deputy fraction of the People's Front of Latvia of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on 15 May 1990 refused to listen to the demands of the workers of the republic who were not in agreement with the Declaration "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic," and were in support of the Ukase of the President of the USSR.

And, finally, a few words about the economic aspect of the document being analyzed. The Declaration, as well as the conception of the future economic development of the Latvian Republic advanced by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, I. Godmanis, does not contain a realistic answer to the fundamental economic questions: But by virtue of what will the independent economy of Latvia have to exist? What, where, and with what means purchase, what and to whom to sell? How will the new conditions be reflected in the standard of living of the population?

It is no coincidence that the questions of the concrete dimensions of the budget deficit, the trade balance, and the balance of payments, of precisely what difficulties await the population, have remained without an answer.

The hopes for assistance and credits from the West are one more dangerous illusion. Given the present state of the Latvian economy, this is the path to prolonged servitude. It may lead to the fact that Western capital will buy up the economy, land and natural resources at a cheap price. But in this case, one should not deceive oneself with hopes for independence, or even self-dependence.

For the solution of the economic and social problems of Latvia, a special status within the structure of the USSR on the basis of *khosraschet* [cost-accounting] and the sovereignty of the republic would be preferable. However, the adoption of the declaration will strike a blow at the constructive work that has already begun in this direction.

The stabilization of the development of the economy of Latvia is possible only in conditions of social consensus, but not of political tension, antagonism, and lack of self-confidence, where half of the population of the republic does not accept the course of events thrust on it. The course which was formulated in the declaration cannot but call forth further aggravation of the difficulties in the economy and in the social atmosphere.

In the conditions that have been created, in order not to permit the further destabilization of the situation and to secure the defense of the Constitution and the Rights of USSR Citizens in Latvia, the Provisional Republic Strike Committee turned to a number of public organizations and public-political organizations with a proposal—to create the Republic Committee for the Defense of the Constitution and the Rights of USSR Citizens. The committee can take upon itself the coordination of all the healthy forces of the republic that support the Ukase of the President of the USSR of 14 May 1990 concerning the Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic."

The proposal was supported on 15 May 1990—the Provisional Republic Committee for the Defense of the Constitution and Rights of USSR Citizens was established, consisting of representatives of the association of the deputy group "Soyuz", the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives], Interfront, the Council of War Veterans of the Armed Forces and Servicemen in the Reserve, the law enforcement organs, and other structures.

I. Goals and Tasks of the Committees

1. Basic Goals

- the guarantee of the validity, in the territory of the Latvian SSR, of the Constitutions and laws of the USSR and the Latvian SSR, and other acts of the higher organs of power and government of the Soviet federation;
- the creation of conditions for the social and legal protection and security of the population of the Latvian SSR, and the prevention of conflicts dangerous to society;
- the consolidation of all socio-political forces which recognize the socialist choice of the people and are oriented toward the renewal of socialism and the Soviet federation;
- the attainment of the complete sovereignty of the Latvian SSR in a renewed Soviet federation;
- the representation of the citizens of the Latvian SSR in the higher organs of power and government of the USSR.

2. The committees being created in the production collectives, organizations, institutions, and educational institutions, at the place of residence of citizens, and in

military units, extend assistance to the rural, settlement, rayon, city, and republic committees in the implementation of their resolutions and decisions in the given collective.

3. Within the limits of their competence, the committees publish legal acts by which the persons and collectives who consider themselves to be citizens and labor collectives of the Soviet federation under the jurisdiction of the USSR and the committees.

4. In the publication of legal acts, the committees are guided by the Constitution and the laws of the USSR, as well as by the Constitution of and laws of the Latvian SSR so long as they meet the provisions of Article 74 of the Constitution of the USSR.

II. The System of Committees

1. The system of committees for the defense of the rights of Soviet citizens in Latvia are formed by:

—committees of labor and educational collectives, at the place of residence, and in military units;

—rural and settlement committees;

—city and rayon committees;

—the republic committee.

2. Committees in the labor and educational collectives, at the place of residence, and in military units are created at meetings or conferences of labor collectives, at meetings of educational collectives, citizens at their place of residence, and in military units.

3. Rural and settlement committees are created at conferences of the representatives of the committees of labor and educational collectives, citizens at their place of residence, and military units.

4. Rayon (with the exception of city rayon) committees are formed at conferences of representatives of committees of rural soviets, settlements, and cities of rayon subordination.

5. City (including city rayon) committees are created at conferences of representatives of committees of labor collectives, at the place of residence, and in military units.

The Riga city committee is formed at a conference of representatives of the rayon committees of the city.

6. The republic committee is elected at a congress of representatives of the city and rayon committees.

III. Organizational Forms of the Work of the Committees

1. The highest organ of the committees for the defense of the rights of citizens in Latvia is the congress.

2. Meetings (conferences) of the committee members are the organizational forms of the work of the committees.

They are authorized to decide questions in the presence of more than half of the membership of the committee.

3. The Congress, the meetings (conference) of committees, besides the questions provided for by the Constitution of the Latvian SSR:

- establish the numerical membership and structure of the committees;
- decide questions of the cooptation and recall of committee members;
- select the committee chairman, his deputy (deputies), the presidium of the committee and the committee secretary;
- adopt the program of action and other documents;
- discuss speeches and reports of the elected persons of the committees;
- delegate their members for elective posts in public and other organizations and institutions.

The congress, meeting (conference) are called together as necessary, but at least: the congress—once a year, the meeting (conference)—once a quarter.

The period of validity of the committees—as necessary.

4. The committee chairman organizes the entire current work of the committee, convenes the sessions of the presidium, and the committee in mutual relations with other subjects of social relations. The chairman and deputy (deputies), the secretary, and the directors of the commissions for the directions of the activity of the committee and other persons are ex officio members of the presidium.

The chairman is simultaneously the chairman of the presidium.

The committee presidia are permanently functioning working organs of the committees during the period between congresses, meetings (conferences). The presidium is authorized to make a decision depending on the current socio-political situation.

Rubiks Speech at Pro-USSR Constitution Founding Congress

90UN2268A SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
23 May 90 p 1

[“Speech of A. Rubiks at the founding Congress of the Committee for the Protection of the Constitution and the Rights of Citizens of the USSR in Latvia”]

[Text] Comrades! On behalf of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party I warmly welcome the participants of the All-Latvian Congress of Supporters of the Protection of the USSR Constitution and the Rights of Citizens of the USSR and Latvia!

We have all been brought together today by a common alarm and responsibility for the fate of Soviet power in the republic, by our disagreement with certain anti-democratic decisions of the Supreme Soviet. The hastily adopted Declaration of 4 May of this year “On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic” grossly and impudently violated the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of the Latvian SSR, and Soviet laws. Precisely for this reason, it was declared to be without legal force by an ukase of the President of the USSR of May 14 from the moment of its adoption. The Latvian CP Central Committee Buro supports this decision of our head of state.

I have every reason to assert that the power of the Soviets of People's Deputies and the power of the entire people of Latvia is in danger. The threat proceeds from that part of the deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet which on 4 May voted for the adoption of the mentioned declaration.

“Colleague” A. Gorbunovs (he uses precisely such an address in his interview in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 20) doubts the validity of the slogan about the protection of Soviet power, which has been advanced by the United Council of the Labor Collectives of the republic, and it is of interest from whom this power must be protected. “From the Soviets themselves?” he asks. “From the power elected for the first time in a truly democratic way?”

Yes, as a matter of fact, “colleague” A. Gorbunovs very correctly determined from whom Soviet power must be protected. The Declaration of 4 May, in points 3 and 4, proclaims the renewal of the effectiveness of the Constitution of Latvia of 1922 and the renewal (pay attention) of the structures of state authority and government of the Latvian Republic.

The question arises: Was it really the Constitution of 1922 which called these state institutions Soviets of People's Deputies? I assert that this was not the case. Was the Constitution of 1922 the Basic Law of a democratic state, as people want to prove to us, making use of the fact that few have read this law? I again assert that this is not the case, since it does not even have a part dealing with the political and social rights of citizens and with the obligations of the state to them.

How can one say that the Soviets were elected for the first time on a democratic basis if the new election legislation of the republic established restrictions of the right to be elected? The entire postwar history of Latvian statehood did not know such infringements.

Now—about the legality of the actions and decisions of the Supreme Soviet. It proclaimed the Declaration of the Sejm of Latvia of 21 June 1940 “On the Entry of Latvia into the Union of Soviet Republics” as having no legal force from the moment of its adoption. Thus, the Supreme Soviet, more correctly, those deputies who voted for such a decision, declared illegal all the consequences of the named Declaration of the Sejm. Thus, a

certain part of the deputies declared themselves to be illegal, since they were elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR, and not the Latvian Republic, on the basis of the laws of the Latvian SSR, and not the Latvian Republic.

And the limits of logic do not at all encompass those decisions of the Supreme Soviet which pertain to the changes in some articles of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR, for example, on the procedure for the adoption of decisions and laws in the Supreme Soviet. How can the Supreme Soviet of one state change the Constitution of another state?

The Declaration of 4 May asserts that the Constitution of 1922 exists *de jure* to the present time since, they say, no one abolished it. Evidently, it never occurred to the authors of the Declaration that world legal practice does not know cases where any law would be considered as valid after the adoption of a new law in one and the same sphere and with the same name.

One can only term as fraud the declaration of adherence to the idea of a rule-of-law state if such irresponsible destruction of the constitutional foundations of the state order are permitted. Abraham Lincoln once said: "One can deceive some people all the time, one can deceive all the people some of the time, but it is impossible to deceive all the people all of the time." It is a pity that this has not been mastered by those who are now in power.

We consider the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Latvian SSR as fully valid in the territory of the republic and we come out in defense of the legal order established by them, in defense of the Soviet democracy of the rights and interests of the workers established in the Constitution.

It ought to be persistently explained to people that a serious danger has arisen of shattering the economic foundations of the constitutional rights and freedoms of the population of Latvia.

The hasty adoption, on 4 May 1990, of the Declaration "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic" will inevitably lead to the complete destabilization of the economy, to the break of the economic relations that have been established with the other union republics and regions of the USSR, without the creation of new ones, and, as a result—to the destruction of the system of the social protection of the workers.

Many inhabitants of the republic may become defenseless not only in the political, but also in the social respect. Completely realistic is the threat of mass unemployment, which in neighboring Lithuania has already encompassed 24,000 people, the threat of the loss of wages, since there is still no state system of assistance for the unemployed. Very great is the danger for many to be deprived of the pensions and allowances that are being paid from the budget of the USSR or the funds of union ministries and departments. A significant deterioration in the supply of food and primary necessities, fuel and

electricity, and municipal and transport services awaits the entire population, without exception.

The experts of the People's Front of Latvia regard the securing of employment for the population as one of the most important economic problems in the conditions of the republic's independence. Even with the present state of management, the number of workers for whom it will be necessary to undergo retraining for a new profession is determined to be 200,000-250,000 people. And in extreme conditions, when the surplus of manpower can be generated in days that can be counted, this problem will become simply insurmountable and will call forth a splash of dissatisfaction of the inhabitants with such changes. Because of the changes in the energy balance alone, about 400,000 workers may remain without work for a total of several days.

At the session of the Duma of the People's Front of Latvia, which took place on 19 May and was transmitted by radio, many asserted that A. Rubiks, they say, travels through the republic and excites the population. Yes, I really did try to tell people, with whom I met, during my trips to the cities and regions, the truth about what awaits them if they follow the course set forth in the Declaration of 4 May—the truth which they try to conceal from them. Those who spoke at the session of the Duma did not shrink even from an open lie, asserting that, during my trip in Laugavpils, called the population to arms. But when someone tried to object they supposedly led him out of the hall. Such reports are open slander for the purpose of laying the blame at somebody else's door.

Everyone knows that deception and falsification have long been in vogue among the politicians of the People's Front of Latvia as an argument and weapon to which they resort when there are no other arguments accepted in the civilized world that are permitted in the audiences of high political culture.

These and many other circumstances, which, because of lack of time, it is difficult to enumerate, we must keep in mind in working out solutions today.

I see three immediate tasks which today's congress must solve.

First of all, it is necessary to combine all forces that come out in support of genuine, not declarative democratism, on a constitutional basis. For this reason, the Latvian CP Central Committee Buro supported the initiative of the Unified Council of Labor Collectives of the republic concerning the holding of the present congress, as a first step in the achievement of this unification.

The formation of the republic Committee for the Defense of the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Latvian SSR and the rights of USSR citizens in the republic can serve such unification. This is the second task of the congress and it must be solved without delay.

The committee itself, in my view, must immediately organize the collection of signatures of voters for the holding of a referendum on the question of the state and socio-political status of our republic, in order to determine it on a genuinely democratic basis.

It is also obligated to study the concrete facts of the violations of the legal rights and interests of the citizens of the USSR in the republic, information about which is already being received from various places. The leaders of the People's Front of Latvia, who have come to power, try to hypnotize the public with assertions about the fact that in an independent Latvia the rights and interests of all people will be guaranteed. Life shows that there is nothing in these assertions except deception. Can it be done differently, besides deception through the violation of rights and liberties, to check the pressure, the intimidation and moral terror to which people who have different ideas than the People's Front of Latvia are subjected. There are such cases.

Thirdly, we must today adopt the kinds of documents which would explain to people who are still misled or who have not perceived all the dangers that have arisen for them from the decisions adopted on 4 May by the Soviet of People's Deputies of the republic. This is needed by the public not only in the republic, but also far beyond its borders. It is necessary to show the perniciousness for the people of the impasse into which the adoption of the Declaration of 4 May by the Supreme Soviet has led us. It is necessary to demonstrate all the time on the basis of examples the anti-popular character of the decisions and actions affecting the rights and interests of concrete people.

The committee, it goes without saying, may have other tasks as well, which it sets itself. But those that have been named must be regarded as first and foremost.

In their solution, the committee can count on every conceivable assistance of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, regardless of the fact that they want to declare it outside the law, as is apparent from the speech of I. Godmanis in the mentioned session of the Duma of the People's Front of Latvia. Such a fate the newly-brought-to-light prime minister assigns to the Unified Council of Labor Collectives and to the committee being created today. He even went so far as to say that it is necessary to do this "if not physically, then if only to announce it."

I am convinced that such statements and others similar to them in the final analysis will compel someone to wake from their sleepiness and note the danger that in reality hangs over all those who support socialist restructuring, for the democratic renewal of our state, for the persistent improvement of the life of all people on the basis of the new economic and social policy.

I am convinced that the unification of the healthy forces in the republic can avert this threat and secure civic harmony and the peaceful life of all the people on Latvian soil.

Rubiks on Future Tactics of Latvian Communist Party

90UN2421B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
12 Jun 90 pp 2-3

[Latvian CP Central Committee First Secretary A.P. Rubiks Report to the 25th Latvian CP Congress on June 9, 1990: "On Latvian Communist Party Tactics During the Current Socio-Political Situation in the Republic: Latvian CP Central Committee First Secretary A.P. Rubiks Report to the June 9, 1990 Session of the 25th Latvian CP Congress"]

[Text] Comrade delegates!

The two months that have passed since the first part of the 25th Latvian CP Congress have confirmed: The main directions of Party activity approved by you are correct and the decisions are true to life. They are supported by the absolute majority of communists and by broad strata of the Republic's population. A number of weighty arguments can serve as confirmation of this.

First of all, the Latvian Communist Party has not disintegrated as the apostates dreamed it would. Those apostates created the so-called independent Latvian Communist Party and left our Congress session. The Party remained standing. The structure of city and rayon committees in the Republic has been totally re-established during the last two months. Of the 176,600 registered CPSU members on January 1, 1990, 166,307 remain in our ranks. We will once again return to these figures.

The second argument: Massive rallies, marches, and demonstrations in support of our Party's policy to consolidate the unity of the USSR that have occurred in Riga, Daugavpils, Liyepaya, and in other cities and rayons eloquently speak of agreement with the Congress' decisions.

Finally, the civil rights campaign movement that has become massive in the Republic confirms the correctness of the planned policy and is manifested in the activities of the United Soviet of Workers Collectives and the Committee for Protection of Citizens' Rights and the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR. This committee was recently elected at the most massive republic workers congress in recent times and 1,493 delegates participated in its work. The collection of signatures under the demand to conduct a referendum in the Republic on the form of Latvian SSR statehood crowns this entire chain of events. There are already 305,000 signatures on it.

The Central Committee you elected at the first part of the 25th Party Congress headed this work in the very

complicated socio-political situation. It was conducted at the very same time that the NKPL [Independent Latvian Communist Party] apostates keenly provoked a split in our ranks, when a fundamental, profound perestroika was occurring in the Party, and when we had to lay a double and triple burden on the most active and dedicated communists.

This was a test of the real revolutionary struggle, a trial by fire. And the extreme nature of the situation demonstrated that many complications, lapses, and difficulties cropped up because, prior to the 25th Congress, the Party did not have carefully thought-out tactics, had not been looking ahead, and had come to resemble a myopic traveler in a fog bank.

The rapid shift of the political situation and the helplessness of previous approaches during resolution of problems that arise placed the Latvian Communist Party's tactics at the current stage on the agenda as a primary issue. A thorough discussion on this subject and analysis of today's situation are necessary both for the Party itself, its organizations at all levels, and also for those residents of the Republic who link the future with the socialist choice and with life in the USSR and who believe in our Party and expect specific actions from it. This conversation is also necessary for those who are not with us today: Under pressure of psychological blackmail, many of them still want to approach the truth with their own minds and, in order to do this, it would be useful for them to know our plans, our intentions, and the paths for their realization.

In order for tactical conceptions to be precise and logical, we first of all need to understand: Between whom and what forces and for what or against what is the struggle in the Republic occurring right now?

In the opinion of the Latvian Communist Party, we must consider the Popular Front and the Latvian Communist Party to be the primary opposing political forces that are conducting a struggle for power and for the right to determine our statehood. No other political current, including the breakaway segment of our Party, wields any serious influence whatsoever on political events in the Republic today.

The alignment of forces in the Supreme Soviet—138 members of NFL [Latvian Popular Front] factions and 59 Latvian Communist Party—is also evidence of this. Four seats remain for all the rest, including independents.

For what or against what is the struggle occurring between these political forces? There is essentially one question: Will the Republic move toward independence and raise the people's standard of living within the Soviet Union or outside the USSR?

While carrying out the will of the Popular Front, the NFL faction in the Supreme Soviet has unilaterally decided that we need to develop outside the USSR. On May 4, its obedient majority voted for secession from the

USSR, hastily, without consulting with the people, and without serious discussion on such an important issue. This vitally important question was decided not only in a unilateral manner but also with gross violations of the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR. That which had just recently been mentioned during fanatic separatists' idle discussions became a fact enveloped in legal form on May 4. This Declaration immediately exposed a difference in approaches to the issue on which a fundamental polarization is occurring not only in the Supreme Soviet but also in the Party, in workers collectives, and among the Republic's population. We can phrase this difference as follows:

The Latvian Communist Party thinks that we must provide for the Republic's independence, its political sovereignty, and raise the population's standard of living while remaining within the USSR. Furthermore, a substantial qualification is being made: Its relationship with the Union as a whole and also with other subjects of the Union must be defined based on the new socio-political conditions created by perestroika.

According to the logic of Popular Front political figures, Latvia did not enter into the USSR, it was annexed. Consequently, the laws of the USSR that regulate the relationships of the federation with its subjects do not have legal force for our Republic. These figures assume that they resolved this issue on May 4th, having restored the force of bourgeois Latvia's constitution of 1922.

We, communists, think that the question, whether we will be in the USSR or if we will secede from the federation, should be resolved by means of a national referendum of all Republic residents. According to NFL statements, a referendum is not needed—the votes of the 138 Popular Front faction deputies in the Supreme Soviet who usurped the privilege to speak and decided for all the people of Latvia are sufficient. Having obtained a total of 35.3 percent of the votes during the elections, they are dictating their will to all the people of Latvia in the name of all of the voters and are leading all of us into a quagmire from which it will be difficult to climb out.

It is also easy to see the difference in the ultimate goals of the choice placed before each of us. The Latvian Communist Party sees the ultimate goal as life in a federative state where all citizens have equal social rights and identical opportunities for work, relaxation, and education, regardless of nationality, property or any other situation of man.

Quality labor for the benefit of society, humanism, and respect for law through which the Republic develops must be the main criteria for man's free development.

On the other hand, the NFL orients everything to a totally different moral: To return the land, factories, and homes to their former owners through secession from the USSR; we need to separate people into those who have property and those who do not have property—into lords, servants, and farm hands. Their plans do not

simply stipulate the revival of various requirements (according to nationality, citizenship, settled way of life, language, etc.), all of this is already being implemented in laws and resolutions of the Republic parliament and government although we still live in a socialist society and under Soviet rule.

This is the fundamental difference of our approaches to the solution of problems. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee is sure that our Party's genuinely national policy will lead new fighters into its ranks.

The Party, whose primary task is the struggle to preserve Latvia's affiliation with the Soviet Union, must clearly present: What is our choice of paths based on and why is the Latvian Communist Party in favor of the federation?

We proceed from the fact that the federation is a union of states formed by several states for joint fulfillment of common tasks.

The realization of common interests can be effective only if federal institutions exist that unite and harmonize the activities of Union members—states, cantons, or republics. As for republics, they independently execute state power outside the limits of the federation's competence, they have their own state organs, their own laws, representatives in the federation's organs, and also their own citizenship along with union citizenship. States with this structure occupy nearly half the territory of the Earth's surface. More than a third of the planet's population lives in them. Let us point out that in all bourgeois federations its subjects do not have the right to unilaterally secede from the Union or the right to participate in international relations.

Another form of state structure—a confederation—is quite unstable. Its disintegration is normally associated with the fact that it still has not succeeded in establishing mutually beneficial and developing interstate relations. Let us recall that the confederation created by Egypt and Syria in February 1958—the United Arab Republic—had already disintegrated for this reason in September 1961. In our days, only one confederation exists—Senegambia. However confederative ties have also not been formed in either the political or economic spheres in it.

Maybe this prospect precisely satisfies those who propose transforming the federation into a confederation for our country?

We advocate the form of confederation where the republics that have entered it retain the right to self-determination to resolve national tasks using specific features of government in the federation.

In our days, many heated discussions are being conducted around the issue of the future union treaty. The topic is complicated and all of us need to develop it together. In our view, we need to adhere to a number of principles while defining the competence of the federation and its subjects. First of all, equality of rights of all

states who are members of the federation; and second, allocating adequate powers and consequently material resources to the federation itself. The federation's competence includes foreign relations, defense, and state security, powers that permit the Union to prescribe forms of property and to limit utilization of property under certain circumstances, to form market relations, to set federal taxes, to regulate the banking and financial system, and to approve the federal budget. We must also include the establishment of guarantees of citizens rights and basic freedoms and protection of the interests of citizens of ethnic and other minorities among the federation's powers.

In this regard, obviously we must state how the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee understands the principle of self-determination.

Public opinion, not only in our republic but also in the USSR, is disoriented to a significant degree by the broadly disseminated unilateral interpretation of the principle of self-determination and its reduction to the context of "secession" alone. Furthermore, this principle was advanced at one time not at all in order to encourage the world to be split into small independent states. Man has already long understood that it is in his interests and in the interests of accelerating progress to preserve large states. The principle of "one nation—one state" was advanced in the 18th Century but since it did not consider the interests of other nations, the community of states rejected it. Today the right to self-determination is declared according to tradition but this term is most frequently understood to be the right of any people to self-determination within the framework of some sort of state structure: A union, federation, or confederation. We are talking about the most complete utilization of its own right to statehood, encouragement and development of a national culture, language, etc. And therefore to place an equals sign between the concepts of self-determination and secession—means to engage in political speculation to the detriment of one's own people.

Questions of self-determination of any people who are part of an independent state, as this is noted in the draft 28th CPSU Congress platform must be resolved with the obligatory consideration of the interests of all nations that are involved in this situation, the existing realities, and the probable consequences for peoples' lives. This is first of all. Second, the very principle of self-determination has two sides—the juridical and political. From the point of view of juridical—the right to self-determination is recognized for all peoples—large and small, without exception. But the question—in what form will this right be realized—is a political question and it must be resolved by the state while considering the interests of other peoples.

While advocating the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin was an advocate of their closest union, but he asserted that this union is impossible without freedom of secession. This is also the dialectic of union through the right and freedom to disunion and

secession. He very often compared this with divorce asserting that the democratic demand to provide the freedom of divorce does not signify that we are agitating for divorce.

Frequently proponents of secession cite international law. But even international law, while recognizing the right to self-determination for all people, does not require unconditional recognition of a people's right to secession from a state, leaving the question about the form of realization of self-determination to the state's discretion. The only condition that states must comply with—is respect of the principle of equality and a ban on discrediting a people.

"The principle of self-determination," states the Declaration of Principles of International Law, "must not be interpreted as sanctioning or encouraging dismemberment, partial or total violation of the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states that act while complying with the principle of equality and self-determination... and, as a result of this, have governments that represent all the people that belong to this territory without distinction due to race, creed, or color of skin."

In other words, given the condition that a state observes the principle of equality, the right to self-determination must be implemented in a form that does not permit undermining the territorial integrity or political unity of the state.

It is worthwhile to remind those who advocate secession from the USSR of the words of the Great American President Abraham Lincoln that "they (those that want to secede) are creating a precedent that in turn will divide and destroy them since their own minority will begin to secede each time that the majority does not want to be under the control of the minority."

We need to admit that disorientation of public opinion on the issue of self-determination occurred due to inadequate ideological support of the policy of perestroika and lack of specific work on ethnic problems in the Republic.

Two other concepts are inseparably linked with the concept of self-determination—human rights and people's rights. The Latvian Communist Party proceeds from the premise that the priority of these two concepts is resolved simply in a sovereign democratic state: Human rights are placed higher than ethnic rights. Protection of the rights of nations—is not an end in itself, but only a means of protecting human rights and the individual. There is nothing higher than human rights!

I recall that this point of view was unanimously supported by representatives of the 30 countries who participated in the UN Seminar on Interethnic Conflicts in Geneva in March 1990. International law also proceeds from such premises.

We think that deteriorating interethnic relations in the Republic have been the result of a violation of the human rights priority. Under NFL leadership, "perestroika" began not with protection of human rights but with protection of a nation's rights and with infringement of the rights of a definite segment of the population. This is a serious, dramatic error that all Republic communists have clearly seen but for some reason the previous staff of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and its leaders did not notice in their time. And really how precisely everything was planned! At first, the Law on Languages is adopted, then a resolution on migration—the national feelings of the residents of the native nationality are heated up, then the Law on Economic Independence is placed on the agenda, later on it is propped up by the Law on Citizenship that divided the people of Latvia into first and second class people and, finally, the Declaration on Self-determination in the form of secession from the USSR. How could we ignore our own convictions and how could we not respect our own people that we remained blind in this destructive situation!

Now when time has been wasted and destructive forces have succeeded in achieving much, Republic communists have to exert immeasurably greater efforts to prevent the separatists from scoring a final victory in Latvia. The campaign to conduct a nationwide referendum on the republic state structure and for victory in this referendum has become the primary direction of our activities under these conditions.

Hence also the Latvian Communist Party's tactics are divided into several stages—during the period until the referendum is announced, during the period the referendum is prepared and conducted, and during the period after the referendum depending on its results.

What should our tactics be during the first period—until the referendum is designated? V.I. Lenin understood the Party's tactics as "its political conduct or nature, direction, and methods of political activity."

The Latvian Communist Party will be guided by the Constitution of the USSR, by the Fundamental Law of the Latvian SSR, and by Republic laws that do not contradict them while remaining true to the political slogan on building a rule-of-law state. Communists are ready to cooperate with the current Latvian government in those directions that are in keeping with constitutional order, do not infringe on the declared rights and freedoms of people, do not lead the republic to unilateral secession from the USSR, and that will promote the development of Latvia's economic independence within the framework of the Soviet federation.

At the same time, the Party will utilize all agitation and propaganda means available to it to explain the unconstitutional decisions of state organs. The Party is obligated to explain, using the words of V.I. Lenin, that the NFL faction is in essence "the primary sin of the petty

bourgeoisie blok." This "sin" consists of the fact that it uses words to hide the truth from the people.

V.I. Lenin recommended consideration of three primary directions of Party activity from the point of view of its tactics.

First of all, he thought that "prolonged work is necessary to clear up class proletarian consciousness and to rally the proletariat of the city and the village against the petty bourgeoisie's fluctuations because only this work serves as a genuine guarantee of the successful advancement of all the people" in order for the Party to obtain the right to form ruling organs that directly express the will of the people.

With regard to today's conditions, this means [we should]:

1. Point out the anti-popular separatist essence of the political force's that are in power.
2. Expose the ethnic limitation of NFL policy that is leading to the Republic's self-isolation and, as a result, to deterioration of life in the city and in the village.
3. Exert efforts toward strengthening ties between workers and kolkhozniks, rural lessors, peasants, and all agricultural workers.

Second, we need to remember V.I. Lenin's instruction about how important "comprehensive work within Soviets" is for the Party.

To the extent that the Latvian Communist Party now is the opposition party and along with other parties is an equal element of the political system, the problem of its influence in Soviets of all levels is raised with all its keenness. We must gain the experience of parliamentary work in factions, constantly analyze it, advocate a legislative initiative, and use the podium of the Soviets and transmission of sessions via radio and television to criticize those decisions that are unconstitutional in nature and fraught with grave consequences for the people.

With high-mindedness, we must raise the question about the role of communists in Soviets of all levels and about influence on leftist factions of the appropriate Party committees. The time has come to gain an understanding about whose interests each deputy with a Communist Party membership card in his pocket intends to protect. What kind of people's trust can we talk about if the majority of Soviet deputies are communists but the decisions being made are reactionary? If we do not soundly accelerate the resolution of the Party's fate that is swaying rank and file communists, then we need to introduce complete clarity with regard to deputies as soon as possible. The voters must firmly know: If a deputy raised his hand while voting to the detriment of the people, he is not a communist although in any case he is also setting aside his Party membership card.

Obviously, we need to have a special paragraph in the Party Charter on communists' work in the Soviets as it was during V.I. Lenin's time.

The Party's organizational principles are one of the most important tactics problems.

As has already been stated, we have restored the entire structure of Party raykoms and gorkoms. Restoration, consolidation, and renewal of the work of leading Party organizations is on the agenda. At the same time, we need to remember that the strength of the leading organization is not about what percentage of [party] dues are left in it or how united it is, but in how many like-minded people are united in it and how much it in fact and not in resolutions can implement the Party's political policy.

In this regard, I once again urgently appeal to all communists to not disband leading Party organizations until the Party itself resolves this issue. The gentlemen from the new government, while they have proclaimed the slogan of de-politicization, are beginning an offensive against the political rights of the workers, are taking up a cause to suffocate democracy, and are attempting to bind us to self-dissolution of Party organizations, having replaced them with NFL organizations. The workers of Latvia whose political advance guard remains the Communist Party will not permit infringement of their democratic freedoms. [The forces of] reaction will not succeed! Let those gentlemen remember this while they plot their next political adventures.

I want to particularly address communist leaders in the name of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. The Central Committee is receiving many letters and telephone calls in which communists express surprise at the ease with which certain leaders are hurrying to dissolve leading Party organizations and at times also widely announce their departure from the CPSU. As a rule, their efforts are being turned against them—in the end, these people are becoming unneeded by anyone. The Popular Front no longer needs them since their role as destroyers of the Latvian Communist Party has already been fulfilled. Yes and it is clearly obvious from their deeds that they have left the Communist Party not from conviction but because of appointments.

This fate is befalling even very prominent leaders. I will name former LRSPS [Republic of Latvia Professional Union Soviet] Secretary Ya.E. Nesaule or former Republic Council of Ministers Chairman V.-E. G. Bresis as examples. In his time, he ensured that the old Republic Council of Ministers staff adopted resolutions that pleased the NFL, including resolutions about de-politicization and dissolution of Party organizations in state institutions. And what was the reward? The NFL did not recommend him for inclusion in the current government.

These and numerous other cases with lower ranking leaders must serve as a warning to those who intend to exchange their conscience and CPSU membership card

for a bureaucrat's chair in the new government or in the new administrative apparatus. Think better of it, comrade communist leaders, do not multiply the ranks of the traitors! Really, turncoats and traitors are equally not needed by anyone. Do not amuse yourself with illusions that renunciation of the title of communist will give you access to enviable positions, salaries, or privileges from the new regime. No, comrades! Face the truth and you will understand that a communist who has changed red for blue, white, rose, and even yellow, will always remain a communist in the eyes of our opponents. They can hypocritically laugh at him while extracting momentary benefit from him, they can shake hands with him, but sooner or later they must dump him overboard. Just like he threw away his Party membership card today that had lain on his chest for a part of his life.

We have quite a number of cases at our disposal where secretaries of leading Party organizations are compelling communists to pay dues into the account of the so-called independent Communist Party.

Shame on them who act this way. This is also shameful for the leaders of the breakaway segment of our Party who are beginning the life of the new organization by planting fraudulent morals.

Right now when all raykoms and gorkoms have been renewed, leadership and normalization of the life of leading Party organizations is one of the fundamental tasks of Latvian Communist Party tactics at the current stage.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that many communists have not surrendered their membership cards and have not written statements about leaving the Party, but they are not actually participating in the work of the Party organization and are waiting for the decisions of the 28th CPSU and 25th Latvian Communist Party Congresses. We can understand these people but we cannot say that they are true fighters for the ideals and world view of our Party. Of course, the Congress will resolve many issues but one thing is clear: The Party of communists remains and as previously it will be the Party of Marxism-Leninism methodology, the Party of socialist orientation, and the Party that protects and represents the interests of the working class, peasants, and all working people. I think this is sufficient to already make the final choice and to already right now return steadfastness and confidence to ourselves.

To determine the Party's tactics, we need to ascertain what the Party must present from itself, what type of Party it must be under new conditions. The Central Committee thinks that our Party, being the opposition party, must not become the parliamentary party. It must be the party of the advance guard, militant, and aggressively operating in all workers' collectives and in all spheres of society's life, especially right now, at this important critical stage of our lives. At the same time, it must also totally utilize all forms of the parliamentary struggle.

As I have already said, Supreme Soviet adoption of the Declaration on Restoration of the Latvian Republic's Independence has introduced radical changes in the Republic's social and state life. I need to dwell on this in more detail.

The adoption of the Declaration mentioned above was conducted on a wave of artificially and skillfully aroused emotions and in an atmosphere of indiscriminate smearing of everything Soviet or socialist and under conditions when the new monopoly on truth is being celebrated and any opinion that diverges from the point of view proclaimed by the NFL is persecuted. However, the Latvian people have the right to know the entire truth. Therefore, we consider it to be especially important to express and argue our own attitude toward the Declaration. One of the most important tactical tasks of Party organizations from top to bottom is to explain the Party's position.

What does the Latvian people's need to choose consist of? On one hand, their ears have buzzed outwardly with the deceiving promises of the "bright future" that come easily to the politicians from the NFL and their proteges in the new government. It will allegedly arrive in 10-15 years after secession from the USSR. Through the efforts of these figures, this future is being described as Latvia's excessively embellished past of the 1920-1930's or as the idealized reality of Finland or Sweden.

Try to ask them: How, using what assets, will this modernization of Latvia's economy and reconstruction and retooling of industry be conducted? With what will the Republic pay for imports? What can its agriculture expect? Unfortunately, no one has yet succeeded in getting an intelligible, distinct, or specific answer to these questions.

Let us ourselves look into history and let us attempt to see the future through its prism. In 1938, nearly a third of the value of Latvian exports consisted of lumber, 24 percent—butter, nine percent—veneer, seven percent—flax, two percent—bacon, and a total of just 0.6 percent—VEF [Riga Order of Lenin State Electronics Plant imeni V.I. Lenin] manufactured radio receivers. Just consider [this]: This model is being proposed to us as a standard at the end of the 20th Century. For whom is this verbal fog intended that has been diligently supercharged by scholar-separatists? Where is the measure of irresponsibility to their own people? Who will assume moral and criminal responsibility when we all—Latvians, Russians, Ukrainians, and other peoples who one day found ourselves in a "free" Latvia—discover that the "Common Market" does not need our butter even at no cost, that our radio receivers are not competitive, that the forest for export lumber grows in Siberia, and hopes for golden rain from tourism are shattered because it is impossible to swim in our sea and we have a shortage of remarkable sights. Who will begin to answer when adventurist promises have plunged our own people into poverty and deprived them of their

future? We are certain that these questions must be placed on the agenda at some point.

Before beginning our independent life outside the framework of the federation, Latvia must travel the path to the world market. We do not need to do this alone under conditions of fierce competition but having a strong rear—the market and raw material and energy resources of the Soviet Union and its enormous scientific-technical potential. Only unscrupulous people can create the illusion that the USSR will permit modernization of the economy of a seceded Latvia using its natural resources and production capacities. If we become a foreign state for the USSR, then its attitude toward us will also appropriately [change]. We have not been presented the calculations for how much time is required for perestroika of existing economic relations and what losses or acquisitions are expected at the same time.

Right now Latvia's agroindustrial complex, to which all of the Republic's political forces assign a priority status, is supplied by 7,500 enterprises located throughout the Soviet Union. It would be the height of political ignorance to assume that if we become a foreign state for the USSR that all deliveries and prices will remain unchanged as if nothing has occurred.

We remind those same people who with excessive conceit think that Latvia "feeds half of Russia": The meat products that all three Baltic Republics deliver to the All-Union Fund total—it is horrible to think!—less than two percent of the meat produced by the country. It is useful for everyone to know these figures in order to more soberly reflect on our own fate and the fate of our people.

Latvia outside the Soviet Union must solve a very complicated problem—how to provide itself with grain and feed for livestock raising and poultry farming. But those who present our Republic in the near future as some sort of patriarchal archipelago of farmers with natural resources must answer the question, where will they get the resources to retool industry to produce our own agricultural machinery?

It does not require any political wisdom to brandish the slogan: "We will be hungry but free!" Those who also did not previously starve and who will not starve under any development of events most often repeat it. As always, the people take the punishment for the politicians' adventures.

Insofar as we clearly are not in a state to deal with anyone using hard currency or at world market prices for petroleum products, metal, cotton, and many other things without which the existence of modern industrial and agricultural production is unthinkable, we can easily predict the first results of Latvia's secession from the USSR. They are the abrupt shutdown of production, massive unemployment, and the decline of the population's already low standard of living. And as a result—the further deterioration of the socio-political situation, civil strife, and a rise in crime.

What do we see as a reasonable alternative?

Today, efforts are being exerted to revive the Leninist idea of an equal union of sovereign republics. We have not lived in such a union and it is not now completely understood what it would be like. But people are already being found who are ready to fanatically reject any promising proposal. But do we not need to seriously and thoroughly explain what the Soviet Union and M.S. Gorbachev can propose to us today? We would need to weigh and publicly and widely discuss all variants and only after this decide if the Latvian people are for this or not. Was this self-interested approach manifested by those people who hold the reins of power in the Republic right now? No, it was not. And really this is not the only possibility for normal existence and development within the framework of the federation.

Latvia's secession from the USSR is not at all required to create and develop free peasant farms, conditions for the greatest advantage for entrepreneurship, or to create joint ventures with foreign firms.

But our legislators who forced through the May 4 Declaration were deaf to any arguments and they turned out to be programmed for this decision at a previously designated hour. It was as if their leaders were in a great hurry, fearing that the people would indeed begin to listen to the voice of reason.

The Latvian Communist Party thinks that, instead of a forced adventurist approach for the Republic under the motto "First of all, let us secede and then we will see," a reasoned and democratic path must be selected that is based on world traditions: First of all—negotiations and a sober assessment of everyone for and against and then—a referendum.

We will unconditionally support any efforts of the Republic Supreme Soviet and Government that are directed at improving the economy for the benefit of the people, eliminating tensions in society, and continuing the dialogue with the USSR leadership. But we will decisively oppose any steps that are capable of worsening the instability in society and increasing confrontation. Unfortunately, precisely these steps predominate in the activities of the Latvian Supreme Soviet and Government right now.

The resurgence of militarized "aizsarg" subunits, that at one time were the primary armed support of K. Ulmanis' authoritarian regime, introduce additional intensity into the Republic's socio-political situation. The government envisions that they will fulfill police functions. Therefore, this is a quite legitimate question: What will the practical activities of these formations be directed at, what will their nature and moral principles be? The fact that they propose having "nationally minded Latvian Republic citizens who are dedicated to the state" join the "aizsargs" may serve as an answer to these questions. They are ordered to administer an oath to those joining

whose text states: "I swear not to spare strength or life for the restoration of the Latvian Republic and in defense of its independence."

If we orient ourselves by ATMODA, in the near future the organization's leadership intends to form three "aizsarg" regiments with a total strength of up to 2,000 men and an "aizsarg" NCO [Noncommissioned Officer] Academy is opening in Daugavpils. No legislative acts provide for the functioning of these structures.

It is worth noting that the "aizsarg" organization that was established for the first time in March 1919 by Christian Union Party Leader K. Ulmanis for use in the struggle for power was used against the revolutionary movement and the Latvian Communist Party. K. Ulmanis executed a coup d'etat in Latvia on March 15, 1934 with the support and direct participation of this organization.

There were nearly 68,000 members in the "aizsarg" organization in June 1940 at the time of the restoration of Soviet rule in Latvia. They refused to surrender their weapons. A large number of armed "aizsargs" joined the ranks of a fifth column that was organized by German Intelligence during the prewar period on Latvian territory and which aggressively fought against the Soviet authorities. From the beginning of the Fascist occupation of Latvian SSR territory, occupation authorities formed punitive detachments and 40 police battalions from members of this organization and German Intelligence dropped nearly 5,000 men into the rear of the Soviet Army to conduct sabotage operations.

It would be interesting to know: Why is this organization being revived? And can we call them measures to stabilize the socio-political situation in the Republic and to strive for civil peace and harmony?

The establishment of yet another formation—the guardians of order—that was announced by Council of Ministers Chairman I. Godmanis on May 23 also puts us on guard. The combination of these two facts can be seen as an attempt to substitute institutions established under the aegis of anti-Soviet and anti-socialist forces for legally existing law enforcement organs.

Similar actions of the Republic's ruling state organs are destabilizing the situation in Latvia and are sending it toward unpredictable exacerbation.

Predicting the dynamics of the socio-political situation directly depends on the answer to the main question: Along what path will our society and the Latvian State develop? Along the path of socialist selection or along the bourgeois model with an orientation on Western "democracies"?

Selection of one of these paths will be determined first of all by the popularity of the two main political forces—the Latvian Communist Party's and the Popular Front's—political slogans among the population and,

second, by reactions to changes occurring in Latvia both in the USSR and beyond its borders.

The Latvian Communist Party vitally needs to theoretically comprehend the changes occurring in the world and the policy to which we are adhering, to discard the obsolete and discredited elements of our ideas, and to preserve and return what is rational to our arsenal. In the future multi-party spectrum, the Latvian Communist Party will be able to occupy a worthy place as a leftist socialist force only if it succeeds in substantiating democratic socialism as the direction of societal progress, economic, social, political, ecological, cultural, and global progress, and if its renewed slogans are accepted and taken up by the broad workers masses.

We need to admit that we were previously constrained by dogmatic perceptions on the model of society and that we did not succeed, in a timely manner, in choosing and further converting everything progressive that has been created by human reason for many centuries. I have in mind commodity-money relations, rule-of-law statehood, balancing varied interests, democracy, movement toward individualization of the personality, and many other things that are part of the concept of democratic socialism today.

The key to understanding democratic socialism can be found only when you begin to look for it not only in criticism of society's already severely criticized shortcomings but also on the paths of its further development for the benefit of man. Democratic socialism does not at all signify that we need to draw some sort of general, schematic diagram of a new society and mobilize all political forces to construct this model. Democratic socialism first of all signifies a political movement for the sake of progress.

By reducing the popularity of radical ideas among the people that are being spread by leaders of the Republic's destructive forces, the Popular Front's propaganda and organizational efforts can be directed first of all toward conducting massive actions for reanimating its prestige. We can expect a peak in these activities this summer during the Ligo holidays, during Latvians' universal Song and Dance Holiday, and on the anniversary of the restoration of Soviet rule in Latvia. We can also assume that a special intensity of massive acts with the appropriate ideological accompaniment will be observed in connection with the June 14th anniversary of mass deportations and the August 23 "Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty."

There is little hope that the political forces opposing the Latvian Communist Party will cease the libelous campaign against our Party and the country's Armed Forces in the foreseeable future. Indiscriminate slander will be accompanied, as it occurs right now, by moral pressure on individual communists who have remained true to the CPSU's principles. It is impossible to exclude the possibility that the leaders of these political forces are attempting to utilize any grounds to once again arouse

public opinion and to divert it from urgent economic problems created by the incompetent government that took power into its hands.

The moment of truth by this same power arrived for the Republic's anti-socialist forces after they came to state power—they need to assume responsibility for all matters. They need to answer for the rapid decline of the Latvian people's standard of living and for the vital necessity food product standard under which our countrymen are beginning to envy a prisoner's ration. For hours long lines at gas stations, for unprecedented price increases and speculation in the most basic commodities, for the corruption that has penetrated into all of society's pores, and for the wild outburst of crime from which a simple man already cannot escape. Now we already cannot blame the center: say People who are well known to each of us have brought the Republic to its present state. These figures have moved from NFL Duma leaders chairs to soft ruling chairs in the parliament and government. In the future, they will hardly succeed in successfully exploiting the thesis on the Latvian Communist Party's responsibility, in particular for these already traditionally negative consequences of decisions initiated by the NFL factions in the Supreme Soviet.

Having been deprived of the opportunity to slander the Latvian Communist Party from these positions, the ruling upper circles are undertaking an offensive against us from the other flank—they are imposing a despotic law on parties upon the Supreme Soviet whose main goal, as is obvious from the draft, is to undermine the social foundation of the Latvian Communist Party. As a result of this law, we can anticipate a ban of Latvian Communist Party activities as a "party of a foreign state" since it does not intend to sever ideological and organizational ties with the CPSU.

The draft law has determined that so-called Latvian Republic citizens cannot under any circumstances join the party of a foreign state, that is, the CPSU. Hence, it follows: If some are prohibited from joining the Latvian Communist Party and others—non-citizens—are prohibited from having the Latvian Communist Party, the Party, so to speak, is condemned to death. We can add that the draconic draft law regulates that a citizen of the Latvian Republic for some reason can join only one party (according to this standard, we allegedly will break many records), that citizens of Latvia who are serving in the Soviet Army, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], KGB, or who work at the procurator's office, the court, Gosarbitrazh [State Board of Arbitration] are obligated to terminate their membership in the Party until they complete their service.

Well, we can certainly congratulate our home-grown legislators because they are leading Soviet Latvia toward that political pluralism on all counts that came about in Latvia's bourgeois Republic after Ulmanis' Fascist coup in 1934.

Not knowing how to deal with the economic and social catastrophe that is inevitably impending for the Republic, Latvia's new rulers are attempting to shift the people's alarmed attention toward restoration of bourgeois regimes. First of all, the restoration of private property for the means of production and land and its return to those who owned this property prior to 1940. Certain local governing organs are conducting this work "on trifles" while returning homes and dachas to their previous owners. This is the path that has been selected by those who advocate the people's interests in words.

The Latvian Communist Party is the main obstacle on the anti-socialist forces path toward these goals. This is precisely why an unprecedented "Crusade" has begun against it, why a widespread slander campaign has been unleashed, and why history is being distorted. The thought is being beaten into the minds of the simple people using all of the most modern ideological means that our Party is the most dangerous and evil foe of the Latvian people. We state very responsibly state: The Latvian Communist Party always was, is, and will be an integral part of the Latvian people, of all the people of Latvia, and a part of its political history and political culture, its political today and its political tomorrow.

It was created by the best sons of the Latvian people for the leadership of its very difficult struggle for freedom and social and national liberation. Ya. Raynis, P. Stuchka, F. Rozin, and many others were among the organizers of Latvian Social-Democracy and the Latvian Communist Party is its successor.

From the first days of its existence, the Party was truly interethnic. Its internationalism was clearly manifested both during the 1905 Revolution, during the Great October Revolution days of 1917, and during the years of the civil and Great October Wars.

We were proud and we will be proud of our Party's revolutionary traditions and its selfless fighters. And it is not their fault but our common misfortune that many ideals for which the Party fought and for which many communists gave their lives have not been made a reality.

The Latvian Communist Party's history has not only been complicated but full of contradictions and dramatic effect. They have banned and persecuted it, shot it and made it rot in jails. Analysis of the path the Party has traveled allows me to state: Let those who quite recently stood in its ranks, were listed as its activists, made the Party a career, and today have become its enemy not dream that they will be permitted to destroy the Latvian Communist Party or that they will succeed in frightening its true members.

We talk with great pain about the Party's blunders and tragic mistakes, especially the period of Stalin's cult of personality: We are doing this not [to cause] a sensation, but so that they will never again be permitted and to find constructive solutions for the future. Latvian Communists have their scores [to settle] with Stalin and with his

clique. The illegal Latvian Communist Party was subjected to Stalinism's cruel blows when it became a part of the Comintern during the 1920-1930's—after May 15, 1934 when K. Ulmanis executed a coup d'etat, dissolved the Seym, banned party activities, and the case of the arrest of hundreds of Latvian communists by the political secret police were assessed by the Stalin controlled Comintern as the result of clogging Latvian Communist Party organizations with provocateurs. [Stalin expressed] no confidence in the Party leadership. Many of its prominent figures who worked in the Foreign Bureau and in leading posts in the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] were declared to be "enemies of the people" or "nationalists" and were repressed. Many died. That same fate also awaited communists in Latvia itself when at the Comintern's insistence, an inspection of Latvian Communist Party members was conducted, in other words, a purge of the Party. I must say that Latvian Communists suffered not only from the Stalinist clique: During the years of Ulmanis' rule, his political secret police repressed 18,198 revolutionaries and anti-Fascists.

Today insufficient time does not permit me to review in detail the heroic and at the same time tragic history of our Party and the history of Latvian statehood, including the events of 1940 and subsequent years. As we agreed during the first stage of our congress, a painstaking report on this problem will be made during the concluding portion of the congress so that no "white spots" remain in our history and so that there are no allusions between us.

If I may return to contemporary problems, I cannot pass by in silence the greatest omissions permitted in the Republic during the last two to three years. They led to the loss of the Party's leading role in society, to a split in the ranks of communists along ideological lines, and gave rise to uncertainty among communists.

The previous Party Central Committee leadership that quite deservedly received an unsatisfactory assessment during the congress' first stage did not recognize in a timely manner the need to profoundly and comprehensively analyze the development trends of political processes. It clearly was inadequately high-minded in developing attitudes toward new socio-political organizations whose aspirations contradicted the ideological foundations of socialist society.

Faced with new social phenomena, the Central Committee and its leadership proved to be incapable of either analyzing or comprehending what was occurring or of lively, mobilizing work among the masses. Without the slightest resistance, the Central Committee began to surrender one political position after another. Practically all newspapers, magazines, television, and radio were transferred unimpeded into the hands of other political organizations. In a short period of time, Party raykom and gorkom first secretaries were replaced—the people who arrived to replace confirmed communists were

contaminated with the virus of separatism and nationalism and were careerists and time-servers. The same thing also occurred with government worker personnel. Contrary to the Charter, the Central Committee staff was massively renewed during the period between congresses—it was strongly diluted with people who already at that time held anti-Party positions. Many Party raykoms and gorkoms and the Central Committee staff totally capitulated and were totally withdrawn from the activities of the Party organization.

As a result, they did not note in a timely manner the danger of the indiscriminate division of society into party and people and the division of the Party into communists and the Party apparatus that was purposefully filled with anti-communists.

Many Central Committee members and responsible staff workers manifested an unprincipled nature in the ideological confrontation and they themselves began to manipulate the concepts of sovereignty and independence and once and for all stupefied untrained communists and disoriented them. The Central Committee was talking so much nonsense that it recommended that communists participate in NFL work. As a result, the matter was reduced to the fact that these same communists began to blow up the Latvian Communist Party from within.

If we cannot say it in another way, conscious slowing of any initiatives to organize elections for Soviets of people's deputies of all levels became the greatest error. Many gorkoms and raykoms were cast to the whims of fate—they were not supported either theoretically or practically by the Central Committee. Right now, with the passage of time, it is impossible to avoid the sensation that all of these uncoordinated activities were well coordinated and developed in a natural sequence as if subordinate to a single scenario.

Today the Latvian Communist Party can conceive its strategic goal very well—to provide worthy living conditions for every person. We think that achievement of this goal is guaranteed by the socialist choice, by building a humane, rule-of-law state, by forming a dynamic and effective economy based on varied forms of property and a regulated market, and by the struggle for an open, free, and enlightened society. It must provide the opportunity to express and satisfy varied human interests.

The Latvian Communist Party advocates the guarantee of total and effective productive employment of people. While acknowledging the advisability of a partial retooling of a number of manufacturing enterprises within the framework of restructuring the Republic's national economy, we are at the same time against those solutions to the problem that are dictated by the political ambitions of the current government of Latvia. The assertion that unemployment will affect only the so-called "migrants" who allegedly will be compelled to leave Latvia can be perceived in no other way than as a deception of the people themselves. Already not talking

about the immorality of such schemes, I must stress that we will not selectively seek unemployment of our own victims because workers collectives have been internationalized. It will strike even those who retain their jobs since they will have to support an army of thousands of people who find themselves unemployed. Any attempts to "distribute" unemployment according to national origin will turn out to have catastrophic consequences for society.

The Latvian Communist Party is for a regulated market economy based, as I have said, on the existence and competition of many varied forms of property and various commodity producers. We consider the key task to be not resubordination of enterprises from union to local control that is only advantageous for the local bureaucracy but guaranteeing production independence.

While advocating the implementation of Republic property rights for land, mineral wealth, internal waters, forests, air space, other natural resources, and also specific climactic features, the Latvian Communist Party considers the Laws of the USSR "On the Economic Independence of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR's" and "On the Bases of Economic Relations of the USSR and the Union and Autonomous Republics" and certain others to be a quite reliable basis for this.

An exceptionally difficult situation is developing in Republic agriculture. Social tensions have reached extremely high levels in rural areas. Persistent proposals about disbanding kolkhozes and eliminating sovkhoses and other agricultural enterprises are heating it up.

Those who work on the land and cultivate it should remain the owners. We advocate variety in types of farms in rural areas, identical opportunities for state, cooperative, and individual farms, and development of rent, lease, and other types of relations. We advocate the continued formation of peasant farms in the Republic, rendering them all possible material support, and their effective economic stimulation. Furthermore, they should not only be peasant farms but peasant commodity farms that are capable of supplying their products to the market. But we are against accelerating this process and transforming it into an end in itself. And this tendency has already been clearly noted.

Hasty distribution of kolkhoz and sovkhos lands continues during allocation of land as property to new landowners with the blessing of the government and local organs of power. Only a few hundred hectares of pastureland remained at a number of Republic kolkhozes and now the question has been practically raised about their dissolution without compensation and if the new farmers [can produce] the same volume of agricultural products in the next few years that were produced by the farms that are on the verge of being eliminated. The Latvian Communist Party is interested in an ally like the peasantry and is prepared to defend its

interests before any government and under any conditions. We share the anxiety of the consequences of "changes" in land utilization. We see our task in joint efforts to prevent a repetition of bourgeois Latvia's 1920 agrarian reforms when half of the landless [people] and farm laborers were left without plots and the rich received large plots of land.

The peasantry is the traditional ally of the working class in the struggle for economic, social, and political rights. The Communist Party, finding support in these two main forces of society, nevertheless also proceeds hand in hand with its other allies toward the achievement of goals that are embodied in the Latvian CP's tactics.

One of these allies is the youth who occupy an exceptionally important place in contemporary society. The Party sees its task in providing all possible support to youth in the most vulnerable issues for it—in warding off the impending threat of unemployment from youth and preserving its unimpeded access to education and the opportunity to study at schools, VUZ's, and technicums in a situation of real bilingualism. The Party will attempt to get the Republic Government to adopt the Komsomol-developed state youth program. The Central Committee thinks it is advisable to form soviets and commissions on youth issues in Party committees for closer ties with our young allies.

The largest mass organization of workers—trade unions—is enduring hard times. The united trade union movement has actually collapsed and disintegrated into sectors in the Republic. A number of its leaders have left the CPSU. All of this objectively weakens the economic capabilities of trade unions and deprives them of solidarity in protection of workers rights and complicates the socio-economic protection of its members.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee thinks that the Party must develop cooperation with the sector trade unions since they are closest of all to the broad masses of workers and precisely they have turned out to be the most viable in the situation that has arisen and they will obviously maintain this capability for the foreseeable future.

Along with sector trade unions, the Party intends to organize worker and employee social protection with the conclusion of collective agreements and resolution of the important problems of total employment in production, assignment of housing, improvement of working conditions, compliance with safety regulations and others.

The Republic United Council of Labor or Collectives [OSTK] is our reliable comrade in arms in the campaign for workers economic and political rights on a level with the trade unions. Recently established, it has already managed to recommend itself as an aggressive, militant organizer of the workers masses and has received convincing support in broad strata of the Latvian people. The Central Committee thinks that the Party can render tangible assistance to the OSTK if it sends its most

experienced and aggressive communist-industrial workers into its soviets and other formations.

I think that the time has come to provide society the grounds for our attitude toward such a political organization as the International Workers Front of Latvia. All the more so since attacks against this movement from anti-socialist forces are unmerited and misinform public opinion and not only have not been terminated, they are also being increased. The enemy has created a certain model of everything hostile to the Latvian people and social progress from this movement.

But let us recall that NFL did not give rise to Interfront but just the opposite—Interfront arose as a natural self-protection reaction of the non-Latvian segment of the Republic's population from ill-considered activities of Popular Front extremists. It arose in answer to the separatists' nationalist aspirations and their attempts to place the interests of the nation above man's rights and freedoms and the NFL's orientation toward creation of a privileged position for one nation.

We will be realists—this protective form must have appeared if you consider that at that time the demoralized Latvian Communist Party did not assume responsibility for protecting the non-Latvian segment of society and the Republic Government and Supreme Soviet, as if competing among themselves, approved documents one after the other under NFL dictation that infringed upon the rights and freedoms of this half of the people of Latvia. Let us recall the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Resolution on migration, the laws on citizenship and on languages, the resolution on relations with the Army, and many others.

It was not Interfront but the NFL Duma that offered the pages of its press for creation of Russians and the Soviet Army as a certain type of enemy and called for registration of those who wish to become citizens of an independent Latvia and who have thus separated people into "true" and "second rate" [citizens]. The NFL's newspaper and not Interfront's called for restoration of K. Ulmanis' "aizsarg" armed organization and the NFL Duma made its living quarters available for recruiting volunteers into it.

Yes, Interfront has not been deprived of shortcomings for various reasons. Perhaps primary among them was the desire to rapidly, with one stroke, restore justice. If we judge objectively, it is a shortcoming of people who have despaired.

That is the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee's point of view on this problem. Our tactics must consist of all possible support of those who take interethnic positions.

The Committee for Protection of Citizens' Rights and the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR is our youngest ally. Formed just recently, it has, in a short period of time, begun gathering signatures under the demand to conduct a referendum and on the form of

Latvia's statehood. In accordance with the law, the referendum must be designated if more than 10 percent of the voters come out in favor of it. The Committee has already accomplished its task in this sphere: The control standard has been exceeded by a factor of two and the collection of signatures continues to gather momentum.

Now another tactical task is being raised before the Committee: With the active encouragement of leading Party organizations, rank and file communists must become involved in the active detection of specific cases of violations of Republic residents' civil rights and their careful examination in order that they immediately become known both in our country and in international society.

In questions of mutual relations with the Soviet Army, the Party proceeds from the premise that the Army and the people are one. We, like all Europe and the entire world, must be grateful to Soviet soldiers because today we live, exist, and can participate in truly historical events. Our duty is to widely demonstrate that the Soviet Army's noble mission, the protectors of our peaceful labor, is to rebuff those forces that are attempting to slander it in the eyes of our youth. We express our solidarity with the assessments and conclusions contained in the Baltic Military District Military Soviet statement that was published this week.

The Party's cooperation with the Republic organization of veterans of war and labor and the very close coordination of our organizations with bolshevik veterans associations provides us the support of their great life experience and wisdom.

As you see comrades, we are not as alone as some would like to present us.

A special conversation about the Party press without which today no party or social organization can exist. Our position is worsened by the fact that television, radio, and youth, many sector, and rayon newspapers, and the majority of magazines have turned out to be on the other side of the barricade. SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA has remained totally on Latvian Communist Party positions. I need to assume that you all know about the resolution of the recent Central Committee Plenum on measures directed at returning TSINI to our positions. This matter is linked with many difficulties but one way or the other the resolution named above will be carried out. A regional press reorganization is occurring during these days and regional newspaper editorial boards are being formed that will completely belong to the Party. Steps are being taken to create our own television channel and we will also acquire our own radio frequencies possibly according to Lithuania's example.

As a result of the restoration of the Party mass media network, we also need to formulate tactical tasks for the Party press. In the Central Committee's opinion, today our primary task is as follows: We have spent enough time holed up in the trenches, we need to go over to the offensive—aggressively, show the people the truth in real

life examples, and loudly oppose the anti-popular, illegal, and discriminatory steps of the current government and administrative organs at all levels.

It is time to stop waiting for valuable instructions "from above"—each local communist journalist can see what he needs to do so that his newspaper becomes his Party committee's militant organ.

Our press is obliged to offer broad opportunities for publication of timely articles on trade union and Komsomol-youth themes and to thoroughly cover acute social problems of industrialized and rural areas and rebuff anyone who infringes upon the Soviet Army's prestige or who does not spare a place for items about violations of citizens' rights or in defense of the Constitutions of the USSR and Latvian SSR. Beggarly food standards, lines in stores, gasoline shortages, an ever growing list of shortage goods, stopping housing construction rates, price increases, all types of bribery, low quality—today all of this is the result of the activities of the current administration. We must inform the workers of the Republic about them through the Party mass media each day. Inform and give a worthy assessment to organizational and other capabilities of the people who have undertaken to lead the people to the "bright future."

This is what the press of the opposition party should become and our press will become this.

Summarizing everything that I have said, I can predict several situations of the development of events in the Republic and define the primary tactical lines of our Party's conduct for each one of them: From the individual communist and leading Party organization to the Communist Party Central Committee and the entire Party as a whole.

The first situation. It already exists—this is the campaign to conduct a referendum. At this time the Party heads up the work to gather signatures and explains the need for the referendum and the legal basis for this step. All forms of political campaigning, including parliamentary, are being used.

As a result, two situations may arise. The first: We obtain approval to conduct a referendum. The Party conducts explanatory work: It demonstrates the anti-popular nature of the policy directed at Latvia's secession from the USSR. The Second is the opposite: [The proposal] to conduct a referendum is rejected. The Party increases criticism of the regime and prepares for new elections with the goal of winning a majority of the votes. Development of pre-election programs.

While conducting the referendum, the task is reduced to active participation in the formation and work of commissions and monitoring compliance with the law on referendums.

The referendum can have two results: Latvia remains in the USSR. In this case, we seek dissolution of the Supreme Soviet that adopted the May 4 Declaration and

that did not obtain the voters' support in this. The Party conducts preparations for the elections with the goal of winning a majority of the votes. In the event that the referendum advocates secession from the federation, the Party develops a new Program and Charter and changes its tactics with regard to the situation that has arisen.

Rejection or cessation of May 4 Declaration activities and the initiation of negotiations with the leadership of the USSR and conclusion of the appropriate agreements is the probable variant. Comrades, as you all know, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee has advocated this outcome since the day the Declaration was adopted. We see our task as actively participating in negotiations and developing the required documents. The Party continues to conduct agitation against Latvia's secession from the USSR.

And, finally, it has not been excluded that the authorities will completely implement the declaration under NFL pressure, the Supreme Soviet will be dissolved, and Semy elections will be set. In this case, the Party will conduct a campaign for a majority of the seats in the Semy. With complications possible due to discrimination of the voting rights of a segment of the population, the Party will assume the leadership in preparation for alternative elections.

Other turns of events have also not been excluded. The Party must always be ready to find its place in them while remembering the main thing: Since its inception, it has been preordained to be the spokesman for the majority of the working people's thoughts and aspirations.

While concluding this conversation about Latvian Communist Party tactics under contemporary conditions that require us to have the ability to overcome difficulties, I would like to remind the congress delegates of V.I. Lenin's advice: "Difficulties appear because we are faced with a task whose resolution very often requires the enlistment of new people and the need to conduct extraordinary measures and extraordinary methods." Now the time has come when Vladimir Ilich's advice will prove very useful for all of us.

Thank you for your attention.

9 June Latvian CP Congress Report

90UN2421A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
12 Jun 90 p 1

[25th Latvian CP Congress Resolution: "25th Latvian Communist Party Congress Resolution On the 50th Anniversary of the Restoration of Soviet Rule in Latvia"]

[Text] This marks the 50th Anniversary of the events associated with the restoration of Soviet rule in Latvia and the formation of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. In this regard, the Party Congress considers it politically important and timely to express its attitude

toward this event in the context of the current socio-political situation and the future development of Latvia.

The Congress notes that recently political forces that take the stand of denial of the socialist choice are undertaking efforts to compromise and discredit, in society's consciousness, the ideas and essence of socialism, the activities of the Latvian Communist Party, and the long-lived struggle of the working people of Latvia for their social liberation. This has been particularly manifested after the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the May 4 1990 "Declaration on Restoration of the Latvian Republic's Independence."

Anti-socialist orientated ideologues are falsifying the historical past and are frankly speculating on the national feelings and moods of the people who survived Stalinist repression, the years of stagnation, and who are dissatisfied with the standard of living and social protection and worsening interethnic relations.

Especially many ideological and political distortions are being permitted in the interpretation of the events of 1940 in Latvia when its working people gave a preference to Soviet rule and entry into the USSR during a difficult and contradictory prewar domestic and foreign policy situation.

And all of this is being done with one goal—to discredit socialist ideals and gains and to reanimate the prewar Latvian Republic life style and to restore bourgeois orders to counterbalance them.

Under such conditions, the Congress considers it necessary to once again affirm the Latvian Communist Party's position that the restoration of Soviet rule in Latvia in 1940 and the Republic's entry into the USSR was a legitimate stage of the historical process and a consequence of a many year revolutionary struggle of Latvia's working people for the socialist choice of development.

The truth of history is that the socialist idea still in the last century began to be confirmed in the Latvian people's consciousness. Their devotion to the socialist idea with all their revolutionary conviction was confirmed during the three Russian revolutions. It is no accident that V.I. Lenin shared and highly valued this devotion.

The Latvian Communist Party, which grew on revolutionary traditions of the Latvian proletariat and peasants and the intelligentsia which came from its ranks, very graphically manifested its consistency in defending and affirming the socialist idea. History itself has witnessed that it obtained the universal support of its people in this cause because it mostly completely expressed its interests.

Already during the years of revolution 1905-1917, the workers of Latvia not only created the embryos of new revolutionary power but also took the first practical steps toward attainment of Latvia's national autonomy while a part of Russia. On the eve of the Great October Revolution, the Social-Democrats of Latvia and the

Soviets stated that the truest path for the Latvian people was the path of socialism and state unity with the future socialist Russia.

The rise of Soviet rule in 1917 on the unoccupied part of Latvia became the result of this.

The establishment of Soviet rule in Latvia in 1918-1919 is an irrefutable fact that is evidence of the expression of the will of the working people to embark on the path of socialist transformation.

It is an indisputable fact that the first sovereign national state in Latvia's history was established not by a group of politicians who formed the Interim Government in November 1918. It arose on December 17, 1918 when the Manifesto of the Soviet Government of Latvia proclaimed the creation of a Soviet Republic that was constitutionally consolidated at the 1st Congress of Soviets of United Latvia (January 13-15, 1919).

After the fall of Soviet rule in Latvia due to external and internal causes, the working people did not cease their struggle for socialism. Tens of thousands of revolutionaries, Latvian advocates of the socialist path—in their homeland and beyond its borders—believed that sooner or later Soviet rule would be restored.

Under K. Ulmanis' authoritarian regime, the dissatisfaction of the peoples masses and social tension increased in the Latvian Republic. The threat of impending war, the Western countries policy to "appease" Hitler, and the Stalinist leadership's negotiations with Fascist Germany—all of this somehow or other predetermined the choice of the Latvian people that would ensure their survival.

During this difficult situation, the Latvian Communist Party oriented the workers toward the socialist choice, restoration of Soviet rule, and toward a close union with the USSR. As a result, the working people of Latvia selected precisely this path in June 1940. It was a difficult choice. It intertwined successes and defeats, bright and tragic revolutionary upsurge and enthusiasm, and the grossest violations of socialist legality and despair in hopes. This is history itself and today we can neither "improve it" nor "make it worse."

In the name of the Republic's communists, Congress delegates and participants express their deep gratitude to all fighters for Soviet rule, for socialism, to the direct participants of the revolutionary events of 1940, to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War and labor, and to the patriots of Soviet Latvia for their high civic duty and bravery, internationalism and loyalty to socialist ideals.

The 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress invites communists and workers to mark the 50th Anniversary of the restoration of Soviet rule in Latvia and formation of the Latvian SSR as an important milestone in the life of the people. This is an integral part of its life, fears and hopes, and lessons for the future.

The Latvian Communist Party will consistently defend socialist values and along with the Latvian people will move along the path of implementing sovereignty, social justice, and confirmation of humane and democratic socialism.

Gorbunovs' Speech at Federation Council

90UN2370B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 Jun 90 p 3

[Speech by Chairman A. Gorbunovs of Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet at meeting of USSR Federation Council on 12 June 1990]

[Text] Honored President!

Honored guests!

The Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the Latvian Republic have authorized me to inform the Federation Council of our point of view regarding the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet Declaration "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic."

I would describe the political situation in Latvia in the context of USSR domestic policy with one quite accurate but harsh word—deadlock. This deadlock was not created by a single person or even by a group of people; it is the logical result of earlier relations—i.e., the relations between the republic and the center, in which there was never enough equality or a mechanism for the realization of equality. At this time—right up to the present day—an unconditional demand is being issued in Moscow and in our republic for the repeal of the 4 May Declaration of Independence adopted by a legally elected Latvian parliament. No one has questioned the legality of the election of our parliament yet. We are being asked to make a compromise which the Latvian public might interpret as a surrender, and most of the deputies will never agree to surrender in the matter of the restoration of state sovereignty.

What is our position?

Our position has been determined by our past, present, and future.

Latvia's past included the implementation of the right to self-determination and the achievement of independence in 1918, followed by 20 years of uncertain development as an autonomous state.

Our past also included the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which decided the fate of the Baltic zone, the Stalin regime's ultimatums and brutality, and the incorporation of Latvia as part of the USSR.

There is no question that positive changes have also taken place in the last 50 years, but if we compare Latvia's position in Europe in 1939 with its present

position, the present one is incomparably worse, because in 1939 Latvia was on the same starting line, so to speak, as Finland.

Latvia's present is reflected in the desire of the People's Front movement for political and economic independence accompanied by the maintenance and development of close and friendly relations with the republics of the Soviet Union on the basis of equivalent exchange.

This desire has been confirmed by three election campaigns—for the elections of people's deputies of the USSR and the elections of people's deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet and local soviets.

The Supreme Soviet's decision to approve the declaration of 4 May was dictated by the will of the majority, which was expressed in these elections. More than two-thirds of the deputies voted for it. The People's Front formed a government through its majority in parliament. There is also an opposition.

What is the purpose of the declaration? A new stage in the establishment and reinforcement of Latvia as an independent state is beginning. The final goal of this process is the actual restoration of state sovereignty.

Why will we be unable to accomplish this within the framework of the USSR Constitution? Because the Constitution of the USSR does not envision the state sovereignty of republics or any mechanism for the establishment of equality in the republic's relations with the center and with other republics. I have already been saying this for 2 years in my speeches at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

If the state sovereignty of republics is recognized, the Declaration of the Latvian Supreme Soviet on the Sovereignty of Latvia must also be recognized.

This will be the first prerequisite for equality. The actual restoration of state sovereignty, however, can definitely be described as a process. For this reason, the Latvian Supreme Soviet has stipulated a transition period. In our opinion, the main thing now is the joint determination of the legal status of the transition period. This will require the official negotiation of an agreement on the legal status of the period of transition to the complete exercise of Latvian state sovereignty. This agreement will be based on the initial premise of Latvia's exercise of autonomy through the sovereignty of the Latvian Supreme Soviet. All of the conflicts arising between laws of the USSR and of the Latvian Supreme Soviet will be resolved by means of equal and mutually beneficial agreements.

No one is interested in self-isolation today. The capabilities of, for example, Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belorussia, and the Ukraine are different, but this does

not exclude the possibility of equal and mutually beneficial relations in all spheres. It is quite natural that those with less impressive capabilities will be more interested in cooperation.

If you, honored Mikhail Sergeyevich, accept our proposal, I am prepared to submit your proposal regarding the suspension of the declaration during these negotiations to the Latvian Supreme Soviet for consideration.

Latvian Program For Foreign Economic Relations Outlined

90UF0301A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 23, 18 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Voldemar Gavars, deputy chief of a department of the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers Directorate For Foreign Ties, by Ya. Payders: "Latvian Foreign Trade: Path To Independence"]

[Text] One of the main steps on the path to independence is Latvia's independent foreign trade. Voldemar Gavars, deputy chief of a department of the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers' Directorate For Foreign Ties, discusses the opportunities and obstacles in this area.

[Payders] When did the Latvian government begin drawing up a program to reform its system of foreign ties?

[Gavars] Latvian economists are well aware of the fact that strict centralization of foreign ties cannot function effectively for very long, and so efforts began to draw up the reform programs back during Yu. Ya. Ruben's leadership. Preparatory work got under way in 1987, thanks to which the "Interlatvia" program was established. Under this program, proposals were drawn up for the organization of foreign trade under Latvian economic independence. These proposals were subsequently taken into account in the USSR Supreme Soviet Law on Economic Independence of the Baltic Republics. However, the law granted us only pro forma rights, since it has an amendment stating that in any event, everything has to be reconciled with the USSR's interests. On February 7, 1990, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted resolution no. 120, which sets forth guidelines for broadening the republics' rights.

[Payders] Can we assume, then, that the long-awaited independence is about to become a reality?

[Gavars] We would like to control our trade resources ourselves and to issue licenses for goods produced in Latvia. The USSR Council of Ministers resolution provides for such rights, but once again there is an amendment about reconciliation with the USSR's interests. In reality, this means that the Latvian government must reconcile with the USSR the list of goods for which licenses could be issued in Latvia within the framework of a quota established by the Soviet Union. Latvia drafted corresponding decisions and documents, but after the declaration of Lithuanian independence, the

USSR blocked a resolution of these issues. Now Latvia can independently register joint enterprises and open offices of foreign firms in Latvia, the potential for foreign tourism has expanded, and the Latvian Foreign Relations Bank has been authorized to operate. Incidentally, such banks have been functioning in Lithuania and Estonia for some time, but in Latvia it began operating only a few weeks ago.

[Payders] However, no progress is to be observed in the sphere of foreign ties as yet. All nonplan activities by Latvian enterprises have been virtually halted. In order for economic independence to become a reality, it is essential to earn foreign currency. Where, in your opinion, is it necessary to start?

[Gavars] Today everyone is saying that he is earning or intends to earn foreign currency. However, in comparison with earlier years, we have begun receiving far less. First and foremost, we must put our own enterprises [farms ?? khozyaystva] in order, and balance expenditures with possibilities. We spend three times more foreign currency than we earn. I believe that expenditures could be significantly reduced if we were to begin producing many goods ourselves. There is no need to buy many electric goods, communications instruments, or, for example, buses from Hungary for 100,000 foreign-currency rubles.

[Payders] What products currently bring the most foreign currency receipts?

[Gavars] The output of the machinery manufacturing, radio equipment, furniture, wood-processing, and food industries.

[Payders] What share of foreign currency income does tourism account for?

[Gavars] A negligible share, approximately 3 percent to 5 percent of the total foreign currency volume.

[Payders] Does that mean that even if this group of revenues were to be increased severalfold, the overall foreign currency fund would not perceptibly change?

[Gavars] I can't imagine how we could currently bring about a significant increase in tourism. We do not have the appropriate infrastructure. Building a medium-sized hotel requires a \$50-million credit. We are currently drawing up various projects, but problems abound—where are we going to get the money and construction materials, who will do the building, and so on.

[Payders] Many Deputies of the "Equality" faction believe that the only way to ensure the rapid development of Latvia's economy is to buy raw materials cheaply from Russia for rubles. Perhaps Latvia's foreign ties should be geared toward the awakening Eastern market?

[Gavars] In my opinion, the Eastern market will become profitable for us only when we are separated by a real border, a customs system, and independent finances.

Imagine what would happen to Finland if its border were open and the ruble was the Finnish currency?

[Payders] Won't the attraction of foreign capital ease the difficulties of the transition period?

[Gavars] Undoubtedly, but for the time being we lack the necessary conditions to attract Western capital investments. In my view, it will be difficult to create them even in two to three years. First, Latvia must guarantee foreign investments. Second, a normal financial infrastructure (banks and so forth) is required. Third, a corresponding economic service infrastructure (roads, communications, etc.) is needed. But most importantly, political stability is necessary. Until a treaty is concluded with the USSR, there will be no foreign investments. The law on property as well as other economic laws will really begin functioning only after relations are normalized with the USSR.

Latvian Citizens' Rights Group on Referendum Progress

90UN2460A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
19 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "At the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions"]

[Text] A regular session of the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions was held in Riga. The session was conducted by committee chairman A. P. Rubiks.

The agenda include the discussion and adoption of the text of a letter from the committee to the USSR President and to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, demanding the preparation and conducting of a referendum concerning the republic's status.

It was noted that the committee had received from the republic inhabitants more than 305,000 signatures, which represents the expression of the will of more than 16 percent of the voters. In accordance with the existing legal standards, this number of signatures is sufficient to raise before the country's President and the Latvian parliament the question of preparing and conducting a referendum concerning the republic's status.

It was also emphasized that the sending of the letter to Moscow and to the republic's parliament does not mean that the collection of signatures has stopped. The task of all structures of the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions that were created in the outlying areas is to reach every proponent of the idea of the need for the referendum.

The session considered the concept of the Law governing the social defense of citizens under conditions of possible unemployment. A special working group was created to develop a new normative act as an alternative to

the AUCCTU draft. The responsibility of heading that work was assigned to the Latvian SSR United Council of Labor Collectives [OSTK]. The committee requested the republic's workers to participate in the creation of that document. The proposals and comments should be sent to O. S. Kapranov, chairman of the committee's legal commission, at the following address: Riga, ul. Kr. Valdemara, 5, Telephone 32-09-44.

The committee listened to an informational report concerning the written statements and oral appeals that it has been receiving, and concerning the steps being taken with regard to them. The following figures were given at the session. During the incomplete month of the committee's existence, it has received 679 letters and has been visited personally by more than 1700 persons. The absolute majority—both Communists and non-party members—express their warm support of the idea of creating a committee that unites the efforts of all the sociopolitical organizations that are fighting for a constitutional resolution of the questions of the independence and further development of Latvia as part of the USSR. There has been approval of the firm political line that was occupied by the new makeup of the Latvian CP Central Committee, which, in particular, originated the idea of creating the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions.

The basic theme in the mail and the oral statements is the infringement of citizens' rights. In this regard, the main object of criticism is the new Latvian parliament. Multinational in its makeup, it has been enacting legislative acts that discriminate against the interests of the Russian-speaking segment of the population. While speaking out in favor of democracy, the letter authors emphasize, the parliament is enacting legal documents without taking into consideration the opinion of the parliamentary minority, which represents the interests of thousands of voters.

A considerable amount of the correspondence consists of letters from disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War, who have found themselves in a difficult situation as a result of the closing of stores specially created for them. For example, category II disabled veteran Sh. reports that his attempt to bear the difficulties of his present-day life encountered crudeness and sarcasm on the part of L. Gavars, the republic's deputy minister of trade. He received no better reception at the Riga City Ispolkom.

Another segment of the correspondence consists of appeals concerning the rendering of assistance in finding jobs for persons who, most frequently as a result of their political convictions, find themselves in the streets for specious formal reasons. For example, Communist R. reports that she was asked to quit her job when, in reply to question of which party she intended to link her future fate with, she answered, "With the one that I entered."

The mail arriving at the committee also brings facts that indicate that officials are officially sabotaging the government's program for teaching the Latvian language in the republic to the nonindigenous segment of the population. For example, it was reported from a book store that the new leadership of a number of the republic's trade-union committees do not want to buy the teaching aids that are designed for the independent study of Latvian, the production order for which was previously formalized by those committees. The argument that is given is more than strange: inasmuch as Russians do not want to become citizens of the Latvian Republic, it is not mandatory that they know the language.

The correspondence received by the committee attests to the fact that there has been an increase in the number of instances of refusal of medical assistance or of providing trade services simply for the reason that the patient or the customer could not make himself or herself understood in Latvian. There have also been examples of the reverse situation, when commodities have not been released to a customer in a store simply because he or she has been speaking Latvian.

The committee investigates thoroughly each instance of violation of citizens' rights, and involves a broad public aktiv in this work. Thus, more than 20 persons who requested assistance in finding them a job are working successfully today at enterprises whose collectives are members of the OSTK.

Press center of the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions.

Latvia's CPSU Congress Delegates Fault People's Front Faction

90UN2460B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
26 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Article: "Political Statement by Participants in the Meeting Between the Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and Members of the Latvian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] Latvia's Communists are extremely concerned about the dangerous course of the political processes in the republic and in the country.

In Latvian society there has been an intensified polarization of the political forces that reflect the multiparty system that has actually formed, a system in which the Latvian Communist Party is opposed by the republic's People's Front, which has absorbed parties and movements of anticommunist mood and of nonsocialist orientation.

The intensification of the political tension and the development of the economic instability down a blind alley from which there is no way out are promoted by the destructive actions taken by the deputy faction of the NFL [Latvian People's Front] in the Supreme Soviet, which faction is enacting one legislative act after another

without forecasting or taking into consideration their possible political and economic consequences.

The Declaration entitled "Restoring the Independence of the Latvian Republic," which was enacted by the Supreme Soviet on 4 May 1990, not only fails to reflect the opinion of the majority of the Latvian nation with regard to that question, but is an unconstitutional act that does not conform to the striving to create a law-governed state.

The election of Latvian SSR people's deputies was held on the basis of an undemocratic law, with an unequal number of voters in the okrugs, under conditions of the purposeful processing of the public opinion by the mass media, which had fallen under NFL influence, and primarily by television and radio. That atmosphere encouraged a large number of the republic's voters not to participate in the election.

That provided the opportunity for the NFL candidates for election as the republic's people's deputies, who had received the support of only 35.33 percent of Latvia's voters, to win 138 deputy mandates in the Supreme Soviet, that is, the majority.

The republic's Supreme Soviet continues to ignore the demand by a considerable segment of the franchised Latvian population that there should be a referendum on the question of the future status of the Latvian state.

On the insistence of a number of people's deputies from the NFL faction, a proposal about the so-called "depoliticizing" of the agencies of state authority and administration, and of the labor collectives at enterprises and institutions, is being implemented. Actually that proposal can be summarized as "repoliticizing," that is, the forced replacement of the primary organizations of the Communist Party in those agencies and collectives by other political structures that oppose it.

Despite the NFL's campaign slogan concerning the de-ideologizing of sports and art, those spheres are being successfully exploited for purposes of exerting a massive psychological effect on people. There has been an increase in the psychological pressure on Communists and non-party supporters of the Latvian Communist Party. There has been an increase in the number of instances of intolerance toward them on the part of the leadership who are NFL supporters, up to and including the creation of intolerable conditions on the job.

This cannot be evaluated as anything but an attempt to tie a person's loyalty to the People's Front directly with the welfare of his family, an attempt to put a ban on the actions of the Latvian Communist Party.

In a number of soviets of people's deputies, for example, in the soviet of people's deputies of Vidzemes Priekshpilset (Proletarskiy Rayon), in the city of Riga, serious consideration is being given to the proposals concerning the discriminatory limitations of rights and freedoms, including the franchise, of entire categories of people

who up to now have completely enjoyed all the constitutional rights and freedoms.

Slandorous and insulting fabrications concerning the USSR Armed Forces and their role in the history and present-day situation in our country are being successfully disseminated.

The so-called "committees of citizens of the Latvian Republic," which lay claim to the role of the expresser of the interests of the Latvian nation and to the power to exercise state power, in a situation when there has been no interference by the government and there has been support from the NFL, are recreating the militarized organization of "aizsargs" ("defenders"), which besmirched itself in the past by supporting the establishment in the republic of a bourgeois authoritarian regime of profascist mood and by collaboration with the Hitlerite occupying forces in carrying out genocide against the Latvian nation.

Such actions also are at variance with the principles of a law-governed state and encroach upon people's rights.

Essentially speaking, the shameful administrative fiat system is being replaced by the rigid political diktat of the Latvian People's Front, in which the leading role is played by the radical forces.

The participants in the meeting consider it necessary to state:

1. The delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Latvian Communist Party are instructed to defend in the congress work the position developed at the 25th Latvian CP Congress; to defend the socialist choice and the ideological and organizational unity of the CPSU; to speak out decisively against the attempt to stop or to pervert the processes of the democratic reforms of socialist society, and against the attempts to bring down the party and the Soviet socialist community of nations, regardless of who is making those attempts; and to be faithful to the socialist choice of development as part of the Union of Soviet Republics, which choice was made by the peoples of Russia in October 1917 and by the working nation of Latvia in July 1940.

2. The basic responsibility for aggravating the crisis in society and in the party is borne by CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo, which have not yet proposed any clearly expressed, scientifically verified concepts for ways to resolve the socioeconomic problems, which concepts would be as clear as possible to the rank-and-file workers and that would correspond to the real-life situation.

The responsibility for the arising of sociopolitical tension in the republic must be borne by the republic leadership and the leaders of the People's Front and the other destructive forces that have joined them, who have not been listening to the voice of reason or to the opinions of the workers and Communists.

3. While supporting the constitutional right of the Latvian nation to form an independent state, and confirming our complete recognition and respect for the right of any nation to self-determination, up to and including secession from the USSR, we cannot agree to a situation in which the decisions to change the republic's status and state system are made by parliamentarians who do not reflect the moods of all the voters of Latvia. Seized by national-separatist euphoria, those deputies ignore the opinion of hundreds of thousands of workers.

Latvian Communists feel that the implementation of the Supreme Soviet's 4 May 1990 Declaration entitled "Restoring the Independence of the Latvian Republic" must be temporarily stopped, since the decision concerning the status of the republic as a state outside the USSR can be made only on the basis of a nationwide vote (referendum), with the consideration of the opinion of all the voters, all the social and national groups in the republic's population.

The Latvian Communist Party will take decisive steps to oppose any discriminatory attempts or attempts to limit the franchise or other rights and freedoms of the citizens, regardless of who is making those attempts.

The way out of the crisis situation that has been created is, in our view, the development of a sovereign Latvian state within the framework of a Soviet federation to be created on a fundamentally new political, economic, and legal basis, that serves the interests of the workers and that guarantees for every individual socially protected living conditions that are worthy of him and that correspond to modern civilization, with the republic's new status in the federation and the new status of the Latvian Communist Party in the CPSU.

We view as destructive behavior the actual refusal of the republic's leadership to participate in the preparation of the new union treaty. The declaration, in words, that one is striving for negotiations, while ignoring, in deed, the invitation to participate in the preparation of the treaty draft, is being carefully concealed from the nation.

In order to overcome this situation, we insist on the immediate formation of a competent delegation from the republic to participate in the preparation of the new union treaty, which delegation must include representatives of all the political forces that are operating in the republic, including the Latvian Communist Party.

It is necessary for all of us to unite our efforts in order to carry out constructive and joint work for the benefit of and on behalf of the nation of Latvia. The republic's Supreme Soviet must accept the appeal issued by USSR Supreme Soviet to the highest agencies of state authority in the union and autonomous republics that was made on 14 June 1990 and that designates the attempt to eliminate the tension in society.

The Latvian Communist Party defends the principle: Latvia's fate is determined by its entire nation and is linked with the fate of the entire country.

The participants in the meeting demand the conducting of a referendum concerning the republic's status.

Riga, 22 June 1990.

Resolution on Latvian Agrarian Reform

90UN2460C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
26 Jun 90 p 3

["Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic Concerning Agrarian Reform in the Latvian Republic"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic, recognizing that the forcible collectivization of the republic's agriculture, both from the political and legal point of view and from the economic point of view, was erroneous and the methods of implementing it were illegal, resolves:

1. For purposes of restructuring the land relations and property relations in the national economy, to carry out an agrarian reform.

2. Within the framework of the agrarian reform, the government is to carry out:

—land reform;

—reform of economic relations;

—reform of the administration of the agrarian branch.

3. To establish that the land reform encompasses all the land in the republic's rural localities and to carry it out in two stages. At the first stage the land is offered for use to physical and legal persons and is transferred in kind. At the second stage the boundaries of the land that has been offered for use will be refined, an evaluation will be made of that land, and, in the established legal procedure, the right to private ownership of the land can be restored or the land can be transferred to the private ownership of physical persons without remuneration or in exchange for payment.

4. To establish that the former owners of the land or their descendants, the existing land users, and persons wishing to receive land submit a request for the offering of land for use in rural localities within a year from the day of publishing this Resolution, with an indication of the time period from the beginning of the use of the land, but no later than 1 November 1996.

Any other previously announced deadlines for submitting requests for land must be coordinated with the terms of this Resolution.

Requests for land are made to the soviet of people's deputies in the volost or city (settlement) on the administrative territory of which there is also land in rural localities, at the place of location of the person requesting the plot of land.

5. To establish that physical and legal persons who, by the indicated deadline, have not requested land for use lose their legally established priority for receiving land for their use and can receive land on general principles.

6. To establish that, prior to the deadline for making requests for land that has been established by paragraph 4 of this Resolution, the requests for land are satisfied and the land is transferred in kind, if the land must be granted in urgent, socially important situations, and also to peasant farms, if other possible claimants for the requested plot of land have rejected in writing their priority rights to that land.

The decision to grant land in the instances mentioned in this paragraph is made by the rayon soviet of people's deputies in response to a recommendation from the soviet of people's deputies in the volost or city (settlement) on the administrative territory of which there is also land in rural localities.

7. In order to coordinate the work and the legal support of the land reform, to create prior to 1 September 1990 land commissions of the soviets of people's deputies of the volosts and cities (settlements) on the territory of which there is also land in rural localities, and of rayons and the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic.

8. To instruct the Council of Ministers of the Latvian Republic to carry out the agrarian reform, its material-technical support, and the restructuring of the national economy that corresponds to that reform.

9. To instruct the Council of Ministers of the Latvian Republic, prior to 1 September 1990, to prepare and submit to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic the necessary drafts of laws and resolutions dealing with the support of the agrarian reform.

A. Gorbunovs, chairman,
Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic.
I. Daudiss, secretary,
Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic.

Growing Political Role of Latvia's Agrarian Union Viewed

90UN2460D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
26 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by LETA correspondents Natalya Ivanova and Tatyana Kovalskaya: "Let's Check Our Positions"]

[Text] The increased activity of the Union of Latvian Agriculturalists that has been noted in recent months, all things considered, will increase even more. And, according to the union leaders, it is not so much quantitatively as it is qualitatively—in addition to the development of societies and branches in the outlying areas, the SSL [Union of Latvian Agriculturalists] intends to find forms for intensifying its own influence in the republic's parliament. Therefore it is completely natural that the persons invited to the next session of the central

board of the Union of Agriculturalists include, in addition to the chairmen of its rayon societies, deputies representing the union in the parliament.

The main factor for deciding to make this meeting a joint one was the legislative draft concerning land reform, which is currently being considered in the republic's government and will soon be submitted to the parliament. The SSL considers several recommendations made in that draft to be fundamentally important. For example, concerning the procedure for granting ownership of the land. From the SSL point of view, the first persons to have the right to receive the land are its current users, and only then the former owners. The basic condition stipulated for allocating the land is: the plot is being cultivated either by the owner himself, or by the members of his family. One additional condition to which the SSL directs its attention is: the land can be granted only for the production of agricultural output.

The union has called upon the deputies to pay special attention to these factors and to defend them subsequently during the discussion in the parliament.

"Like the very fact of our inviting deputies to our session, this may appear to some people to be exerting pressure on them," Ayvar Bertulis, SSL deputy chairman, said. "But this is a well-accepted practice in parliamentary work. Rural deputies have been called upon to represent and defend the peasants' interests. And I do not think that it is excessive to direct their attention once again to these important factors."

The brief statement by Voldemar Strikis, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet's Permanent Commission on Agriculture and Timber Management, developed into a discussion lasting one and a half hours, confirming once again that today's situation in the rural localities is perhaps more complicated and more contradictory than in the other branches of the economy. But it was precisely with the resolution of the rural problems that absolutely all the speakers linked the possibility of making cardinal changes for the better. The participants in the public movements in the rural areas have a rather large number of false ideas about one another, which do not help the situation. Therefore it is difficult to overestimate the importance of such meetings, at which, as the current one has demonstrated, there can be a living exchange of opinions, information, and arguments with a common goal—the defending of the interests of the producers of agricultural output.

It is obvious today that at the present time, slightly more than a year after its formation, the SSL, which proclaimed itself to be a socioeconomic organization, is already taking part in the republic's political life. And it was precisely in this context that the participants at the session discussed the question of the place occupied by the union among the large number of public and political currents. Several alternatives were proposed: the SSL can attempt to unite various political currents in the parliament—to create a kind of coalition party—in order

to achieve its chief goal: the guaranteeing and defense of the interests of the producers of agricultural output, of all rural inhabitants.

The second alternative is: at the forthcoming 2nd Congress, the SSL can proclaim itself to be a sociopolitical organization engaging in economic activity. And its by-laws must state the possibility of acting during an election campaign by using the methods of a political party. There is also a third alternative: the SSL remains a socioeconomic organization, but creates, in parallel, its own political party. Either a completely new one or there will be found, among those that already exist, a political force that will assume the expression and defense of the interests of the producers of agricultural output and all the rural inhabitants.

The participants at the expanded session also listened to reports on the work performed by the SSL public commissions and the union's Dobelskiy Rayon Society, and on the creation of the Karlis Ulmanis Foundation.

Latvian Parliament Debates Republic Budget

90UN2459A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 26 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by TASS correspondent G. Kuchina: "Latvia: At the Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] Last week the deputies to the Latvian Supreme Soviet devoted the bulk of their time to financial matters. The law governing the republic's budgetary rights was adopted in the first reading. The chief feature of that law is the principle of the independent formation of the budgets of the republic and the local soviets; the allocation of funds for joint "intergovernmental" specially earmarked programs is also authorized. In order for the law to be able to operate, it needs to have a normative act concerning taxes. Unlike the first document, the draft for this act has not yet been published for broad discussion.

The session temporarily stopped the action on Latvian territory of one article of the union law governing the USSR State Budget for 1990. The deputies decided to leave in the republic the entire income tax and the so-called transport tax, and to increase the share of the turnover tax to be transferred to meet the republic's needs.

The question of the material support for the deputies is moving ahead with more difficulty. As long ago as 4 June, A.V. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, reported that it will be necessary to reconsider the payment for the labor performed by the parliamentarians. Unlike the people's deputies of Lithuania, Estonia, and the USSR, whose monthly salary is 500 rubles, in Latvia that amount is as much as 650 rubles. In Lithuania 150 rubles a month are allocated for a deputy's expenses; in Estonia, 100 rubles; and in Latvia the figure has been established at 200 rubles. This week the session returned again to this problem. The deputies requested that they be given the tables of organization of

the apparatuses of the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, in order to compare the salaries paid to the legislators and the executors. The information concerning the Presidium apparatus has been prepared, but last week the matter did not get as far as a discussion.

'Democratic Latvia' Movement Leaders Discuss Goals

90UN2459B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 26 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Oleg Ilyenkov, Boris Tsilevich, and Eduard Liyepinsh, by Yevgeniy Orlov, under rubric "Conversations in Room 1109": "The BSD 'Democratic Latvia': 'To Prevent a Split From Happening'"]

[Text] Oleg Ilyenkov: "In someone else's home a guest does not have any rights except the right to leave... But we are not guests!"

Boris Tsilevich: "Since the very beginning we have helped the People's Front. Its ideas have been our ideas. But these are different times now..."

Eduard Liyepinsh: "In society there is a program level and a real level. Sooner or later an idea must be adjusted by life. Otherwise there will be a split..."

This is the twenty-fifth discussion in Room 1109. An anniversary discussion... In two years we have introduced to the SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH reader people of absolutely different political views. With almost each of them it is possible to find some views in common, and with almost each one it is possible to disagree with regard to various questions.

At the present time, when I am transcribing the magnetic-tape recording of the discussion with members of the organizing committee of the Baltic-Slavic Movement [BSD] "Democratic Latvia," I see that I want more to agree than to dispute. This is both good and bad. Probably among the SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH readers there will be a large number of people for whom the views of Boris Tsilevich, Oleg Ilyenkov, and Eduard Liyepinsh will prove to be unacceptable. That also is completely normal.

So, read, discuss, and make your conclusions.

(On the calendar is the second month of the independence of the Latvian Republic, the independence that took us two years to reach...)

[Ye. Orlov] The Baltic-Slavic Movement "Democratic Latvia"... With what is the appearance of this new structure on the republic's political scene linked? Wherein, specifically, lie its innovativeness, its goals, and its tasks?

[O. Ilyenkov] At the present time there exists a definite split in the republic—it lies between the ethnic groups, and the entire misfortune consists in the fact that the

organizations that in one way or another represent these ethnic groups are talking to one another "in different languages." Take, for example, the NFL [Latvian People's Front]... Whether we want this or not, the basic idea of the Latvian People's Front is national. And that probably is how it had to be. The International Front, the KPL [Latvian Communist Party], and the TsDI [Center for Democratic Initiative] basically stand on a class, communist idea... In this situation it is difficult, if not simply impossible, to reconcile the "dinner with the fence"—they are completely different things.

In this kind of situation it is possible to begin a dialogue only on the soil of recognizing a system of universally human values. From this evolves the Christian idea; the Baltic-Slavic idea, which we understand as an idea of interethnic consent; and the idea of building a democratic state... For the time being, the republic does not have any organizations or movements uniting these ideas, and we shall attempt to create this structure.

Will it have the status of a party? The first items published in SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH mentioned the word "party," but, obviously, we shall reject the creation of a party and will stop on a "movement."

In the movement's organizing committee, two groups are represented: "Civil Consent" (Boris Tsilevich and Eduard Liyepinsh came from it) and the Baltic-Slavic Society. Neither of these organizations are falling apart. They are both continuing their work, so that even though our movement was organized by them, it is independent.

[B. Tsilevich] At the present time people constantly mention the need for dialogue and compromise. This requires that a few people have the moral or legal right to speak in the name of one of the participants in the dialogue. Personally I am convinced that the Latvian People's Front has that right—to speak in the name of the Latvian nation. The question arises: who, then, in this interethnic dialogue can represent the second side? The IF [International Front]? The KPL on the CPSU platform? We feel that the Communist ideology is definitely not a Russian national ideology... The Russian-speaking sections of the Social Democrats? At the present time a large number of "Russian-speaking sections" have sprung up in the republic, and each of them lays claim to the role of "expresser of the interests"... Could it be the NFL itself? But, much as it wants to, the People's Front is incapable of doing this, since it will not be able to understand completely: what is it, properly speaking, that we "Russian-speakers" need?

At the same time there exists today a very important task (I would define it as a decisive one)—the choice of that STRATEGY, that policy, that would guarantee the loyalty of the non-Latvian population with respect to the independence of Latvia.

I would like to mention the People's Front once again. Eduard and I completely consciously helped the NFL from the very beginning. We helped in the election... But the situation has changed, and it is now time to collect on

all the promissory notes of confidence. At this moment there are two tendencies in the Latvian People's Front: national and democratic. It is difficult to say which of them will be victorious, but the moment has already come when they are beginning to contradict one another, when it is necessary to make a decision: either Latvian Latvia, or democratic Latvia. We understand that in the current political, demographic, etc. situation, the attempt to build a LATVIAN LATVIA is unpromising...

[Ye. Orlov] It is not simply unpromising. It is doomed and fraught with cataclysms...

[O. Ilyenkov] But nevertheless there are definite circles that are putting their hopes precisely on this; and there simultaneously exist other forces which, concealing themselves with the statement that they are struggling against the ugly forms of implementing the national rights, are actually fighting against all forms of implementing those rights.

I cannot fail to make a digression here... The opponents of the National Front have two strategic lines. One is the struggle for the observance of human rights. The second is the struggle for socialist ideals. And they are constantly offered and bound together in this combination, as though one is inseparable from the other. Actually, however, they are indeed separable, and our movement's task consists precisely in showing that human rights and socialist ideals are by no means one and the same...

[E. Liyepinsh] Returning to our movement's goal... Today we observe a strange opposition: a class approach has been contrasted to the national approach. This opposition is destructive and will not yield any positive results.

Another matter is the opposition of homogeneous values. In principle, values are irreconcilable, and a democratic, pluralistic society proceeds from the assumption that the values of one side cannot be binding for the other side. Therefore, consent lies not in adopting someone else's values system, but in finding a compromise that is acceptable for both sides. In democratic Latvia, therefore, it is necessary for two definite forces to exist. On the one hand, the nationals, who will, to a certain degree, determine the gauge of the republic's "Latvianization," and, on the other hand, the "free citizens," who will choose that country on the basis of the extent to which that country will guarantee the conditions for their harmonious development and prosperity, professional activity, etc.

In this sense the Latvian state (if it has a self-interest in being civilized and a country in which people from the entire world, people with any skin color, would like to live; if it does not want to remain isolated and to have at its disposal only third-rate human material) will be obliged to assume definite pledges and to guarantee its democratic nature with respect to all citizens who have chosen Latvia as the place for their prosperity and free development.

[O. Ilyenkov] I would like to say a few words about something else. I want for both groups—both those who are moved by the national idea and those who stand on class positions—to understand that none of us are guests in Latvia...

[B. Tsilevich] ... Strongly stated! It is not quite that way.

[Ye. Orlov] Oleg evidently has in mind those who take the attitude toward Latvia that it is their homeland. I also am against having us cultivate a "guest psychology."

[O. Ilyenkov] Precisely. But, unfortunately, the stream that frequently emanates from television and the press is directed at forming in us that guest psychology. But in someone else's house a guest does not have any rights except the right to leave if he is asked to do so...

[E. Liyepinsh] Once again, returning to the beginning of the conversation: even after everyone learns Latvian and is involved freely in the republic's vital processes, there still will be a large number of people who see their future—both on the professional and the spiritual level—within the framework of the Russian language and Russian culture. They have things that they want to talk about, things that they want to argue about, things that they want to decide, while accepting at such time the terms advanced by the Latvian People's Front. Today, for example, the Slavs who are loyal with respect to independence already have something they want to discuss—in a constructive manner, in accordance with our common problems.

[Ye. Orlov] Well, so far as I understand it, your organization, your movement, sets as its goal the coordinating of the interests of the indigenous nation and the nonindigenous nations in the Latvian Republic for purposes of building a law-governed democratic state...

[Ye. Liyepinsh] In principle, yes.

[Ye. Orlov] What path to democracy do you see?

[Ye. Liyepinsh] The term "democracy" is very "in" nowadays. Absolutely everyone uses it. However, for the time being, we all have become bogged down in superstructure games and have not been dealing properly with the basis. At the present time the Latvian government is faced with a dilemma (which maybe it is not even completely aware of): either a strong government, or strong citizens. I consider the first path to be one taking us down a blind alley. It repeats the USSR path. On the second path, the state will have to guarantee a certain degree of "Latvianization" of Latvia and the state budget will have to guarantee first of all those programs that would preserve Latvia as Latvia, rather than converting it into a state with an incomprehensible national makeup. But it must be mandatory to create a sphere of entrepreneurial activity in which there must be no national limitations whatsoever. Then many problems (of education, culture, and development) will be resolved on principles of entrepreneurial activity. Without that democratization of the basis levels, without natural

privatization, we can quickly choke and will be suppressed by the state machine. In that instance there will be no democracy at all.

[B. Tsilevich] I feel that today is the time for specific steps, for specific pragmatic actions. I have several clear-cut principles that have to be resolved without postponing them until tomorrow.

The first problem is the problem of citizenship. It is the first one not because of importance, but simply for chronological reasons. The second is the problem of education. As an example, the same question about RGI [Riga Institute of the Humanities], because approximately the following statement was made: "We feel that you do not need RGI, although you feel that you do need it..." Although in principle it is for US to decide whether or not we need it, and if we do need it, what it should be like. Because RGI can be both an "anti-Latvian hotbed," and also perhaps a "territory of interethnic consent"! The third problem is to acknowledge in essence that Latvia never was an ethnically pure state, and that we non-Latvians have been part of Latvian culture not as guests, but as owners with equal rights. Take, for example, Daugavpils. It is my profound conviction that it must be granted linguistic autonomy. Then it will not require political autonomy at all. Because no one in Daugavpils is against Latvia's independence, against the Latvian language as the state language! The protest is against having forcing a Russian to speak in Latvian with another Russian. This is also a problem of explaining that the LETTISH [latyshskoye] and the LATVIAN [latviyskoye] are not one and the same thing... The fourth is the problem of the mass media, primarily television. Godmanis has complained that the Russians and the Latvians have different channels of information... Well, they will be different is some people will watch only Riga and others will watch only Moscow. But Riga broadcasts in Russian are practically nonexistent, and those that do exist cannot compete in any way with "Vzglyad" [Vi-w]... The first problem is language. I have already mentioned Daugavpils, but, proceeding from everything that was previously stated, we must state unambiguously today that in INDEPENDENT Latvia there must be as a minimum two state languages. Yes, we have always been in favor of having in Latvia—so long as it was part of the USSR—one state language, the Latvian language, and during the transitional period one state language, but in independent Latvia we also need Russian. The sixth problem is the reconsideration of the psychological results of World War II. In particular, with respect to the Hitlerite executioners. At the present time there is a tendency to equate everyone: the "ayzsargs," the legionnaires, and the punitive troops. For me, a Jew, this is unacceptable... The seventh problem is national protectionism. I do not think that discrimination on the basis of nationality began in 1988. Even by my own example I can say that its origins were much earlier...

[Ye. Orlov] I would add that in Soviet Latvia it was always difficult for a person of non-Latvian nationality (and in principle impossible) to occupy the first position.

We need only to recall Pelshe, Voss, Pugo, Vagris, etc. Even though a few of them spoke Latvian only haltingly, their internal passport stated their nationality as "Latvian." At the Military Department of LGU [Leningrad State University] we were told, "We do not understand why Latvians do not want to serve in the Soviet Army. A Latvian officer will be promoted more quickly, and a job on the staff will be guaranteed..." Thus the Soviet ideologues conducted a cadre policy everywhere—in the republic Communist Parties, in the government, and in many other spheres. Perhaps the only exception was the production sphere... Today, when Latvia is living under its own national flag, in principle we non-Latvians should have more opportunities to lay claim to positions among the "firsts," since there is no need to demonstrate to the world a "Latvian owner" for show purposes on this land—the Declaration of Independence puts the dot on the "i"... However, unfortunately, we will accept the present cabinet of ministers, we will accept the questionnaires of the first people in the republic...

But the guarantees that I too, a Russian, will be able to become the President of Latvia (which is something I could not even dream of in Soviet Latvia) must be established right now, during the transitional period!

[B. Tsilevich] Yes, for me, what could serve as a model of democracy would be the election of a Negro as the President of the United States...

Then our conversation became more chaotic: we dragged out first one topic and then another, that were interrelated in one way or another, as a result of which I put onto paper a kind of "digest" of the second half of the conversation.

[O. Ilyenkov] Speculation on the basis of nationality continues. You can see how labels are being stuck on people, how people are being divided into blacks and whites. For example, one side says, "Dzintars is a real Latvian—he's good." The other side echoes, "This one is a good Russian because he supports the idea of the People's Front, he accepts it completely, and practically merges with the indigenous nation... The goal of this is to have pocket Latvians and pocket Russians: to pull them out and display them, saying, "Look at how well he speaks!" and then stick them back in your pocket again...

As a result it will be very difficult for a Russian person today to be part of the government. He might lose the influence that he used to have.

[B. Tsilevich] Much of what we have been saying here sounds as though it is coming from the mouth of the International Front, the TsDI, and the KPL (CPSU). Therefore a nasty situation has been created: all you have to do is to state a fact, "But he says the same thing!", and you have already been labeled a member of the International Front...

[Ye. Orlov] That happened to me when I spoke out against the draft of the Languages Statute.

[B. Tsilevich] That's right. That's a typical example. For us, that factor is a rather serious psychological barrier. We are more accustomed to a situation in which we in the Russian audience defend the People's Front, justify it, and explain its policy. But at the present time the situation has changed, and it is necessary to explain to the People's Front the pain and aspirations of Russian people.

Here are our four positions: **WE** are not guests; **WE** are loyal with respect to the idea of independence, we recognize the Supreme Soviet and the Declaration; **WE** state firmly that our interests still are not being recognized by the People's Front and are not being taken into consideration, and therefore we must give them a constructive form and must defend them, and in the final analysis this will benefit the development of democracy in Latvia; **WE** set ourselves apart from Communist ideology, we recognize that the Communist Party does not represent our interests, and that our interests are not formulated as "faithfulness to the ideals of socialism."

[O. Ilyenkov] We organize ourselves as a constructive, healthy opposition to the current Latvian People's Front. For the time being, this is so. When positive changes occur in the NFL, our attitude toward it will also change.

[E. Liyepinsh] But what is the sphere of our interests? It is free development on the territory of free democratic Latvia.

And there is something else. At the present time the tone in policy is being set by the intelligentsia. And the intelligentsia also fights for the purity of ideas. But the NFL continues to set the tone on the level of ideas, rather than on the level of practice, of specific affairs. In society there is always a program level and a real level—how that program is embodied in a concrete way. The hour has come when we have to analyze what we have achieved in the course of the process of implementing our program statements. Because sooner or later the idea must be adjusted by life, must be adapted. Our movement is a dialogue between the pure idea and life, people's real perception of the world.

This conversation (and, incidentally, many other conversations in Room 1109) could have been continued far into the night. Our time is a time of new topics for discussion, topics which previously only loomed on the horizon. Persons wishing to take part in the "Democratic Movement" can write to: 226001, Box 220, or can telephone during the week (from 1800 to 2100 hours on workdays) at 612350 or 612167.

And all that remains for me is to rewind the tape and wait for new guests to the rubric "Conversations in Room 1109."

Belorussian Runoff Election Results Published

90UN2119B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 24 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "List of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies Elected in Runoffs on 14, 16, 17, 18 and 20 May 1990"]

[Text] **Berdavtsev**, Sergey Vadimovich, physical education teacher at Secondary School No 7 in Polotsk, Vitebsk Oblast; from Polotskiy-Dzerzhinskiy Electoral District No 173.

Bogovtsov, Eduard Aleksandrovich; CPSU member; machine tool operator at the Bobruysk Tractor Parts and Components Plant, city of Bobruysk, Mogilev Oblast; from Bobruyskiy-Zapadnyy Electoral District No 289.

Boyko, Nikolay Ivanovich; CPSU member; trade union committee chairman at the Minsk Motorbike Plant, Minsk; from Leninskiy Electoral District No 1.

Volkov, Anatoliy Yegorovich; CPSU member; laboratory chief at the Belorussian Land Reclamation and Water Management Scientific Research Institute, city of Pinsk, Brest Oblast; from Pinskiy-Zapadnyy Electoral District No 132.

Demidenko, Valeriy Aleksandrovich; CPSU member; director of the Gomel Meat Combine, city of Gomel; from Gomelskiy-Leninskiy Electoral District No 191.

Selivonchik, Yevgeniy Stepanovich; CPSU member; deputy general director for foreign economic relations at the BelavtoMAZ Production Association, city of Minsk; from Golodedovskiy Electoral District No 11.

Sushkevich, Boleslav Iosifovich; CPSU member; deputy chairman BSSR Gosteleradio, city of Minsk; from Baranovichskiy-Tsentralnyy Electoral District No 109.

Tarasenko, Leonid Grigorevich; vice-president, Belorussian Ecological Union, city of Minsk; from Chkalovskiy Electoral District No 19.

Belorussian SSR Decree on Repeat Election Results

90UN2119C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 24 May 90 p 3

[Decree of Central Commission on Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, 22 May 1990: "On Holding Repeat Elections for Belorussian SSR People's Deputies in Certain Electoral Districts"]

[Text] Due to the fact that in the runoffs of 16-20 May neither of the two candidates running for election in five electoral districts was elected, and the fact that the election was declared invalid in one electoral district because less than half the electors on the voting list took part, the Central Commission on Election of Belorussian

SSR People's Deputies, on the basis of Article 57 of the Law On Election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR decrees:

1. The district electoral commissions of the following electoral districts are instructed to hold repeat elections for Belorussian SSR People's Deputies on 20 July 1990: Akademicheskii No 27, Minsk; Gomelskiy-Krasnooktyabrskii No 188 and Gomelskiy-Tsentralnyi No 198 in Gomel Oblast; Mogilevskiy-Altayskiy No 280 and Osipovichskiy City District No 304 in Mogilev Oblast.

2. The commissions shall ascertain that nomination of candidates for Belorussian SSR People's Deputies for repeat election be conducted from 28 May through 6 June, and registration of candidates shall take place from 6 through 11 June 1990. Other pre-election measures shall be carried out according to procedure and within the time-limits established in the Law On Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies. Voting shall be conducted at the very same election precincts in accordance with the voters' lists drawn up for conducting the general elections. For the repeat elections, citizens of the Belorussian SSR who shall have reached age 18 by election day, who are permanent residents on the territory of the given election district, as well as those who have taken up permanent residence there, shall be included on the voters' lists.

M. Lagir, chairman, Central Commission for Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies

I. Likhach, secretary, Central Commission for Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies

Decree on Repeat Election in Gomel Oblast

90UN2119D Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 24 May 90 p 3

[Decree of Central Commission on Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies of 22 May 1990: "On Holding Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputy for Svetlogorskiy-Molodezhnyy Election District No 232, Gomel Oblast"]

[Text] In connection with the death of the Belorussian SSR People's Deputy elected in Svetlogorskiy-Molodezhnyy Election District No 232, on the basis of Article 58 of the Law on Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, the Central Commission on Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies decrees:

That election of a Belorussian SSR People's Deputy for Svetlogorskiy-Molodezhnyy Election District No 232, Gomel Oblast, shall be held on 27 July 1990.

M. Lagir, chairman, Central Commission for Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies

I. Likhach, secretary, Central Commission for Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies

Ukrainian Deputies Meet with European Parliamentarians

90UN2119A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 24 May 90 p 3

UKRINFORM report: "Deputies Study"]

[Text] "Comparative Parliamentary Experience," a two-day international seminar, was held on the facilities of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. The seminar was organized by the International Management Institute (MIM - Kiev) and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretariat, by request of a large group of People's Deputies from the Ukraine.

Formerly well-known parliamentary figures from Great Britain, the FRG and Switzerland described the practice of forming governments in their countries and drawing up draft laws; the relationships between legislative, executive and judicial organs, as well as between the government and the parliament; and the organization for carrying out government and parliamentary policies. The seminar concluded with general discussions, during which the conversation turned to the possibilities of adopting foreign experience both on the nationwide, and at the republic level.

Kharkov Oblast Repeat Election Result Noted

90UN2119E Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Central Election Commission; On Election of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] The Central Election Commission for Election of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, on the basis of the district election commission report from Radyanskiy Election District No 375 in Kharkov Oblast on the results of the repeat election held 20 May 1990 has, in accordance with Article 51 of the Law on Election of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, registered as Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy of this election district:

Shcherbin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, a non-party member; Shcherbin is a department chief at Kharkov State University, and lives in the city of Kharkov.

Ukrainian Deputies Form New 'Moderate' Block

90UN2010A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 18 May 90 p 1

[Article by V. Veretennykov, people's deputy of UkSSR from Dnipropetrovsk: "'Zlagoda'—This is how a Group of People's Deputies from Ukraine Have Decided to Call Themselves, a Group Which Aspires to Bring Constructive Action and Productivity to the Supreme Soviet's Session"]

[Text] It is difficult to make a prognosis about the division of power in the Supreme Soviet. Many of the leaders are not showing their cards even now. But in any

event, I shall try to say this. Two opposing blocks have clearly made their appearance: one is the so-called democratic bloc, whose base is constituted by Rukh, the just recently created Republican Party, and "Green World"; the other is for the most part made up of professional Party members and soviet and administrative workers, the so-called apparatus. Both blocks make up 25 percent of the deputy's body. The Kiev deputies are acting in a group; an agrarian group has formed.

But the main power is in the center, which is made up of the so-called left wing deputies on one side who do not accept a certain number of deputies' extremist and nationalistic calls, and on the other side is made up of deputies opposing the party bureaucracy and conservatism, sign-board changes, the overly expanded condition of state institutions; these deputies advocate fundamental change in the republic's agricultural and political structures.

It would seem that the center should assume responsibility for itself; it should play an active role in the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the permanent commissions' chiefs, in forming the Presidium. However, the center appears as the bloc least organized to undertake such a mission. In my view, the time is ripe for the need to form a central bloc—whose tentative name would be "Zlagoda" [concord, agreement], which would be able to oppose the split in the deputy's body in Ukraine and to assure agreement in deciding how to handle issues in the most important programs of the republic's economic, political, and social development.

The bloc can play a consolidating role, and in doing so, not siding with one wing or another, but rather forging its own position on the basis of important political and social issues, on the principles of pluralism, setting forth as its main issue—universal values; the bloc's main policy would be solving economic and social problems as quickly as possible. This, certainly, can become the profile of "Zlagoda." The bloc has great, potential possibilities insofar as it has veteran leaders in it and from its setting there will arise new, authoritative, political leaders, who will be able to not only shape the principles and paths of the republic's renewal, but also take an active part in putting them into practice in life.

Life itself put forward the necessity of forming "Zlagoda." Already in the first days of the session's work clearly showed the uncompromising nature of the opposing, struggling sides and their procrastination in deciding issues on any give occasion. We are lashing the waves, and at the same time in the parliamentary struggle of the leaders, hundreds of people are becoming involved outside the building of the Supreme Soviet. Insults are heard that are being addressed to the deputies: "Toadies!", "Muscovites!", "Janissaries!". And this is being said about only newly elected deputies, on the first day they walked into this building! To offend them, to put it lightly, is unethical to the Ukrainian people, who have just elected them to the Supreme Soviet.

Is everything that is happening coincidental? In my view, this is a continuation of politics. When some leaders from one side, in order to put pressure on the deputy's body, are drawing the people into the parliamentary struggle in the square, and from the other side there resound, though offensive, but all the same, passionate voices—to forcibly sweep up the square.

To what such a confrontation can lead, we already know from the grim events in Tbilisi. Wisdom—lies not in power, but in a sense of agreement reached among people. To put out, not stoke the fire. Patience is needed, and this requires one to moderate the confrontation that divides the deputies themselves. After all, truth is never in the extreme poles. The deputy's groups "Zlagoda" would be capable of playing at this very instant a consolidating role.

The need for this is considerable. This will confer dynamism and constructivity on the parliamentary work. Otherwise, in the divergence of views, the parliament will end up boxing over the opposing and struggling blocs' unproductive, ideological differences.

To do this is also necessary in order to confer authority to those forces which are striving for real changes and which have received a mandate from the people to put them in practice in life. And they are not associated with those who are regarded as conservative, but with those who oppose nationalism and extremism. These deputies constitute the majority; they tend to make careful, thought out decisions and are ready to state their social position in the parliament.

The essence of our platform is giving priority to solving economic and social problems, regarding them as the most important tasks; [and another part of our platform is] to unfold political programs by stages that are closely linked with the most important tasks.

Here are the main points of the platform:—giving priority to the issue of economic and political sovereignty for the republic within the framework of the USSR. The implementation of a new union treaty;—a pluralism in terms of allowing for various types of ownership, equal opportunities for it and legal protection;—a decisive move to a market economy with guaranteed social protection for people with low income;—the liquidation of the Chernobyl tragedy's effects and the resolution of other pressing problems in ecology;—legal equality and solidarity for all nationalities that are living in the republic;—the formation of a lawful nation, which includes within it a mechanism for protecting individual rights and interests;—the supplying of all workers with essential food stuffs and goods of primary necessity for two-three years;—the formation of independent channels of information—one of democracy's guarantees;—cooperation with all political parties and movements which want to make a real contribution to our republic's rebirth.

The goal of uniting the deputies into the group "Zlagoda", it is understood, is not to intensify confrontation,

but conversely, it is to oppose the split in the deputy's body of Ukraine; the goal is not to intensify the degree of politicizing, but to search for a solution to the most important programs of republic's economic and social development. In this, we see above all else, the wisdom of state politics.

Discontent With Party Leadership in Eastern Ukrainian Oblasts Viewed

90UN2120A Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA
in Russian No 9, May 90 pp 29-32

[Article by Prof V. Komarovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences, and V. Korniyak, candidate of historical sciences: "How Should Our Party Restructure Itself?"]

[Text] Scientists at the Experiment Research Institute of the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences conducted a number of studies connected with the aggravation of social and political tension in some party organizations, including some in Ukraine (in Voroshilovgrad, Donetsk and Kharkov oblasts). In part, the studies analyzed the specific reasons for the rallies that had been held there whose participants expressed a lack of confidence in party committees and demanded the resignation of their leaders.

Substantial material was also provided by analysis of the election campaign and the results of the elections of union republics' people's deputies and deputies to local soviets.

The studies were done in the period in which the CPSU Central Committee had submitted the drafts of pre-congress documents for discussion. That contributed to the fact that many of their provisions were viewed through the prism of present-day realities, and on the whole it focused attention on issues connected with the CPSU's perestroika: Will it be able to find its place in the new political situation, or will it have to "withdraw into the background"? Will it preserve its unity? Is it capable of proposing a program for the reinvigoration of society?

The studies also showed that, given a complex situation overall, priorities had been shifted among the problems on which public attention was focused. Whereas just yesterday the housing and food problems and trade and consumer services were accorded the leading places in terms of urgency, today they are yielding to demands to more vigorously fight crime (67 percent of those surveyed), establish order and discipline (63 percent), and tackle environmental issues (53 percent).

Just what were the main reasons for the February rallies, including those in Ukraine's eastern oblasts? The most frequently repeated answers were as follows:

- the accumulation of unsolved social problems (42.5 percent);
- the irresponsibility and incompetence of a substantial number of party leaders (37.5 percent);

—a general growth in revolutionary processes that is characteristic of the entire country (35 percent).

For characterization of the attitude toward the party apparatus, it is of no small importance that 34.5 percent of those questioned identify it with the administrative-command system, and one in five presupposes its connection with corrupt groups from the "shadow economy" and therefore does not believe in its ability to effectively restructure itself.

Only 17 percent of the communists surveyed expressed confidence that matters in the region would improve after replacement of the party leadership, and 40 percent categorically stated the need to eliminate the party apparatus's monopolistic power. Most of the respondents believe that outbreaks of social tension are possible even with a new party leadership if the economic situation gets worse. Thus, radical changes are needed simultaneously in both the political and socioeconomic spheres. Many people continue to link changes for the better with the restructuring of the party.

However, the renewal and democratization of the party are seen differently by different groups and tendencies within the party. According to the survey data, the left wing makes up approximately 20 percent of communists, the right wing—22.5 percent, and the "center" (although it is fairly heterogeneous)—52 percent. Within each of those groups there is also a whole spectrum of opinions and attitudes. Therefore, the division of political forces in society and the party into democrats and conservatives, supporters and opponents of perestroika, is rather provisional and oversimplified. That may fundamentally influence the course of the report and election campaign, affect elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, and have unexpected political consequences at the congress itself.

In this connection, the answers to the questionnaire's question, "Which delegates to the 28th Congress would be most desirable for you, all other conditions being equal?" are interesting. Most of those questioned (66 percent) gave preference to a person's competence and the confidence that communists felt in him. 43 percent wanted to see rank-and-file communists among the delegates, while 17 percent wanted to see members of elective party bodies, and only 10 percent wanted to see employees of the party apparatus. 40 percent preferred representation by workers, 30 percent preferred representation by peasants, and 10 percent preferred engineering and technical employees and members of the creative intelligentsia.

In the opinion of the respondents, the **questions of the party's ideological activity** are becoming increasingly acute, because the process of reinterpreting various periods of party history and history of the state has proved to be the most complex. Many of those questioned believe that the party's ideological foundations and key guideposts and goals have been lost. That is persuasively indicated, for example, by the fact that the

most important problems that should be discussed at the congress were listed as follows: analysis of the party's omissions and mistakes during the years of perestroika (61 percent), the ideological foundation of the CPSU's activities (40 percent).

Most of the respondents were unanimous in the belief that the CPSU's ideological work requires up-to-date theoretical substantiation and the reinforcement of its intellectual element. Without rejecting socialist guidelines, they believe that the old model of socialism is obsolete, yet there is no new one, and what's more, that a new one will not be created right away, although the accomplishment of that task has a high priority.

A good many of those surveyed spoke out against a number of propositions that they perceived as deviations from communist principles (a diversity of forms of ownership, a multiparty system, a multistructural system [mnogoukladnost], or regarded as a shift to a capitalist course of development.

That also explains the fact that many people believed that the model of a humane, democratic socialism set forth in the draft CPSU platform is insufficiently thought through. They pointed out, in particular, the vagueness of the wording of fundamental theoretical positions concerning the renewal of society, reformation of the CPSU, the forms in which democratic centralism is to manifest itself under the new conditions, and so forth. About half of the respondents proposed that this model be thoroughly and deliberately discussed at the congress.

The research showed the lack of readiness of most party committees for political cooperation and dialogue with informal organizations, whose influence on public thinking and behavior must not be underestimated. In response to the question, "Who, in your opinion, contributed most actively to the fact that a decision was taken concerning the resignation of a secretary, party committee, or apparatus?", 39 percent of those surveyed cited the population as a whole, 22 percent cited informal organizations, and only 10 percent saw the role of the party apparatus and oblast aktiv in such an action.

In staking their bets on the growing politicization of the masses, especially the working class, some extremist-minded schools and groups have been striving to attract its representatives to their side. And sometimes they succeed. Taking advantage of the upsurge in the organized working-class movement, they have sharply stepped up their activities, have been pushing categorical judgments, and have been presenting economic and political demands in the form of ultimatums. This is becoming possible because communist workers do not always properly rebuff such attempts, and sometimes they keep quiet entirely and assume a generally passive posture.

In this connection, let us identify communists' attitude toward the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" and, in particular, to the section on the "Radical Reform of the

CPSU" that is included in it. One-third of those surveyed support, on the whole, the need for changes contributing to the party's democratization and perestroika. Another third sees this process as one that has become mandatory, without which it is simply impossible to get by given today's realities. One in five sees it as an attempt to split the party from within.

While not sharing certain positions of the Democratic Platform, many communists note the clarity and succinctness of the propositions it contains, to which they attribute their appeal.

Although the existence of multiple parties has already become a fact and been legislatively codified, 14 percent of the communists surveyed did not support this decision, and about 30 percent accepted it on the condition that the CPSU retain its vanguard role.

The problem of **providing for the CPSU's political leadership** under the conditions of the new versions of Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution continues to be a problem of high priority for party committees. The ranking of opinions expressed makes it possible to identify the priorities that, from the standpoint of the party aktiv and rank-and-file communists, should become definitive in party committees' activities.

- unity of words and deeds, a high level of organizational work, and accountability for the consequences of their own ill-considered decisions (56 percent);

- initiative in posing and solving the problems that are most important to people (47 percent);

- glasnost and informing the working people about the activities of party agencies (34 percent).

This is the context in which one must regard another extremely fundamental question—the question of reorganizing the structure of oblast party organizations. It should be unequivocally recognized that, in the context of the democratization of intraparty relations and the broad development of horizontal ties, the multilevel system standing over the primary party organization has become obsolete and is perceived as a serious impediment to establishing fruitful ties between party committees and communists. The position of party committees and higher party agencies is not finding support. On the one hand, they have been taking half measures (for example, reducing the size of the party apparatus while preserving its overall structure), and on the other, they have been trying to defend themselves against growing criticism on the part of rank-and-file communists and the representatives of various informal associations, the brunt of which continues to be directed at the ineffective and cumbersome organizational structure.

At the same time, the content of the vast majority of answers by communists who were surveyed comes down to the belief that these issues should be resolved by the

party organizations themselves and be the business exclusively of communists, not of a crowd gathered for a rally.

Among communists—and nonmembers of the party, as well—there has been extensive discussion of the advisability of party organizations' activities in various structures. An analysis of proposals indicates a broad spectrum of opinions on this problem—from categorical rejection of them to a belief that existing structures should be preserved virtually unchanged. Let us cite just two positions. Only one-third of those surveyed believed it possible to maintain party organizations in law-enforcement agencies, the army, educational institutions, and at places of residence. 85 percent of those surveyed favored keeping them in labor collectives and at production facilities.

The changing nature of such approaches and judgments should be taken into account. In a situation of a de facto multiparty situation, this issue will become more acute, as statements by the leaders of various political schools indicate.

If the CPSU is striving, in a situation of a multiparty political system and the extensive development of various sorts of informal movements, to maintain its political leadership, the emphasis in party organizations' work should be resolutely and fundamentally shifted to communication with the working people and the public, and mastery of the methods of social psychology and dialogue forms of ideological influence. This process is complicated by the fact that over the years of holding an elite position, party personnel have, by and large, lost the skills of organizing effective political campaigns and have had no experience taking part in mass activities.

It is this ability that is assuming special importance in connection with the provision concerning the "power of the party masses" that has been included in the CPSU Central Committee's draft Platform. Emphasizing its importance, participants in surveys have stated that the document provides no idea of the mechanism and forms of implementing that principle. And in their view, that may be an impediment to its practical application, which will create conditions for maintaining the present state of affairs, in which rank-and-file communists are cut off from making policy and decisions regarding the principal areas of the party's activities. Because of that, they have come to expect any changes in life to be made on initiative "from above."

Communists are proposing what, in their view, are the three most suitable options for direct, secret, multicandidate elections in election districts. The first is based on combination production and territorial districts and would entail bringing together communists belonging to the party organizations of enterprises located in a single city subdivision, regardless of the industries in which they are employed. The second is based on territorial districts, whereby an entire city (or rayon) party organization would become an election district. Elections of

delegates would take place on the basis of a single general list of candidates nominated by primary party organizations. The third is based on production districts and would mean bringing together communists belonging to the party organizations of enterprises in related industries located within a city or rayon.

The process of rally-style democracy has resulted in a situation wherein in many cases **participants' attention has been focused on the personality of the party committee leader.** He has also been the main target of criticism and has often been viewed as practically the main person to blame for various shortcomings.

What has influenced the public's development of such an approach toward the person who is deemed to be leader? Among the properties that have contributed to the development of such a negative attitude, one can identify two groups: highly personal traits, and manifestations of incompetence that are associated with various sorts of problems in general and vocational training, and the inability and, sometimes, unwillingness to assimilate new methods of work.

The main "set" of elements in the first group includes isolation, self-assurance, cautiousness and lack of initiative.

The second group includes traits that could, given the desire, be eliminated through the persistent acquisition of knowledge and mastery of work methods that develop the ability to provide a realistic assessment of the existing situation and predict the development of events, as well as the skills of conducting dialogue and speaking to mass audiences.

One gets the impression that for most party officials—at any rate, party leaders—it continues to be extremely difficult to give up the role of a mentor who "issues directives," "calls attention," and so forth and so on. At best, they act as attentive, kind teachers and older brothers who are prepared to listen to complaints, do something to assist, help something along. This sort of paternalistic style of relations, which is furnished at meetings with appropriate accessories (a presidium, applause, speakers who have been prepared in advance) is no longer accepted. However, when encountering face to face the unprogrammed reaction of people who are oriented toward independent political thinking and a high degree of exactingness, rather than toward the passive "show of hands" and automatic voting, many party officials have become nonplussed. They have manifested their inability to lead the growing political activeness and social creativity of the masses.

One-third of the communists surveyed had taken part in various sorts of activities whose participants demanded the resignation of a first secretary, and only five percent had attempted to stop the process in the belief that it would damage the party's prestige and result in destabilizing the situation in their oblast. One-tenth had not taken part in such events for the same reasons, and 12.5 percent of those surveyed believed that such action was

pointless, since it was unable to change the situation. Approximately one-third of those surveyed had not taken part in actions that had resulted in resignation of the party leadership.

The party, actively undertaking the perestroyka and renewal of its activities, has found itself facing numerous difficult problems. It must be recognized that the situation can be stabilized not only by the general party program documents that are to be adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress, but also by a powerful movement on the part of primary party organizations, and the endeavor to build communications with the nonparty masses on a qualitatively new basis and work to achieve genuine unity between the people and the political vanguard.

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Ukrainian Communist Party Composition Data Published

90UN2120B Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA in Russian No 9, May 90 pp 33-34

[Unattributed article: "The Ukrainian Communist Party in Figures"]

[Text] (Figures as of 1 January 1990)

1. Numerical Makeup of Party Organizations

CPSU members	3,227,588
Candidate members	66,450
All Communists	3,294,038
Women communists	939,070(28.5%)

2. Breakdown of CPSU Members and Candidate Members by Occupation

Communists	Numbers	Percentages
All	3,294,038	100.0
Workers	935,862	28.4
Kolkhoz members	376,403	11.4
Office employees	1,372,751	41.7
Students	20,824	0.6
Pensioners, housewives and other unemployed	588,198	17.9

3. Nationality Makeup of Party Organizations

Ukrainians	2,215,444
Russians	894,447
Belorussians	37,727
Uzbeks	715
Kazakhs	479
Georgians	2,228

Azerbaijanis	2,974
Lithuanians	567
Moldavians	10,767
Latvians	526
Kirghiz	53
Tajiks	158
Armenians	5,331
Turkmen	163
Estonians	347
Abazins	19
Abkhaz	82
Avars	186
Aguls	6
Adygey	77
Aleutians	1
Altay	22
Aysors (Assyrians)	112
Balkars	17
Bashkirs	558
Bulgarians	11,719
Buryats	72
Hungarians	3,888
Veps	16
Gagauz	1,062
Greeks	8,234
Darghins	97
Dungans	3
Jews	59,920
Izhors	1
Ingush	28
Iranians (Persians)	9
Spaniards	38
Kabardins	68
Kalmyks	39
Karaims	158
Karakalpaks	9
Karachay	32
Karelians	275
Chinese	55
Komi	629
Komi-Permians	10
Koreans	390
Koryaks	3
Kumyks	79
Kurds	12
Laks	97

Lezghi	454
Mansy	7
Mary	579
Mongols	2
Mordvinians	2,206
Nanay	3
Germans	1,944
Nentsy	9
Nivkhi	2
Nogay	23
Ossets	740
Poles	12,383
Romanians	3,029
Rutuls	12
Serbs	62
Slovaks	388
Tabasarans	96
Tatars	7,661
Tats	31
Tuvinians	2
Turks	25
Udins	13
Udmurts	714
Udegey	3
Uighurs	23
Ulchi	1
Finns	82
Khakass	34
Khanty	11
Tsakhurs	7
Gypsies	85
Circassians	51
Czechs	677
Chechens	147
Chuvash	2,281
Chukchi	4
Shory	5
Evenki	3
Eskimos	2
Yakuts	31
Other nationalities:	
Total	257
Austrians	4
Albanians	206
Arabs	2
Argentines	1

Belgians	1
Bessarabians	1
Bolivians	1
Dutch	2
Danes	2
Italians	23
Macedonians	2
Malaysians	1
Slovenians	2
French	4
Croatians	1
Swedes	4

4. Breakdown of CPSU Members and Candidate Members by Education

	Numbers	Percentages
All Communists	3,294,038	100.0
Educational level:		
Higher	1,160,892	35.2
Incomplete higher	60,216	1.8
Secondary	1,617,335	49.1
Incomplete secondary	315,270	9.6
Primary	138,155	4.2
No primary education	2,100	0.1

5. Distribution of Communists Among Branches of the Economy

	Numbers	Percentages
All CPSU members and candidate members employed in the economy:	2,685,016	100.0
Employed in material production	1,990,006	74.1
in industry	901,430	33.6
in transportation	174,306	6.5
in communications	26,298	1.0
in construction	176,871	6.6
in agriculture	544,282	20.3
in procurement	9,100	0.3
in material and technical supply and sales	13,994	0.5
in trade and public food service	106,586	4.0
Employed in nonproduction branches	695,010	25.9
in housing and municipal and everyday services	56,917	2.1
in health care	80,943	3.0
in education and higher educational institutions	225,950	8.4

at research institutions	82,084	3.1
in geology	6,292	0.2
in culture and the arts	24,670	0.9
on the apparatus of state administrative agencies	182,771	6.8
in party agencies	21,652	0.8
in trade-union agencies	7,689	0.3
in Komsomol agencies	6,042	0.2

6. Age Breakdown of Communists

	Numbers	Percentages
All Communists	3,294,038	100.0
Under 20 years	3,667	0.1
21-25 years	101,966	3.1
26-30 years	317,831	9.6
31-40 years	770,116	23.4
41-50 years	655,975	19.9
51-60 years	733,416	22.3
Over 60 years	711,067	21.6

7. Network of Party Organizations

Obkoms	26
Gorkoms	138
City raykoms	120
Rural raykoms	437
Party committees on a par with raykoms	2
Primary party organizations	72,271
Primary party organizations having party committees	7,241
Primary party organizations' party committees having raykom powers	182
Shop party organizations	73,352
Shop party organizations having powers of primary party organizations	52,708
Shop party organizations having party committees	336
Party groups	118,714

*Including the Kiev gorkom

8. Breakdown of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations

	Numbers	Percentages
All secretaries of primary party organizations (excluding shop organizations)	72,243	100.0
Women	25,956	35.9
Workers	5,139	7.1
Kolkhoz members	3,260	4.5
Engineering and technical employees	17,516	24.2
Agricultural specialists (including kolkhoz members)	1,410	2.0
Educational level:		
Higher education	48,630	67.3
Incomplete higher education	1,797	2.5
Secondary education	21,647	30.0
Incomplete secondary education	164	0.2
Primary	5	—
Secretaries of primary party organizations released from regular employment	8,945	12.4

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Lugansk Remains on Moscow Time

90P50046A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 6 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by L. Aleksyeyeva: "What Time Is It?"]

[Text] Lugansk, 5 July (RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent). As was reported by the city's mass information sources, due to Lugansk Oblast's unpreparedness to fulfill the government resolution on the time change starting on 1 July 1990, the area will remain on Moscow time.

The oblasts executive committee has formed a special commission to study and work out technical measures connected with implementing the second time zone.

Kiev Procuracy Denies Wrongdoing in Demonstrators' Arrests

90UN2110A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
23 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Kiev City Procuracy"]

[Text] It is well-known that in connection with numerous appeals from citizens and the press articles on the display of extraordinary cynicism and disrespect to the dignity of V.I. Lenin and public morality, committed by a group of young people during the ecological demonstration in Kiev on 22 April 1990, the Kiev City Procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings on the basis of malicious hooliganism (Part 2, Article 206, Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code). Placed under arrest in connection with these events were Berdnik, N.D., born 1969, and Dukhovnikov, A. Yu. Born 1971, who were bearing barbed-wire wreaths and insulting inscriptions.

Pamphlets distributed in the city in the name of the Rukh secretariat indicated that the actions of the law-enforcement organs—are "unfounded attacks by the party apparatus directed against Ukraine's civil-patriotic forces and aimed at inflaming hostilities among various cross sections of the population and go against a person's right to freedom of conscience." The pamphlets also maintain that, "even now, in the course of the investigation of 'current events', the workers of our 'illustrious organs of internal affairs' are committing numerous violations of criminal-procedural law: they are having people illegally detained and are committing grave infractions of investigative ethics during interrogations (they are insulting and blackmailing witnesses and even offering them bribes). All this only to carry out and even surpass the carrying out of the orders of unscrupulous authorities." People are appearing on the streets with banners demanding freedom for those arrested. Certain deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Kiev Soviet are also raising these questions.

At the very same time the procuracy is receiving letters from citizens who are "staggered, and indignant over such escapades." The letters include demands to severely punish the guilty parties.

In this connection the members of the city procuracy collegium declare that, while they are opposed to applying criminal-law and other coercive measures in combating political dissidents, they are by virtue of their office and by their own conscience, bound to uphold the laws, which were adopted according to established procedure. Every citizen, while having the right to criticize the laws in effect, has a sacred duty to obey them to the letter. A selective attitude toward executing the laws is incompatible with democracy; this is a kind of neo-Stalinism in a pseudo-democratic performance; this is lawlessness. Every citizen has the right to political struggle, but it is axiomatic that this conflict must be waged within the framework of the law.

An altogether natural question is, "How did those taking part in this act break the law?"

The individuals cited, and other members of Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), grossly violated the procedure for holding sanctioned ecological demonstrations; that is, they violated public order and at the same time showed blatant disrespect toward the thousands of Kievites and guests in the capital who were in the Kreshchatik [downtown Kiev], and not only toward them. Their acts were accompanied by blatant disregard of commonly accepted norms of morality.

Such actions, in accordance with part 2, Article 206, Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code, and the USSR Supreme Court Plenum Resolution No 9 of 16 October 1972, "On Judicial Practice in Cases of Hooliganism" (with amendments introduced 21 September 1977), are seen as especially rude and exceptionally cynical. Committing them is a criminal act punishable by law.

As far as the allegations of violation of the law in the investigation of this case are concerned, none of that corresponds with reality. The procuracy is maintaining strict control over the investigation, and states that the internal affairs organs violated no laws, neither procedurally nor materially. Those arrested were provided the opportunity to employ the services of defense lawyers of their choice.

When the investigation is completed, the case will be sent to the people's court. Not one other organ, nor any other social organization, has the right to interfere in the investigation of this case. Any pressure on the investigative organs, the procuracy and the court whatsoever, is unacceptable. One can agree with the attempts to present Berdnik and Dukhovnikov as victims of political conflict only in the sense that they have truly become victims of the provocations of the SNUM [Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth] leadership.

Nationalist Tension On Rise in Poltava

90UN2110B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
23 May 90 p 3

[Editorial: "The Next 'Battle of Poltava': The Perpetrators are Known, But Who are the Instigators?"]

[Text] At the session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, deputies from the so-called Ukrainian Republican Party [URP] repeatedly raised the question of the actions of the law-enforcement organs which took place recently on the territory of Poltava Oblast. At the request of the session's presidium, Ukrainian SSR Internal Affairs Minister I.D. Gladush provided an explanation on this regard (See PRAVDA UKRAINY of 18 May). But obstructionist attempts to play the "Poltava card," manifestly in order to heat up an already complex situation at the session, continue. Therefore, the editors consider it necessary to cite the facts here, as cited in the official

records of the republic MVD, and also in the latest issues of the newspapers MOLODA GVARDIYA and ZORYA POLTAVSHCHINI.

Many of our readers apparently remember how last summer extremist nationalistic forces were trying to take advantage of the anniversary of the Battle of Poltava to incite inter-ethnic strife, and how provocateur "commando raids" set out from Lvov, Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev and other cities for this purpose (See PRAVDA UKRAINY of 23 July 1989). And in April-May of this year, Poltava once again became the target of such provocations.

On 20 April, fliers calling for refusal to serve in the Soviet Army were found on the door of the military commissariat in the city of Kobelyaki. On 24 April, in Poltava, a gang of youths caused a hooligan uproar at V.I. Lenin's statue. On 29 April, in the village of Maksimovka, Kremenchugskiy Rayon, committed blasphemous desecration of the state flags. On 1 May, in the Gadyach city park, the sculpture group, "Lenin and Children" was barbarically damaged. On 9 May, in the city of Grebenka, the desecrated state flags of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR were discovered near the eternal flame. On 11 May, in Mirgorod, at the entrance to the resort, the charred remains of still another state flag were found... And on 13 May, nationalistic "commandos" converged on Poltava from Lvov, Ternopol, Kiev and a number of other cities in the republic in order to observe, with unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations, the birthday of Simon Petlyura, the bloody hangman of the working people, who betrayed the Ukraine to both the German and the Polish occupiers.

Here is material evidence of just what kind of witches' sabbath was being prepared: the black-and-red standards of Bandera's OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists]; fliers with appeals to refuse service in the Soviet Army, signed by a certain "Committee for the Creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces"; signboards with the words, "Simon Petlyura Street," which they tried to stick on the houses along Ulitsa imeni General Zygin, the liberator of Poltava from the German-Fascist usurpers; song books of the Banderite UPA cutthroats; fliers with an appeal to celebrate the birthday of the "glorious countryman" and "national hero" Petlyura, signed with the abbreviation, "SNUM"...

And so once again, SNUM, that is, the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youths; that same nationalistic organization which grossly insulted the memory of V.I. Lenin, and aroused public indignation in the republic. According to documentary evidence, the "commandos" who descended on Poltava were mainly young people, and there were even 27 juveniles. The question naturally arises: just who is standing behind these young folks; and who is inspiring them to clearly illegal, anticonstitutional actions?

On 20 May, MOLODA GVARDIYA, the newspaper of the oblast and city Komsomol committee, published an article, "SNUM is SNUM," which provides an answer to this question. The article cites the statement of the head of SNUM in Lvov, O. Vitovich, that, "if necessary," they

would introduce "new Petlyuras and Shukhevichis" to the battle. The article also quoted the statement of D. Korchinskiy, SNUM leader in Kiev: "The war which began in the Ukraine in 1917 continues." The article provides convincing proof of the fact that SNUM is the youth branch of that same URP (formerly UKhS), its "light cavalry," and that the illegal extremist escapades of the Snumites are but the fruits, so to speak, of UKhS [Ukrainian-Helsinki Union] education. Is that not why they also waged a new "Battle of Poltava," in order that URP members, Deputies I.S. Derkach and S.I. Khmara would have an opportunity to once again cause a stir at the session of the republic parliament?

The oblast newspaper ZORYA POLTAVSHINI reported in a 16 May article, "The Scenario Was Not Written In Poltava," that, "The facts convincingly testify that the action on the birthday of Simon Petlyura was very carefully planned in advance. The nationalistic organizations did not scrimp on the associated expenses. With their own money, they hired buses and bought railroad tickets, which they then passed out free to everyone who wanted to visit Poltava on 13 May. For example, Ternopol resident I. Andreiyev was given 30 rubles for this purpose at the regional Rukh council."

The newspaper cites the following testimony of yet another Ternopol resident, storeman V. Doletskiy: "Since 6 May I have been a candidate member of the Ukrainian Republican Party. On 12 May I set out for Poltava on the Lvov-Kharkov train. Levko Teodorovich Golovka, chairman of our local organization, gave me the ticket three days in advance. Twelve other Ternopolites went to Poltava with me. The senior member of our group handed me 200 copies of the newspaper TERNISTYI SHLYAKH, which I was obliged to sell in Poltava for one ruble apiece..."

ZORYA POLTAVSHCHIKI stresses that the nationalistic provocation, generously financed from the coffers of URP, aroused the indignation of the majority of the oblast's populace.

The documents with which we were acquainted at the MVD show that the juvenile "commandos" arrested in Poltava were, as the law demands, handed over to their parents; that Kiev residents Berezhanskiy L.V. and Tkachuk I.S. were subjected to administrative arrest by decision of the court (for 3 and 2 days, respectively), and after serving their punishment, they set out for home; and that criminal cases have been brought on the above-mentioned instances of malicious hooliganism.

Political Activism Among Ukrainian Students Viewed

90UN2065A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 23, Jun 90 p 8

[Article by O. Unguryan: "Different Versions Are Possible"]

[Text] A May day. Students are picketing the administrative building of Kiev Polytechnic Institute. Alongside a home-made yellow and blue banner are placards:

"Give us back our language!", "We want to study in Ukrainian!" Citizens passing by enter into a polite dialogue with the picketers.

Even in a nightmare, Kiev students of the 1970s (of which I was one) could not have foreseen this situation. I recall how once our student wall newspaper suddenly disappeared. Its content was absolutely innocent. But, to its misfortune, a short-sighted artist had portrayed a Zaporozhye Cossack in wide trousers and with a forelock of hair (on a shaved head)—that was regarded as a political error. I can still recall that our dean at the time harshly told us green first-year students: "Whoever goes to T. Shevchenko's monument on 22 May will leave the university the next day." Of course, we bypassed the monument to the Kobzar (many years later we found out that this terrible "date" was the anniversary of the arrival in Ukraine of the coffin containing the poet's body from Petersburg). There were rumors that some first-year students had been expelled from the university for "nationalism." "Nationalist" was a terrible word. Even more terrible than "dissident." Those who spoke in Ukrainian other than in classes were regarded by their classmates with surprise and wariness. Our general secretary triumphantly proclaimed that soon our passports would say simply "Soviet" under the category of "nationality."

All that actually happened. And it would not hurt to recall the asphyxia of past years before pinning labels on today's students.

The person who organized the pickets at Kiev Polytechnic Institute is a member of the Ukrainian Student Union (USS), which was formed last December. Today the union numbers about 2,000 students throughout the republic. Of course, not all students share the goals and tasks of that organization. Whereas the USS is considered a radical organization in Ukraine's eastern regions (one has even heard the assessment that "the USS is RUKh in miniature"), students in the western regions, on the contrary, reproach the USS for "centrism" and excessive cautiousness. The Ukrainian Student Union is only one formation in a whole kaleidoscope of student organizations. The USS has joined the Ukraine Student Federation with the rights of a collective member; the federation includes the Student Brotherhood (Lvov), the Left Front of Independent Students (Dnepropetrovsk), Vilna Khvylya (Odessa), and many other associations and fronts. The Lvov members of the confederation are probably the most experienced and tested "fighters." They are working to bring about Ukraine's national and spiritual revival through actual deeds: the restoration of historical monuments, the revival of the forgotten ancient folk potter's craft, and so forth. The Student Brotherhood is officially registered. Today it is probably the most numerous and prestigious student organization in Ukraine. Its leaders consider the establishment of an All-Ukrainian Student Union premature—the student movement in Ukraine is still too diffuse and motley.

"In general, we do not set the goal for ourselves of carrying out any sort of special actions," says Oles Doniy, a fourth-year student at Kiev State university and leader of the USS's Kiev organization. "We are an independent student trade union. And our task is primarily economic: stipends, the 100-percent housing of students from other cities in dormitories, job placement of students in the summer, contracts with enterprises, contacts with foreign higher schools."

"Excuse me, Oles, but I have heard some remarks about your organization that are not particularly flattering: a lot of political noise and little practical benefit."

"That's not surprising. A natural process of the organization's development is under way. We are not being registered, although we have appealed officially to the Council of Ministers. We do not have a bank account, and we cannot conclude contracts with organizations (and we already have several worthwhile proposals). As soon as the USS is registered, we can concern ourselves with economics. And until then—only politics."

Should students be engaged in "big-time politics," or should they be concerned only with their own purely vocational interests? In the West this dilemma is resolved by consensus within the framework of nationwide student organizations: participation in "pure politics" and membership in a party is a student's personal business, but his political predilections are supposed to take second place to his specifically student interests.

Back at the All-Union Student Forum it became clear that the radically minded students do not want to, and cannot remain apart from politics. The forum's political declaration was discussed with greater ardor than any document pertaining to the specific concerns of student life. The dam of years of silence was broken. The discontent that had accumulated among the students, who had been driven to the roadside of the political process, burst out.

"Power is not given, it is taken!" a young man from Kharkov with "burning gaze" told me. "Only active forms of protest! Strikes! Hunger strikes! All our victories rest on the bones of comrades who have been expelled from the university for boycotting the military division or protesting against compulsory agricultural work."

In this noisy mix of seething passions and general excitement, the statement that our Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov let drop has somehow been forgotten: solution of the students' material problem will take two and a half million rubles, and the country does not have that sort of money right now.

Yet there are "scissors," and they are growing. "Scissors" between the increased politicization of the students, on the one hand and the poverty of our higher education and the students' lack of social protection, on the other.

According to sociologists' data, only six percent of the republic's students believe that changes for the better have occurred in higher schools, 52 percent are dissatisfied with their financial circumstances and the equipment available to them, and 58 percent are dissatisfied with the quality of their instruction. (Student letters to newspapers' editors scream about that dissatisfaction, to put it mildly. Here is what one student from Kharkov writes: "And not long ago we set a mouse trap in our dormitory room. And in seven days we caught seven mice. No comment, as they say, is required.") According to the results of sociological surveys, in Ukraine's higher-school centers, only five percent of those surveyed believe that perestroika is fundamentally changing students' life. It is significant that the occurrence of such a small percentage of "optimists" is practically the same throughout all Ukraine's regions. The absolute majority of those surveyed are certain that the Komsomol is incapable of solving young people's problems.

Are people in the mood for consensus here? The students are prepared to fight for a radiant life and go to the barricades. Well, not to the barricades, but to a rally. An unsanctioned one. And to make demands, many of which had already been heard at the forum and been included in resolutions. And then, following the arrest of the organizers, to demand their freedom in the form of an ultimatum, picketing the ispolkom. And when some of the picketers are arrested and the rest are fined, to declare, as a sign of solidarity with their comrades, a hunger strike right on the steps of the Kiev Gorispolkom. And as a result, new administrative arrests from 8 to 15 May.

Granted, Oles Doniy avoided administrative persecutions. And he got away with organizing picketers at Kiev Polytechnic Institute only because at that time he was a candidate for deputy to the city soviet. But alas, the duration of his candidacy, and hence of his "immunity," was not long. And he does not intend to lay down his arms, and it seems that he is full of optimism.

"Everything, sooner or later, will be resolved. And there will be groups at the Polytechnic Institute with instruction in the state language, Ukrainian. But we want for the changes to happen faster, and that is why the pickets and rallies."

No one is satisfied with half-measures now. Here is an example. Not so long ago a decision was adopted to raise student stipends. A seemingly good decision, if it were not for one "but." The increase was accompanied by two little notes: it is necessary that a family's per capita income not exceed 60 rubles, and that a student have

only good and excellent marks. So you can count on your fingers the lucky ones for whom the Council of Ministers has done a favor.

Is that not why the ranks of the Ukrainian Student Union are growing?

Study of Ukrainian Language Use, Instruction

90UN2133A Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA
in Russian No 10, May 90 pp 49-51

[Article by A. Vlasenko, candidate of historical sciences: "Without the Native Tongue"]

[Text] The draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress states: "Not a single ethnic group, however small, should be allowed to lose its culture, language and unique, centuries-old identity." And further: "The CPSU supports the unconditional right of all ethnic groups to use their native tongue and to declare it the state language within the confines of its ethnic and state autonomy."

These crucial points in the current language policy stem from the leninist analysis of the ethnic language problem. The main point here is full equality of ethnic groups and languages: "no privilege whatsoever to any ethnic group or language." ("Complete Works", vol. 24, p. 118.)

The language issue has a special significance in our republic. Known poet V. Sosyura described that significance as follows: "Without its native tongue, young man, our nation does not exist."

The draft of the programmatic principles of Ukrainian CP activity stresses the need to consistently affirm the Ukrainian language as the state language and to broaden the area of its use while meeting the linguistic and cultural needs of all nationalities living on the territory of the republic.

It will be hard to implement these programmatic statements since many problems exist in the area of Ukrainian language use. The following data is from a study conducted in Kiev by a group of sociologists of the Ukrainian SSR institute of philosophy. It turned out, for instance, that only 67 percent of respondents know Ukrainian, while 15 percent read it freely, 14 percent understand it and the remaining 4 percent understand only certain words.

The forecast for the study of Ukrainian was also sad, as only 2.5 percent of first graders went to Ukrainian language day care centers and another 14.5 percent to mixed ones.

And one more thing. At a number of Ukrainian cities, a situation has arisen whereby only Russian is being used. In Donetsk, for instance, there are no Ukrainian schools. Here, we clearly see a mixture of national nihilism and the bureaucratic zeal of those who were in a rush to

achieve the proclaimed goal of ethnic confluence and therefore coldly closed down Ukrainian language schools.

The demands of social development in our country called forth the need for government protection for ethnic languages. The relevant law was passed in our republic, too. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic law "On the Ukrainian SSR Languages", based on the leninist analysis of the function of languages in a multi-ethnic union state, safeguards the legal equality of Ukrainian and Russian, and of all other languages as well, whose representatives live in the republic. The law is certain to help correct distortions in the area of Ukrainian language study.

Currently, the republic has some 20,500 general day schools. Among them, 15,600, or 77 percent, conduct classes in the Ukrainian language. Almost half of all school children are enrolled in those schools. Some 14,100 of the children's preschool facilities (60.7 percent) use the Ukrainian language.

In the past 2 years, some 250 schools and 3,000 day care facilities have been built or shifted to Ukrainian. In the near future, in every neighborhood at oblast centers and other cities, schools, classes, day care centers and groups are planned where teaching and education will be conducted in Ukrainian. This will give citizens a true opportunity to select an educational institution with the appropriate language.

The knowledge of the native language, history and culture is the necessary attribute of a true patriot and internationalist, and a distinctive feature of an educated person.

The Ukrainian language society imeni Taras Shevchenko, founded in February 1989, can make a major contribution in implementing the language policy developed by the programmatic party document and in ensuring greater diffusion and prestige of the Ukrainian language. One of its founders, Ukrainian SSR Academician V.M. Rusanovskiy, said that it is an association of people who realized that by protecting their language from erosion and their culture from becoming shallow, they raise their voice against oppression of reason and nature and fight for the just solution of social, economic and environmental problems. By protecting the Ukrainian language they defend pluralism of opinion and freedom to express it, as well as free access to the treasury of our memory.

At the same time, we must be decisive in rejecting the position of the society for ethnic-Russian bilingualism, declared scientifically unsound and politically harmful. It flies in the face of the basic needs of the development of the Soviet federation, scientific conclusions, international experience and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics law "On USSR Ethnic Languages", and is a direct departure from the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference.

The situation at a number of grassroots organizations of the society is also troubling. Various demagogues and loud mouths have wormed their way into local cells. They have subjugated them to their influence and lead them down a dead end street.

It is especially troubling that young people have fallen into the skillfully laid trap of the pseudo-patriotic debating society.

Articles of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress and the programmatic principles of the Ukrainian Communist Party activity in the area of meeting linguistic and cultural needs were received with approval by the entire Ukrainian public, since we are witnessing a rise of interest to the native tongue among Soviet Ukrainians living outside the UkSSR. According to the 1979 census, there were 5.5 million of them, including 658,000 in the Russian Federation, 898,000 in Kazakhstan, 561,000 in Moldavia, 231,000 in Belorussia, 109,000 in Kirghizia and 114,000 in Uzbekistan. Among them, over 2.5 million consider Ukrainian their native tongue.

It should be noted that in the 1920s and 1930s much attention was paid to meeting the ethnic needs of Ukrainians. In areas where they lived in large groups, such as Siberia, Kazakhstan and Trans-Caucasus, ethnic territorial districts and kolkhozes were organized and Ukrainian schools opened. During the Stalin era, all of this came to an end.

Only perestroika and the socialist renewal of Soviet society have made full realization of the ethnic and cultural needs of Ukrainians outside the republic possible. Thus, in Moscow, where over 200,000 Ukrainians reside, classes and courses of the Ukrainian language, history and culture have been set up and a Ukrainian Sunday school established.

Ethnic cultural associations foster the spread of the Ukrainian language and culture. The Moscow society of admirers of Ukrainian culture, "Slavutich", headed by twice Hero of the Soviet Union cosmonaut P.R. Popovich, is well known thanks to its activities. Similar associations have been set up in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Contacts between cultural and educational organizations in the republic and Ukrainians outside the republic have been revived. On the decision of the Ukrainian SSR government, a Ukrainian cultural and education center is being built in Moscow. The Ukraine sends 161 different periodicals, with a circulation totaling over 1 million, to the fraternal republics.

At the same time, many problems remain unresolved. On the Kamchatka peninsula, the Sakhalin island, in Kazakhstan and in Moldavia, there is an acute shortage of Ukrainian language textbooks, dictionaries, collections of songs and theater plays for amateur groups, recordings of Ukrainian language lessons, etc.

The international association of Ukrainian scholars, founded in June 1989 on the initiative of scholars from various countries, will help disseminate the Ukrainian language and introduce Ukrainian culture in the international community. It consists of independent national cells and draws on the scholarly potential of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and other Ukrainian research centers the world over.

Much attention is paid in the Ukrainian SSR to the study of the Russian language. Undoubtedly, it remains the official language and will be used as means of interethnic communication by the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The draft notes that in carrying out ethnic and language policy we should take linguistic trends among the population into account, since all Soviet republics are multi-ethnic, complex units. In the Ukraine, for instance, some 52 million representatives of over 100 ethnic groups reside. Ukrainians comprise an absolute majority, or 37.4 million. The share of other nationalities is as follows: Russians 11.3 million, Jews 488,000, Belorussians 440,000, Moldavians 324,000, Poles 219,000 and all others over 1 million. Those ethnic groups are unequally distributed in different regions. More than half of all Jews, for example, live in Kiev and Odessa, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk and Vinnitsa oblasts. Moldavians are concentrated mainly in the Odessa and Chernovtsy oblasts, Poles in Zhitomir, Khmel'nitskiy and Lvov oblasts, Hungarians in Zakarpatskaya Oblast and Bulgarians in Odessa and Zaporozhye oblasts.

Given this diversity of ethnic composition, we must develop a network of educational institutions. The republic has 123 Moldavian schools, 68 Hungarian schools and 2 Polish schools. In the past 2 years, over 700 courses have been set up for non-Ukrainians to study their native language, the necessary curricula and study and methodological reference materials prepared and published and teachers selected. In addition, radio stations have been set up broadcasting in Bulgarian and

Greek. Broadcasts in Moldavian and Hungarian have become regular. Periodicals now come out in various ethnic languages.

Amateur theater activities have grown considerably. Over 2,000 folk performance groups have been created. Ethnic and cultural societies of Poles, Jews, Hungarians, Turkic-speaking nationalities, Greeks, Bulgarians and others have emerged.

They do much that is useful. For instance, the Polish cultural and education society, in less than a year of its existence, has sponsored a history symposium dedicated to the 45th anniversary of the Polish armed forces, the book fair "Books Bring People Together", a show by the Kiev artist V. Zaslavskiy titled "Krakow, the Sister City", the literary reading "The Fraternity of Literatures Is Our Wings", a Polish film festival and a literary soiree dedicated to the memory of the famous Polish poet Adam Mickewitz. With the society's assistance, schools and classes to study the Polish language have been set up in Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Kiev and Khmel'nitskiy.

We have inherited a sad legacy from the period of arbitrary rule and lawlessness. A pressing issue in the Ukraine is to restore justice with respect of Crimea Tartars. Much is already being done to more fully satisfy the consumer and cultural needs of the Crimea Tartar population.

A new sovkhos "Agrarnyy" has been established in Pervomayskiy Rayon, Krymskaya Oblast, to give them residence and work. Some 20 amateur theatrical groups now exist, with repertoires containing folklore and professional works. Nearly 40 schools offer 80 voluntary enrollment classes in the Crimea Tartar language, and in 14 classes it is part of the required curriculum. Reference books "Native Tongue", "Reading Selections" and the Crimea Tartar-Russian dictionary have been published. This year, the oblast newspaper began publishing a supplement and there are broadcasts in the Crimea Tartar language.

Copyright: Izdatelstvo "Radyanska Ukrayna", "Pod znamenem leninizma", 1990

Prison Crime Statistics, Conditions Examined

90UN2211A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 25, 23-29 Jun 90 p 6

[Commentary by Yu. Khitrin, et al: "Save our Souls: As of 1 May 1990 Corrective Labor Institution Held 700,000 Convicts"]

[Text] The corrective labor policy conducted in our country has not produced positive results. The state of affairs in this realm can be rated negatively.

Yu. Khitrin, a member of the board of the USSR Procuracy and member of the International Committee Against Torture, spoke of this at a press conference at the USSR Procuracy.

Our corrective-labor legislation is extremely harsh in comparison with similar laws in democratic states. This has prevented us from signing a number of extremely important international documents which are based on humanitarian standards.

In many regions of the country one can observe the very same attitude toward convicts as in the time of GULAG [Corrective Labor Camps Main Administration].

In 1989, upon representation of procurators of 130 special procuracies, 303 employees of corrective-labor institutions (ITU) who violated the law were fired, and 22 subjected to criminal liability. Two-thousand-seven-hundred-fifty four convicts were released from their cells and punitive isolation lock-ups.

But this problem has another aspect as well. Society has been stunned by crime of the most severe type. As a result, the most dangerous criminals are concentrated in the "far-off places": 70 percent have been convicted of serious crimes; of these, 100,000 are murderers and 70,000 are habitual criminals. Thirty percent of the convicts are psychological deviants, and one in four requires treatment for alcoholism or narcotics addiction.

It turns out that the age group with the greatest criminal tendencies is 25-55, or 68.7 percent of the convicts; next is the group up to 25 years old, or 27 percent.

Of those convicted in the past, 54.4 percent were workers and only 7.7 percent kolkhoz members. White-collar workers comprise only 3.2 percent. This states unambiguously in which social sphere the crisis of society is expressed most boldly.

Of those given administrative punishment in 1987, 16,000 convicted once again of murder, rape and other serious crimes.

The corrective-labor system turns out to be just as susceptible to all the social manifestations in society. Today, just as "on the outside," hunger strikes, strikes and political meetings are quite common.

The greatest increase in crime in the colonies was noted in 1989: there were 312 murders, and 528 cases of severe bodily harm.

Attacks on ITU employees and military servicemen have significantly increased: there were 77 hostage-takings, in which 300 criminals took part. One-hundred-seventy-seven people were taken hostage, including 83 women. There were casualties on both sides.

Instances of mass disturbances were noted, brought about by protest on the part of the majority of the convicts against the terror waged by the "criminals in the law" and the arbitrariness of the administration. Such events took place recently in Dnepropetrovsk and Chelyabinsk.

The aggravation of inter-ethnic relations in society have found expression in similar conflicts in the places of incarceration.

More than 90,000 liters of alcoholic beverages, up to 2,000,000 rubles, and 130 kg of narcotic substances are confiscated in the colonies every year. All these, of course, are objects to be bought and sold, along with equivalent "forbidden" pleasures. Liquor, money and narcotics penetrate the barbed wire not only with the aid of relatives and visitors, but also by military servicemen and free laborers.

Information from the USSR Procuracy:

"The conditions for serving one's punishment and preliminary confinement do not altogether meet the sanitary and hygienic standards; this applies especially to investigative isolation cells (Nearly 40 percent of them require urgent repairs and reconstruction). One convict in eight suffers from tuberculosis."

The disease rate in the ITU is 17 times higher than for the USSR as a whole, and the mortality rate is 10 times as high. The AIDS situation is more favorable. Only eight carriers of the virus have been revealed. All convicts are subjected to testing.

The financial state of the ITU is just as complex as its legal and social state. The average monthly wages of the convicts amounts to 156 rubles: of this 78 rubles goes to the state treasury; 22 rubles are deducted for food; 3 rubles go for clothing and kit; part is subtracted for legal statements, and the convict is left with about 25 rubles. And the convicts receive only one-tenth of this sum.

Information from the USSR Procuracy:

"In 1989, 115,400 convicts had wages of up to 70 rubles; 83,500 did not work for various reasons. One in four convicts does not cover the expenses for his keep, and 36,000 have been deprived of the means of compensation for damages. Revenues from convict labor (1.5 billion rubles) are almost 250 million rubles less than the state's expenses for maintaining the ITU."

Convict labor productivity is lower than the national level by almost a factor of two. Even now, the ITU is several hundred million rubles in debt to the state.

Humanization of the legal sphere has led to a reduction in the number of persons held against their will. The USSR Finance Ministry reacted in a flash: several thousand controllers (and these are, as a rule, women) were dismissed; about 20,000 officers were demobilized, and postings were reduced twofold. Wages of ITU employees are very, very low.

There is one employee for every 100 convicts, whereas in Switzerland, which is well-equipped in this sphere as well, there are two employees for every convict. At the same time one must acknowledge that our "clients" are far more dangerous and inventive than their Western "colleagues."

The problems of the ITU are beyond the purview of many of the organs of power, to include the government. None of them bears responsibility for the results of the correction of the convicts.

A. Petrov

Commentary of a Jurist:

The tasks of our criminal justice system are: punishment for the act, re-education by special regimen, and prevention.

But there is also a fourth goal: to protect society from a person dangerous to it.

Unfortunately, we have neglected this final task, and punishment has gone the route of liberalization. Data from last year are characteristic: Out of 2.5 million crimes, nearly one million remain unsolved. That is, those guilty of committing them have not been exposed and are living among us. Nearly 40,000 criminals known to the law-enforcement organs are "on the run." Of those against which cases are brought to trial and who are convicted, only 36.5 percent are sentenced to confinement.

Our society has learned neither to effectively re-educate in special institutional conditions, nor to protect itself from its non-law-abiding fellow citizens.

Therefore the problems of the corrective-labor institutions are—part of the hard-to-solve problems of all society.

V. Prishchep, Col-Justice,
Senior Assistant, Main Military Procuracy.

Vandals Arrested for Desecrating Monuments in Ukraine

90UN2124A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
22 May 90 p 3

[Article by V. G. Sinyukov, Ukraine SSR first deputy procurator: "Democracy Means Legality, First and Foremost"]

[Text] Lately cases of negative sociopolitical manifestations have become more frequent in certain of our republic's oblasts. As letters to the mass media attest, instances of the desecration of monuments and mockery of state

symbols arouse particular indignation among citizens. What sort of measures are the law-enforcement agencies taking in this connection? Are charges being brought against guilty parties? V. G. Sinyukov, Ukrainian SSR first deputy procurator, answers these questions.

Unfortunately, some citizens interpret the development of democratic processes in society as permissiveness and freedom to engage without restraint in various outrages and mockery, including mockery of the people's memory and of state symbols. Naturally, such actions are not only immoral but illegal. In the case of such lawbreaking, the law-enforcement agencies take the actions provided by law, and guilty parties are held liable as stipulated.

The procuracy in Kobelyakskiy Rayon, Poltava Oblast, has initiated and is investigating a criminal case involving I. I. Gagan, a resident of Lvov Oblast, who, after arriving in the village of Radyanskoye to take part in the construction of residential buildings, on the night of 6-7 May 1990, out of hooligan motives, destroyed a bust of Lenin and tore down and destroyed a Ukrainian SSR flag, for which he was arrested.

Criminal charges are being brought against citizens V. P. Savchuk, Yu. I. Andreychuk and A. M. Goshiy for desecration of a monument to V. I. Lenin in the settlement of Otyni, Kolomyyskiy Rayon, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast. The latter two have been arrested.

Similar crimes have occurred in certain other oblasts, as well. In this connection, it is necessary to recall once again that such actions are punishable under criminal law. The same criminal penalties are applied for the desecration of monuments as for hooliganism, for which punishment is provided in the form of the deprivation of liberty for up to five years. According to Art 187.2 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code, actions connected with mockery of the state emblem or flag entail liability in the form of deprivation of liberty for two years, or corrective work for the same period, or a fine of up to 200 rubles.

We should all remember that an inseparable condition of the formation of a state based on the rule of law is the strict observance of laws by every person. The development of democracy and glasnost should be reliably protected by the law.

Ukrainian Procuracy on Economic Losses From Crime

90UN2156A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 30 May 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy"]

[Text] The Collegium of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy discussed the status of procurators' supervision of execution of legislation aimed at fighting offenses in the economic sphere.

It heard reports by the city of Kiev Procurator V.I. Shevchenko and the Rovno oblast Deputy Procurator

V.K. Nikitenko, as well as explanations by First Deputy of the Ukrainian SSR Minister of Trade V.S. Timofeyev and Deputy Chairman of Ukoopspilka [Ukrainian Union of Cooperative Organizations] G.P. Ushkov.

It was noted that misappropriations, manufacturing of poor quality products, violation of contractual obligations, upward distortions of results achieved and abuses in the trade sphere and at cooperatives are still fairly widely spread in the Republic, which causes large losses to the State. Losses from misappropriations, shortages and economic mismanagement were equal to R244 million in the agroindustrial complex, R17.5 million in the Ukoopspilka system and R5.3 million at Mintorg URSR [Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Trade]. Upward distortions of results achieved and distortions of accounting reports were revealed at over 10,000 projects. Enterprises have undershipped products worth over R2 billion. Economic sanctions for manufacturing poor-quality products were applied to 1,500 enterprises.

Increased speculation, violation of rules of retail sales and cheating of buying customers cause serious concern. Over 30,000 such facts were revealed in 1989. The number of abuses in cooperatives is not decreasing. These negative phenomena create social tension.

Mismanagement in equipment utilization, including imported equipment, and railcar demurrage cause considerable economic losses. At the beginning of the year,

there were almost R3 billion worth of excess stock of uninstalled equipment, and enterprises paid R27 million for railcar demurrage. At the same time, a large number of business managers are not taking necessary steps to recover the losses from the perpetrators.

Last year procuracy organs had uncovered and protested over 15,000 unlawful legal acts in the economic sphere. On procurators' demands, administrative, financial and disciplinary actions were taken against 98,000 violators of retail trade rules. Claims worth R45 million were filed in courts against the perpetrators of losses the State had suffered. Law enforcement organs took legal actions against approximately 20,000 perpetrators.

In order to eliminate causes of and conditions for violation of law in the economic sphere, the Republic's Procuracy has made representations to the Gosagroprom [the USSR State Agroindustrial Committee], Ukoopspilka and Mintrans URSR [Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Transportation]. At the same time, the Collegium has demanded that oblast and transportation procurators strengthen the supervision of law observance in the national economy, in each specific case raise questions of calling perpetrators to account, and react keenly to actions of those business managers who do not exercise proper departmental control and do not ensure safe-keeping of people's property.

Measures to Combat Chernobyl Aftermath

Europe Offers Assistance

90UN2131A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Notice by the Information Department of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers: "Help is Coming"]

[Text] The Chernobyl tragedy is not leaving indifferent a growing number of people today both at home and abroad.

The European Parliament recently adopted a resolution on an offer by the countries of the European Community of emergency medical and food aid to our republic's people, as well as the Ukraine and several oblasts of the RSFSR, which suffered as a result of the Chernobyl power plant accident. In its resolution, the European Parliament proposed to the EC Commission and the EC Council of Ministers that substantial resources be allocated for medical and food aid to the residents of the three republics exposed to radiation.

Belorussia has already received humanitarian and technical assistance from Austria, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Switzerland, Cuba, the USA and Japan. The GDR, Greece, Denmark, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Norway and several international organizations offered humanitarian assistance in April-May.

Korosten Residents Voice Dissatisfaction

90UN2131B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
27 May 90 p 1

[Article by V. Kukoyashnaya, Zhitomir oblast, "Questions Remain"]

[Text] On May 23, a joint session of the Korosten City Soviet of People's Deputies and plenum of the Ukraine Communist Party gorkom reviewed the issue "On the Course of Realizing Measures to Eliminate the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES and Tasks to Improve the Ecological Situation in the City."

Guarantee that residents' health is out of danger. How are children to be cured, where are the vacation passes? Why are doctors "fleeing" from Korosten? The city is catastrophically empty—how can the hemorrhage of labor be stopped? Introduce a coefficient of extra pay in unhealthy conditions. The people of Korosten posed these and other demands and questions to representatives of ministries and agencies from Kiev, headed by the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, K.I. Masik.

Locomotive depot party secretary I. Khiznyak reported on the tense situation in the Korosten department of the YuZZhD [Southwest Railroad]. The railroad workers have already created their own strike committee, and are calling on city enterprises to follow their example.

The participants of the joint session of the city soviet and the plenum of the party gorkom were not satisfied with their meeting with the officials from Kiev. They displayed complete mistrust of the explanations of O.A. Bobyleva from the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health and V.K. Chumak, director of the center for economic problems of nuclear power of the Institute of Nuclear Research of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.

The decision of the session of the city soviet and the Korosten party gorkom plenum admitted that the questions remain open.

A more detailed report of this session will be published later.

Ukraine Adopts Decree on Resettlement

90UN2131C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
27 May 90 p 3

[Notice by the Information Sector of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers: "For Those Resettling from the Chernobyl Zone"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the Ukrsovprom [Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions] have adopted a resolution on the provision of housing to citizens subject to additional relocation from the territories exposed to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident.

This decision mandates that the Kiev, Zhitomir, Rovensk and Chernogiv oblast executive committees must provide for the resettlement of people from those areas within certain deadlines. Already this year, all citizens from the area of high contamination will be relocated, as well as families living in the urban villages of Narodichi in Zhitomir oblast and Poleskoye in Kiev oblast, and having minors or pregnant women. During 1991-1992 all families shall be relocated, with their consent, from those areas where the radiation contamination is 15 curies per square kilometer and above.

Necessary assistance shall also be provided to families with minors, pregnant women or persons who for medical reasons should not live in population centers listed in the appendix to the decree of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the Ukrsovprom of December 14, 1989, No. 315, with subsequent annexes, and who have expressed the desire to relocate themselves independently to other regions of the republic.

The decree establishes the procedure for providing housing to citizens being relocated from the areas subject to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl accident. They are to be provided living quarters, as a rule, in housing of the state and public housing stock, in population centers specially defined for this purpose, or those in which they choose to live in other population centers of the republic.

Persons independently resettling to other areas of the republic, except Kiev and resort areas, are provided

housing according to a special list without waiting in line. Persons moving from population centers where the radiation contamination is 15 curies per square kilometer and more to the living quarters of their parents, children, grandchildren, or brothers and sisters as members of their families are provided housing for common residence without waiting in line, if the relocation results in a need for improved living conditions according to the law.

If they choose, relocating citizens, instead of receiving living quarters in state or public housing, can join housing construction cooperatives without waiting in line, receive land for individual housing construction and bank credits, and acquire construction materials and a house as personal property.

A number of other benefits are also provided for those resettling.

Second All-Union Conference on Chernobyl Clean-Up Held

90UN2177A Kiev *SILSKI VISTI* in Ukrainian
10 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by reporter for "VESTNIK CHERNOBYLYA" (Chernobyl), M. Khriyenko: "About Zone With No Secrets (Notes From Second All-Union Conference on Results of Eliminating Consequences of Accident at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant)"]

[Text] Unlike the previous Conference in November of 1988, this one was unclassified. Almost 400 representatives of Soviet Union's scientific organizations took part in it. Director of a recently created S&T Center of scientific production association "Pripyat" Doctor of Technical Sciences Ye.V. Senin addressed the plenary seating on the first day of the Conference. He summed up principal results of the work on eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident during the last period and reported of the creation of the S&T center in the 30-km zone and of its structure and objectives.

Then the Conference participants continued their work in six Sections. It was noted at a meeting of the first Section, "Medico-Biological Aspects of the Chernobyl AES Accident", that four years of investigation make it possible to conclude that the number of diseases of the gastrointestinal tract and the bone and muscular system among those who participated in the elimination of the consequences of the accident has been increasing. In the future not only will this lead to decreased working ability, but it could possibly result in a shorter life span. This is why a paper by M.N. Savkin, laboratory manager, the Biophysics Institute, who was trying to convince the medical Section participants that it was possible to reevacuate certain settlements in the Chernobyl zone, generated a sharply negative response.

Forty-five scientific papers were presented at the "Agricultural Radiology" Section. Using concrete data, scientists proved convincingly that strontium and cesium content in plants' root systems increases every year. Scientists have already done a lot of work to develop a methodology for removing radionuclides from organisms of farm livestock and obtain clean meat and milk. It was emphasized that rumors on strontium contamination of the Dnieper water were strongly exaggerated. Scientists contended that at present strontium contamination of lands irrigated by the Dnieper water is impossible. A lot of speakers warned that exaggeration of the radiation hazard can have a ruinous effect on the condition of cattle breeding in the Ukraine, because ideas had been voiced already on the need to sharply reduce meat and milk-producing livestock.

How can forest help the poisoned land? Several papers presented in the "Radioecological Aspects of Consequences of the Accident" Section were devoted to this subject. Scientists think that forestation of the 30-km zone will help control migration of radionuclides. Unfortunately, one has not yet developed special intensive forestation equipment that can reliably protect personnel from radiation. Program "Lyes" [Forest], which was developed in Moscow, has yielded very little in this respect. To correct the situation, scientists proposed to create a Forest Radioecology Department at the NPO [scientific production association] "Pripyat" S&T Center. They stated unanimously that at present the radioecology direction must develop as a priority line.

Candidate of Biological Sciences, Manager of the Laboratory of Ecological Monitoring of AES Regions, the Evolutionary Morphology and Ecology of Animals Institute, AN SRSR [USSR Academy of Sciences], I.M. Ryabov reported that wild boar livestock in the 30-km zone increased eightfold and there are almost 2,000 wild boars now. Rare bird species, in particular, two black swan couples, have shown up. But the number of mooses and roes has decreased, compared to the preaccident period. An increase in poaching is the reason.

Conference participants were alarmed by a report by a group of scientists on the probability of strontium release from the cooling pond of the former 4th power-generating unit into the river of Pripyat. But a real sensation was a speech by Doctor of Geological Mineralogical Sciences, associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Non-Metallic Mineral Resources, USSR Ministry of Geology, V.O. Kopeykin. He said that in 1987 a large amount of a so-called "ginger" forest was cut down and buried in sand soil. Thousands of cubic meter of pine contaminated with radioactive dust found themselves in primitive sepulchres that had been built without cleaning clay shields. Last year a sepulchre near the Yanov rail station was dug up, and marsh water from it was taken for analysis. In addition to strontium, cesium, cerium, ruthenium and antimony, large amounts of plutonium, a radioactive element that is very dangerous for human organism, were also found in the water.

What is the current situation in the "sarcophagus"? This problem was the subject of a speech by Deputy Head of the S&T Department, Integrated Expedition, Atomic Energy Institute imeni I.V. Kurchatov and Head of the Nuclear Fuel Research Laboratory K.P. Checherov. According to Konstantin Pavlovich, 96 percent of nuclear fuel remains in the former 4th power generating unit of the AES. Its condition is being controlled. Studies that have been conducted do not corroborate the probability of a chain reaction. But the "sarcophagus" condition does cause anxiety. It is a temporary structure, and it is only expected to retain its strength and leak-proofness for a few decades. It seems that the way out is to build a "sarcophagus No 2" that would stay for several centuries. But construction of a colossal weight structure can cause soil movement...

A speech by Deputy Director of the NPO "Pripyat" S&T Center A.S. Miroshnichenko was very sharp. "Our country", Aleksandr Sergeyevich said, "met the Chernobyl tragedy technically disarmed and therefore was forced to plug the fracture in the destroyed reactor room with live people. And today one has to reap the fruits of our technical backwardness and rake out the very last dime from the treasury. Because they understood the extremely complicated situation our people have found themselves in after the Chernobyl AES accident, scientists and designers from Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, Leningrad, Alma-Ata and other cities pledged to develop new special technology and equipment in the shortest possible time. But their effort is like pouring water into sand. The thing is, model units for decontamination of abrasive materials, territories, metal hardware, vehicles, rolled metal stock and pipes, which we received for testing, are wallowing as deadweight and rusting in the open air. New units are on their way, but theirs will be the same fate". The scientist continued: "To see for oneself the indifference of the NPO "Pripyat" management, one should pay attention to the draft of our association's five-year plan prepared for Minatomenergoprom [USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry]. In this document only R198 million out of R2.5 billion, or approximately 8 percent, is appropriated for all types of S&T work, including 2 percent for new hardware development. Even in industrially backward countries one would not find such ratios. And with this we want to solve successfully problems of catastrophic consequences of the world-scale nuclear accident".

Talking to our reporter after the Conference had adjourned, Head of the Department of Radioecological Monitoring, Laboratory of Environment and Climate Monitoring, Gosgidromet SRSR [USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology] and AN SRSR, V.O. Vetrov said: "Exchange of scientific information with our colleagues during the Conference will help us develop a concept of the future fate of the contaminated land. One must find ways to close all ways for radionuclides to get into the Dnieper, from which 35 million people drink water. But if all the data that scientists have already collected will be laying in the NPO "Pripyat"

"remote drawer" without practical implementation, we will resemble passengers of a kid's train that is running on closed-loop rails. We should hope that the recently created NPO "Pripyat" S&T Center will be very helpful in the implementation of knowledge that has been accumulated".

... I would like it very much to write an optimistic report from the Chernobyl zone, so that the readers of the newspaper and my children in Kiev read it and everybody stops worrying during these hard times. But I cannot do it, because I do not have optimistic facts.

Goskompriroda's Vorontsov on Environment as National Security Issue

90WN0235A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 31, 4 Aug 90 p 3

[Interview with Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, people's deputy of the RSFSR and chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Environmental Protection, by correspondent Armen Gasparyan: "National Security: Reordering of Priorities"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Nikolay Nikolayevich, in one of your speeches you spoke of the national security system. What did you have in mind? What relation does this have to your agency, which is supposed to protect us from the danger of ecological disasters?

[Vorontsov] I agree that it might sound odd that I, a biologist, am discussing this topic. National security has traditionally implied national defense interests, but the new international policy has brought about considerable changes in priorities, and direct proportional expenditures on defense are decreasing. This is happening not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Eastern Europe, in the NATO countries, and in countries belonging to other defensive military alliances. A second component is what is commonly referred to as state security: the protection of state borders and the struggle against smuggling. Finally, a third component is the protection of the life and rights of citizens....

It seems to me, however, that this definition of national security is already clearly obsolete. The triad must be supplemented.

[Correspondent] Why?

[Vorontsov] Because we are not fighting any wars. The Afghan venture is over, thank God. Today no one is dying in a war, and I hope no one ever will again. During the perestroika years there has been a change in attitudes toward the issue of the military threat: Whereas in the past people, especially the elderly who had lived through a war, prayed only for the absence of war, now few people are seriously afraid that our country will be attacked. Therefore, the shortage of defense is not claiming any victims. Victims are more likely to be claimed by the surplus of troops, by carelessly and

incompetently conducted maneuvers, by a lack of discipline, and what I would call the lack of proper interrelations in the army.

When people talk about state security, they often argue that a single intelligence agent can ruin the efforts of a whole army. But does this argument "work" today?

As far as the maintenance of law and order in the country is concerned, many people are genuinely alarmed: After all, people are dying! We are almost the world leader in traffic fatalities, for example. It is also disturbing that people are dying in peacetime in confrontations with a social or ethnic basis. All of this is true.

Let us compare the number of deaths in all of these spheres, however, and we will see that there have been virtually no losses resulting from border violations. There have been losses in the military sphere, but they have been due to defective equipment and a lack of discipline.

What is it that is responsible for the highest percentage of losses? What are the main causes of death?

First of all, there is the shortage of funds for public health care, the flawed structure of public health services, and poverty.... Second, people are dying from environmental pollution. Third, people are dying from a lack of propriety, including people in the army. All of the drunkenness and fights are the result of our shocking ignorance of the proprieties.

[Correspondent] In other words, when you speak of national security, you are referring to all aspects of human ecology, and the situation in this area is absolutely alarming. Take, for example, the problem of longevity. It has long been a matter of concern to many international organizations: UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization. In our country, however, it was rarely seen as a matter of concern, except by experts in this field. Now we have learned a great deal, and the knowledge has horrified us. Have there been any changes at all in our country in human priorities?

[Vorontsov] In terms of longevity, the Soviet Union ranks 50th among the 52 countries where these statistics are kept. We have seen the average lifespan in Japan, which was never a long-lived country, increase to the point at which Japan is now the world leader in this area. In our country, on the other hand, we have seen a catastrophic increase in the number of children with birth defects. Furthermore, we must not forget that only 10 percent of the new mutations are dominant—i.e., they show up in the first generation—whereas the overwhelming majority of hereditary mutations are recessive and will affect our grandsons and great-grandsons. For this reason, all of the comments to the effect that we are exaggerating the dangers of life in, for instance, the Chernobyl zone—when people say that normal children are being born even there—are unconvincing, to put it mildly. We already know that the rising rate of birth defects in some regions is directly related to the pollution

of the environment. In the same regions we find oncological diseases, which are also the result of chromosomal damage, but in this case it is not the sex chromosomes that are involved, but the so-called somatic chromosomes—the cells of the epithelium, lungs, liver, kidneys, etc.

We have so much to say about conversion, but how should it be perceived? I think it should be viewed primarily within the context of all national security interests, including public health, ecology, and propriety.

[Correspondent] I might just be talking in clichés, but we have always viewed the human being as a "cog" in the machine. His interests have always been obscured by the interests of industry and defense.... Today we are talking about the redirection of "defense surpluses" into peaceful channels, and what could be more peaceful than ecology? How can conversion be turned into a reality? After all, before we can understand the need to direct the savings on defense spending into ecology, we must have a complete understanding of the state of affairs in the country. We must know what is going on here. Could you give us at least a brief overview of our ecological problems?

[Vorontsov] In my opinion, there has been a great deal of talk about conversion, but no serious conversion program. After all, if one of the plants of the Ministry of Defense Industry which once produced first-class missiles begins producing not just pots and pans, but even refrigerators, this still cannot be qualified as conversion. With this kind of pseudo-conversion, we can only lose the exceptional skills of the design and construction engineers and workers employed at defense enterprises.

Genuine conversion must follow a different pattern. Obviously, parliament must have unrestricted data—I repeat, unrestricted—on the financing of the first three areas of national security: defense and its industry, state security, and internal affairs organs. Besides this, there are indirect costs. Most agencies have separate financing which is not included in the total figure. Parliament must determine which part of the budget should remain directly at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense Industry, the Ministry of Defense, and so forth. It must decide how much the state security system should receive and how much law enforcement agencies should receive. The rest should be redistributed among the other, previously neglected spheres of national security—public health, ecology, and propriety. When these spheres have money, they can act as clients, and then they can decide which areas need a single shot and which need a whole course of injections without any pressure from above.... If the Ministry of Health has money, it can choose its own suppliers and supplies.

The same is true of ecology. When the conversion program was announced, Goskompriroda [State Committee of the USSR for Environmental Protection] was literally under siege by the general designers of our most

respectable firms. There were days when I had appointments with up to three general designers in my office, and each thought that money had been allocated for ecology and that he could get a good contract.

But we have no money. Of course, we could use the old directive method to exert pressure on the Council of Ministers for an order to produce water purifiers instead of submarines.

Once again, however, there would be no competition.

Everything should be done differently. Today we are spending around 9 or 10 billion rubles on ecology, spreading the funds around to various agencies. Each year, however, soil erosion alone costs us 16 billion rubles. And the total figure is frightening—losses amounting to 43 billion rubles.

I think that even these estimates, however, are only half as high as the real figures. Some people believe that we are losing 90 billion rubles a year. And what is the state allocating for ecology? If we count the cost of reforestation, just 12 billion rubles.

All right, maybe the state does not have this money, but then give us at least part of the funds made available by conversion. Give us, for instance, 5 billion rubles and let us decide what we need first. Should we produce more personal dosimeters for the Chernobyl zone? (Current plans call for the production of 25,000, but I feel that we need 50 million, so that a dosimeter will be as common as a thermometer in each home, and so that each adult and teenager in the Chernobyl zone will have one of his own. At the present rate, the program will take more than 50 years to satisfy our demand for dosimeters.)

If we could get at least 5 billion, we could announce a contest and invite the institutes and design bureaus of the Ministry of Defense Industry to develop the necessary devices. Production quantities would be our own decision.

This is how I imagine the coordination of national security with conversion. We must not simply take money away from military branches and deposit it in a mythical state budget. This will simply ruin existing enterprises. Instead of this, we must give all of those responsible for what should be called the national security system under these new conditions a chance to act autonomously.

The cuts in the army are another problem. Why has no one considered the possibility of enlisting some of the people connected with, for instance, the chemical forces to organize a paramilitary but strictly peaceful civilian emergency response ecological service? Then the people who have been trained to observe military discipline and to operate technical equipment could reach the site of an accident quickly, determine the source of chemical or radiation pollution quickly, and take immediate measures to localize the danger and minimize the damage. The possibility of service in these ecological units as an

alternative to military service probably warrants consideration. This is extremely important. After all, we hear reports of accidents almost every day.

[Correspondent] Accidents are a matter of special concern. They occur everywhere. But ecological teams usually would not have access to territories occupied by military troops. Would accident monitoring and prevention be out of the question in this case?

[Vorontsov] This is true. In this context, law enforcement agencies have extremely serious complaints about our army units. Our inspectors are not allowed to enter those areas.

I was in Murmansk Oblast recently and I saw how weak the monitoring system is in territories occupied by military installations. The Soviet Government and Goskompiroda agencies have virtually no control over much of the oblast. We simply do not know what is going on there. And this is not simply a matter of health hazards. Keeping these areas restricted also gives rise to social problems. People stop trusting the government. They might live right next to a testing ground which is absolutely safe in the ecological sense, but because they know that everything is a secret in our country, they fly into a panic over nothing. These problems could be solved simply by allowing an environmental inspector to conduct an inspection of the testing ground and make his report. Either he will report that everything is in order and that there are no health hazards in the area, or he will report a potential threat which can then be eliminated before it causes problems.

The withdrawal of our troops from Eastern Europe led to the submission of extremely sizable financial claims—some of which might not be valid—in connection with the ecological state of the territory of military bases. In some cases, local authorities have estimated that the cost of all the structures that were built (I repeat, it is possible that a great deal has been overestimated) cannot compensate for the ecological damage. As prominent geochemist B. Moldan, the Czech Republic's environmental minister, said when he was interviewed by THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE on 25 July 1990, the cost of the ecological clean-up of each of the 150 military bases has been estimated at 2 million dollars on the average—i.e., around 300 million dollars in all. It is possible that our experts will arrive at different estimates, but the evidence of the regrettably careless treatment of nature everywhere is not in our favor. You and I will be the ones who have to pay for this.

And do we act any better at home? After all, this is just a collection of unregulated states within a state. Events sometimes take a shocking turn. We are often upset by the mounting national feelings in the Baltic zone. Last December, however, there was an oil leak on one of our military bases there. The base did not take the trouble to clean up the leak before it reached tragic proportions. As a result, a fire broke out on the river. Local inhabitants

watched the river burn. Does this attitude toward nature enhance the prestige of our garrisons?

Here is another example. I sent a letter to Comrade D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, to protest the military district's decision to build a road through the Badkhyz natural preserve. This is a unique preserve, established in 1941 in the wilderness near Kushki. In peacetime, some military engineers got the bright idea that a highway should run right through the preserve. The minister has not answered my letter yet. We ordered the Turkmen committee for environmental protection to prohibit the construction. Incidents of this kind prove, however, that many of our comrades simply have no idea of how important environmental protection is to the life of the country, its future, and the peace of mind of the population....

[Correspondent] It would be difficult to argue with anything you have said. All of these are national security issues from the standpoint of the country's internal interests, however. What is the connection between these and the interests of international cooperation in the protection of the environment? What is the world community discussing today?

[Vorontsov] A special UN session on economic cooperation, particularly in reviving the economic growth of developing countries, was held this April and May. At this session and at many other meetings of this kind, such as the conferences of the environmental ministers and foreign ministers of the European countries, the term "stable development" was the subject of a great deal of discussion—not just development, but stable, self-sustained development.

[Correspondent] What is it, this "stable development"?

[Vorontsov] This is development which is stable in terms of economic and ecological indicators. It is obvious that economic development with no consideration for ecological factors is unstable. The miser has to pay twice. The English delegates at the UN session, for example, said that development which is not stable will lead eventually to total degradation.

[Correspondent] We often say that economic problems cannot be solved without some concern for ecology. Could the secret lie in the reverse pattern? In other words, maybe we cannot solve ecological problems without economic development.

[Vorontsov] Economic development will be essential. When a state spends 1-3 percent of its gross national income on the needs of nature, it is actually only perpetuating the existence of bureaucratic, fiscal, and other structures. In other words, it can only obtain information—and not even complete information—about what is happening in the country. Obviously, there is not enough money to prevent the degradation of the environment. When a state allocates around 5 percent of its national income for ecological needs, on the other hand, it has the ability to maintain the existing state of

the environment. In other words, not enough to improve it, or enough only to improve it on the local level. In our country this percentage would not be high enough, because things have gone too far in some locations

The resolution of problems connected with ecological disasters and zones of severe ecological damage would require the allocation of over 5 percent. Funds would be needed for the Chernobyl zone or the whole left bank zone of the Ukraine, including the Donbass—Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Zaporozhye, Mariupol.... This is a huge blotch of pollution! Little is said about this in our country, but these regions are comparable to the Chernobyl zone....

I went to some of these cities. Krivoy Rog..., when I saw it, was simply ruined. It is difficult to even imagine how polluted the city is. Nevertheless, they came up with the idea of building the Krivoy Rog Mining and Enriching Combine (and it is an expensive project—over 2 billion rubles). The USSR Gosplan State Board of Experts' report was negative, but hundreds of millions of rubles had already been spent there. They say it would be a pity to lose this initial investment, but if we continue the project, we will add another 2 billion rubles to the total, and the plan envisages recoupment only after 53 years. I ask you, are we rich enough to build this combine? Especially if it causes the deterioration of an already tragic ecological situation?

The Americans, for example, spent around 2-3 billion dollars to normalize the situation in Pittsburgh, the center of the steel industry. They spent around 17 billion dollars to clean up the Great Lakes. These sums were over and above the 5-percent budget allocations.

Here is an interesting detail. I was talking to Madame Birgitta Dahl, Sweden's minister of the environment, and she said that she had seen "Little Vera" and was absolutely delighted with it. It was the best ecological film she had seen.

It begins, as you know, with a panoramic shot of the city (the movie was made in Mariupol), with endless rows of smoke-emitting pipes and chimneys. The Swedes felt that the joyless life of the heroes portrayed in the film was the result of ecological stress. It was a surprising interpretation of the movie.

[Correspondent] I have another question. The crisis of faith in our society extends not only to certain structures of public administration or directorates of industrial enterprises which have discredited themselves by telling lies, omitting some details, and concealing many facts, but also to many other government organizations, such as sanitary and epidemiological stations and other inspectorates. Today, it seems to me, it is unlikely that anyone would express complete trust in the experts of the ecological appraisal service or the inspectors of environmental protection committees. How can this trust be restored?

[Vorontsov] It seems to me that people in our country still trust Goskompriroda. We are still a new organization and we have not used up all of the trust that was extended to us.

How can trust be restored? I will begin by going far back into the past. I spent the whole war in an evacuation facility in Yelatma, a village in Ryazan Oblast. I went to school there. We had an old teacher, Petr Petrovich Petrov.... This teacher made a great impression on me. The only time he did not come to school was the day he received the news that his son had died.... He had been a teacher in the local school for the children of the gentry. He began teaching in 1898. I arrived in the village without any books and I began visiting the homes of the local intelligentsia, the homes of local teachers and physicians, and in each home I always saw barometers and thermometers hanging on the wall, and the Brockhaus and Yefron Encyclopedic Dictionary or the Granat Encyclopedic Dictionary, the volumes of World Geography, and volumes of the Russian classics in the bookshelves. I think that these people, even if they had suffered in the 1930's, had a sense of inner confidence, and they were highly respected, these venerable old villagers.

For this reason, I think that if a young man, who has graduated from the public health department of a medical institute, arrives in a village as a person who is paid an adequate salary and who wants to occupy this position not just for the purpose of getting good sausage from the meat plant he inspects, if he respects himself and does not take bribes but lets the society provide him with this sausage, everything will be different.

Instead of presenting diplomas to future rural doctors or teachers in solemn ceremonies, we should give them a library worth at least a thousand rubles. The absence of this kind of library in the home of the rural doctor or teacher costs the state much more.

[Correspondent] As far as I know, no one abroad even dreams that an environmental inspector can be bribed. As a rule, these are highly moral individuals who deserve the public's absolute trust. Furthermore, they work in close contact with the public, and all conflicts with businessmen are settled in the courts. And there is never any need for them to make any requests of any chiefs whatsoever. But in our country.... This is, after all, a question of propriety, conscientiousness, and integrity, a question of the professional duty of people. The situation with regard to professional duty in our country is not very good.

[Vorontsov] But this is also connected with the lack of proper relationships between individuals in our country. Where does the profession of, for example, the chief, the man with the briefcase, still exist? In our country. Unfortunately, Goskompriroda agencies were also staffed in line with this principle. It was simply that there were chiefs who had to be placed in jobs. Some of them are committed to the cause and do good work. Others are

simply serving time and waiting for retirement pensions. Work in the sphere of environmental protection and in the sphere of cultural propriety should be highly prestigious and respected, and should not be viewed as banishment for transgressions. It should command a high salary. But money is not the only concern, because there are higher salaries in business.... The important thing is respect. Children should take pride in the fact that their father is, for example, a fish inspector, and not because the fish inspector can get extra fish on the sly or sell it illegally.... They should be proud of him because he is a man fighting for the national interest and the interests of nature. And what about the forest ranger? The history of forest rangers dates back to the time of Peter the Great in our country. Forest rangers were highly respected individuals.... Or what about mining engineers?...

[Correspondent] You have explained what the national security system is. Does this kind of system exist in the developed Western countries?

[Vorontsov] In the FRG, for example, at the suggestion of Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher, 15 civil defense posts were included in the national ecological and meteorological monitoring network. Now the creation of special UN ecological forces—so-called "green helmets" (along with the "blue berets")—is the subject of enthusiastic discussions. This raises an important point: If international ecological forces of this kind are created, then there should also be internal ecological forces. There is no good reason for us to fall behind in this area.

[Correspondent] The public is playing a more important role in environmental protection today, but the members of ecological movements are sometimes distinguished by a great deal of noise and passion and few realistic programs. Of course, public opinion is extremely important, but this is a job for experts and professionals, and it requires a precise ecological policy. What are its distinctive features?

[Vorontsov] In general, ecological policy, in contrast to economic policy, is distinguished by its long range. We have to realize this and be emotionally prepared for this kind of prolonged effort. Economic plans are usually discussed seriously for 10 years in advance, but ecological plans have to cover 50 or even 100 years. Discussions of the problem of the Aral Sea, for example, have to address three different sets of undertakings of varying duration. In the first 5 years we would have to solve the problem of a supply of drinking water and uncontaminated food in a variety of ways. These would include the distribution of clean drinking water in plastic bottles, the establishment of temporary water lines exclusively for drinking water, and the use of special distilling and water purification equipment. The second concern would be a supply of ecologically clean produce for the population of the cis-Aral zone, which is suffering from severe pollution by pesticides, high rates of infant mortality and hereditary defects, etc.

Then there would be a middle-range program to convert the drained territories of the Aral Sea, where the silt is mixed with salt and pesticides, into meadowland. This would entail changes in the entire structure of farmland, the entire structure of agriculture in the whole Central Asian region. In other words, we would have to give up the single-crop system of cotton farming, pesticides, and irrigation ditches. This is a barbarous way of using water: It leads to colossal losses of water and the salinization of the soil. We must make the transition to drip irrigation. This will take at least 10-15 years.

Then we have to determine the best way of using the meadowland. They say there is a meat shortage now. If there is a meat shortage, we must find out what Uzbekistan can export, so that it can feed its population with the proceeds from exports. Then we have to restore the bottomland forests. These are the woods growing along the Amu Darya, the Syr Darya, and all of the rivers.

Finally, the long-range program will cover the next 75-125 years. It will include the restoration of forests on all the mountains encircling the Turana basin. These are forests of walnut and juniper in the Western Tyan-Shan. And juniper takes a long time to grow. This will include the forests of the Western Pamiro-Alay and the forests of Kopetdag. The program will make it possible to trap moisture and stop soil erosion on the slopes.

[Correspondent] What will happen to the Aral Sea? Is there a concrete plan to save the dying sea?

[Vorontsov] We have announced a contest. The winners will be paid prizes of up to 40,000 rubles, with a grand prize of up to 10,000. What is more, foreigners will be paid the prize money in hard currency. We want to collect many proposals so that we can suggest some new ideas.

I can definitely say that it would be wrong to return to an idea which is still being promoted—the old idea of redirecting the flow of the northern rivers. Why? Because the Tajik Republic is second only to the RSFSR in water resources in the Soviet Union. All of the sources of the Amu Darya are located in Tajikistan. If we use these

water reserves intelligently, we can solve the problem. The main reason, however, is that this is an inter-republic, inter-regional problem. It can only be solved within the context of the whole group of Central Asian republics. Besides this, I have to say quite frankly that the program cannot be carried out without some changes in demographic priorities. We can show respect for the traditions of Islam, but without changes in demographic policy in these republics we will not be able to solve any ecological problems. In addition to everything else, we also have to remember that all kinds of social upheavals frequently occur in highly overpopulated regions. We are well aware of this from our observations of animals. We must not be afraid of applying confirmed laws of nature to human society. Yes, these are extremely overpopulated locations, with covert and overt unemployment....

Mistakes in demographic policy, and not only in ethnic policy, particularly the outrageous overpopulation of the Fergana Valley, are one of the causes of social conflicts. We must not forget that all of these situations were artificially created. People were forced to move out of the alpine valleys to work in the cotton fields. There are so many abandoned villages in Central Asia, with the remnants of alfalfa fields and orchards, with abandoned cherry trees with trunks a meter and a half in diameter, from which tons of fruit could be picked....

In short, the resolution of each problem will require a definite policy and the consideration of all factors and all components. Above all, it will require money. We can only hope that the new interpretation of "national security" and of its international and internal aspects will help us get this money. Global security will depend just as much on the ecological security of our huge country as on its international and military policies. We are part of a single biosphere, in which humanity is only one component. During the years of perestroika we laid the specter of nuclear war to rest, the Berlin Wall came down, and the Iron Curtain disintegrated. Now it is time to consider a new view of global and national security issues. The protection of nature, the protection of human health, and the preservation and development of man's spiritual world are the most important elements of the new view of national security issues.

**ERRATUM: Russian Cultural Association
Renamed, Registered**

In JPRS-UPA-90-047 of 3 August 1990, in the article entitled "Russian Cultural Association Renamed, Registered" on pp 72-73 the name of the association should read

"Yedineniye." All occurrences of the names "Unity" and "Yedinstvo" should read "Yedineniye" except in paragraph 2, line 2: "its original name was Yedinstvo [Unity]."

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9 Oct. 1990